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ABSTRACT
Comparative study of the U.S. and Japanese construction
industries was carried out. First, the reasons why Japanese
construction firms have not penetrated foreign construction
markets although Japanese goods have been very successful
recently were discussed. Then, the construction industry in
both countries were compared thoroughly on the assumption
that Japanese construction firms will enter the U.S.
construction market. This comparison revealed facts which
formed the basis of the discussion of how Japanese
construction firms might enter the U.S. construction market.
Areas of special interest include characteristics and
differences of the construction industries and firms in both
countries, advantages and disadvantages of such
characteristics and differences for Japanese construction
firms in entering the U.S. construction market, barriers and
incentives for Japanese construction firms, strategies and
methods to be employed by Japanese construction firms, and
implications of the involvement of Japanese firms for both
the Japanese and U.S. construction industries.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose and Scope
Until its upward climb was halted by the oil crisis of
1973, Japan's real gross national products (GNP) had been
growing at an average annual rate of 10% since the early
1950s. Even though Japan's economy was damaged
significantly and its forward momentum was weakened by this
crisis, Japan eventually succeeded in pursuing its economic
achievement. As a result, in the 1980s Japan, with a
population only half as large as that of the United States,
has been producing almost as much steel and as many
automobiles as the latter, and innumerable Japanese products
and goods have been flooding world markets.
Japan has also succeeded in penetrating the U.S.
markets for automobiles, cameras, calculators,-TV sets,
video recorders, semiconductors, microchips, and many other
products. Compared to the tremendous amount of export
products, the export of services has been at quite a low
level.
One typical example of such services is construction.
Construction firms, especially general contractors, sell
knowledge and skills for developing projects of buildings
and facilities, rather than provide manufactured products.
In comparison to $64 billion in commodity export to the U.S.
in 1984, Japan's construction export to the U.S. amounted
only $0.6 billion.
One of the goals of this thesis is to analyze the
reason why Japan could penetrate the U.S. markets with its
products and goods, but not with services, especially,
construction. The study will be based on a historical
analysis of Japan's entire industrial structure. This
background will provide the perspective for the main goal of
this study, an analysis of the fundamental conditions which
have shaped Japan's construction industry.
Before clarifying the main goals of this study, it is
useful to review briefly the position of the construction
industry in Japan's economy.
Japan's domestic construction industry has been a
cornerstone of its national economy. Growing along with
the rapid expansion of its national economy, Japanese
construction almost equalled the amount of new construction
put in place in the U.S. in 1980. However, since the
second oil shock in 1980, Japan's construction industry has
fallen into the doldrums. The value of total construction
has been decreasing even in nominal terms. For this
reason, Japanese construction firms began to search quite
seriously for markets in overseas.
Originally, Japan's major overseas construction arena
was located mainly in South East Asia and the Middle East.
However, the steep downturn in oil prices and demands forced
OPEC countries to abandon many new projects. This caused
an abrupt shrinkage in the Middle East construction market.
Furthermore, the shrinkage in the Middle East market
also forced other international contractors into the South
East Asian market, the traditional arena for Japanese
contractors. This exacerbated competition in South East
Asian countries.
Accordingly, Japanese firms had to find new markets in
areas other than the Middle East and South East Asia. The
United States, Australia, and China recently were perceived
as promising markets by Japanese general contractors. The
U.S. construction market was especially attractive because
it is one of the world's largest and healthiest markets.
In 1984, the U.S. became the most important country in
terms of the amount of construction contracts won by
Japanese contractors, jumping up from the seventh place in
1982 and the fifth place in 1983. However, because of the
relatively small amount of overseas construction performed
by Japanese contractors compared to the amount of domestic
construction performed in Japan, the value of the contracts
won in the U.S. still remained below $700 million in 1984.
This study compares the U.S. and Japanese construction
industries to determine the potential of the U.S.
construction market as a possible main arena for Japanese
general contractors through the end of this century.
In this context, some of the most important questions
include: What are the characteristics of each country's
construction industry? How do they differ? How would
these characteristics and differences affect Japanese'
contractors entering the U.S. construction market? Would
they be advantages or disadvantages for the Japanese
contractors? What factors in the U.S. construction
market would be either barriers or incentives? What
would be available and not available there? All of these
issues will be considered in light of the fundamental fact
that up to the present, Japanese contractors have n6t
penetrated the U.S. market.
1.2 Thesis Layout
In Chapter 2, the overall structure of Japan's industry
will be discussed at the macro-level, in order to identify
the underlying reasons why the Japanese construction
industry, as well as other service industries, has not
penetrated foreign markets, including the U.S. market so
far. The fluctuations of industrial development in
Japan will be reviewed historically in relation to Japanese
government policies, patterns of growth, and
industrialization. Also, in support of this analysis,
historical changes in Japan's-trade structure and in the
financial structure of firms in each industry will be
discussed. During this argument, not only will the
underlying cause of why Japanese construction industry has
not penetrated foreign markets be investigated but the
position of the Japanese construction industry in Japan's
entire industrial structure will also be identified.
In Chapter 3, the construction industries of the U.S.
and Japan will be closely reviewed from a micro-economic
point of view. Their compositions, markets and financial
structures as well as cost structures will be examined in a
comparative manner.
Next, other independent issues which may possibly
become barriers or incentives to the entry of Japanese
contractors into the U.S. construction market, such as the
labor unions, bidding system, subcontract system, coverage
of services, characteristics of management styles will be
considered.
Finally, issues of technology and research and
development will be reviewed. Because these issues are the
keys to the future of the construction industry in both
countries, a comparative analysis will be made of the
construction industry and other industries as well as of the
U.S. and Japanese construction industries.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, Chapter 4 will
analyse the feasibility or conditions for feasibility for
Japanese contractors to seek constructions market in the
U.S.. Then, based on this analysis, some points of
strategic planning for Japanese contractors to penetrate the
U.S. construction market will be suggested.
First, general entry modes and strategies will be
outlined, depending upon types and characteristics of
industries and economic situations surrounding the
industries.
Next, after summarizing the advantages and
disadvantages of Japanese firms compared to their U.S.
counterparts and also looking briefly at inroads made so
far by Japanese firms in the U.S. construction industry,
analysis will be made of the most reasonable and appropriate
entry strategies and modes on a segment-by-segment base of
the market. Then, recommendation will be made based on
this analysis.
Chapter 5 will summarize the findings and conclusions,
then consider the implications of Japanese involvement in
the U.S. construction market from the points of view of
both U.S. and Japanese construction industries.
Finally, points for further study will be suggested.
1.3 Note of Caution
Because of the comparative nature of this thesis, it is
very useful to state all values in one monetary term, e.g.
in the U.S. dollar. However, it is quite difficult to
translate Japanese Yen to U.S. Dollar due to the
fluctuations in the Yen-Dollar exchange rate since it moved
into the floating system in 1970.
In order to cope with this problem, the following
measures were taken in this study rather than leaving
Japan's various values in Yen terms;
1) Although there has been much controversy over what
is the most appropriate rate in evaluating the value of Yen
against the U.S. Dollar, the rate of $1=Y220.54 was taken in
this study. This rate was the average of the exchange
rates in 1981 according to Economic Planning Agency of Japan
and was used in Survey of Construction Statistics 1985 by
the Ministry of Construction, Japan.
Furthermore, because this exchange rate is located
nicely at the point of mean value in the historical time
series of the Yen-Dollar exchange rates after 1970, it does
translate value in Yen term to values in Dollar term
precisely enough as a whole.
2) During the course of completing this thesis, there
occurred a dramatic change in the Yen-Dollar exchange rate,
that is, the appreciation of the value of Yen as well as
other currencies against the U.S. dollar, triggered by the
September 22, 1985 decision of the major industrialized
countries to intervene in currency markets against the
dollar. This measure was generally seen as a temporary
measure to defuse protectionist sentiment. At present,
with the continuing movements of appreciating Yen against
Dollar, the rate is approaching $1=Y170 as of the end of
March, 1986, a big movement, compared with $1=Y205 as of
September 22, 1985.
However, because of uncertainty in the future movement
of the exchange rate and the difficulty of deciding the
truly appropriate exchange rate, this recent development
will be neglected here. The aforementioned exchange rate
of $1=Y220.54, that safely translates values, will be used.
CHAPTER 2
Japan's Industrial Structure Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the position
of the Japanese construction industry in Japan's industrial
structure and, by doing so, to provide the basis for the
main points to be made in the following chapters.
The first half of this chapter will be devoted to
analyzing the reasons why the Japanese construction industry
has not penetrated overseas markets while Japanese
manufacturers have been successful in doing so. Answering
this question will establish the characteristics of Japan's
industrialization and explain the accompanying fluctuations
of Japanese industries after World War II. Based on this
information, the latter half of this chapter will provide
clearer pictures of the changes in Japan's industrial
structure, and to identify the position of construction
industry in it.
2.1 Why Japanese General Contractors Have Not Penetrated
Overseas Markets
One of the best ways to understand why Japanese general
contractors have not penetrated overseas construction
markets, including the U.S. construction market, is to
review the history of Japan's industrial evolution since
slightly before World War II from a macro-economic point of
view.
It is necessary to go back so far first because the
economic system which was created during the pre-war and
wartime eras was directly transferred to the postwar
economic system and wartime technology was reborn in the
postwar industries.
Secondly, the Japanese government did recognize
manufacturing industries as Japan's future leading
industries through export immediately after World War II and
this recognition determined the direction of Japan's
industrial policies as well as the role of the construction
industry as the supporter of manufacturing industries in
Japan's domestic economy. That is, the government
perceived that the market for the construction industry
would be only in Japan. This perception was also common
among Japanese people and firms. The fact that the
construction industry has not been involved in the main
stream of the government's industrialization policy was one
of the reason why Japanese contractors have not penetrated
overseas markets.
In addition to this, a couple of other explanatory
factors may be considered. First, Japan experienced
significant destruction of people's dwellings in the major
cities and of the nation's infrastructure during World War
II. To large extent, this determined the course taken by
Japan's post-war construction industry, which was focused on
immediate reconstruction of the nation. In addition, the
size of the pie and growth in the size of that pie
representing the domestic market was enough for Japanese
contractors to prosper in the domestic market.
Furthermore, the nature of Japanese contractors as building,
civil, or building-civil contractors, not as plant
constructors, restricted their capabilities in gaining
overseas market because many overseas projects fell in plant
construction.
Lastly, the delay in finding their way in overseas
markets because of the aforementioned reasons made Japanese
contractors fall behind other countries' contractors in
forming the capacities needed for the overseas market, e.g.
accumulating knowledge and experience, establishing a system
of collecting information, fostering capable managers and
management techniques, cooperating among contractors
themselves and with subcontractors, financial institutions,
and government organizations.
These factors combined to creat a situation in which
Japanese general contractors did not quickly enter overseas
markets, but stayed in the domestic market. Later when they
desired to compete in the foreign markets, they had already
fallen into the situation that precluded their involvement.
In this chapter, these issues will be reviewed in detail.
2.1.1 Reason 1: Recognition that Manufacturing Industries
were the Key Industries for Japan's Economic Recovery
Transfer of Bureaucratic Control to The Post-War Era
Japanese government's authority over the industries was
established in wartime and continued into the post-war era,
mainly under the control and guidance of MITI (Ministry of
International Trade and Industry). Following the February
26 Incident of 1936 (1), there was no political power in the
government strong enough to question or oppose the Army in
Japan and the Army gradually increased its control over the
entire economy by enacting several measures before taking
complete control between 1940 and 1945.
In 1937, the Temporary Capital Adjustment Act and
the Temporary Export-Import Commodity Measures were
approved. The former law imposed controls on the
establishments of firms, capital increases, payments, bond
flotations and the borrowing of long-term funds in an
effort to direct them on a priority basis into
munitions industries. The latter enactment gave the government
the authority to control the production, processing,
trading, holding, and consumption of commodities and raw
materials related to imports and exports.
Furthermore, in 1938, the National General Mobilization
1. The coup d'etat attempted by a right-wing army group. In
the course of suppressing this attempt, the army seized
control of the government, then of Japan entirely.
Law was passed, ordering the conscription of labor,
determining wages and other working conditions, and
directing the production and distribution of goods.
The Army-controlled government had two major
organizations to perform actual control over the entire
economy. Controls over industries were performed by the
Commerce and Industry Ministry (corresponds to MITI in the
post-war period) and control over financial institutions
weas performed by the Bank of Japan. These two
institutions played remarkable roles in performing the
industrialization of Japan.
Through legal means and through industrial and
financial controls by bureaucratic organizations, the army-
controlled government turned the industrial capacity of the
entire nation towards military purposes though eventually
defeated. Small Japan felt itself capable of fighting with
the giant United States in a very short period. This
wartime experience convinced the government that
bureaucratic control of industry could effect the post-war
reconstruction of Japan's entire economy.
Post-War Government's Recognition of Industries
Although light industries, such as spinning and
textiles, supported Japan's economy in the 1930s, the
foundation of Japan's heavy and chemical industries were
established in the course of developing the munitions
industries prior to and during World War II. Following
the war, the government realized that Japan was so resource-
poor that industrialization would be crucial and that the
focus of the economy would have to be shifted away from the
light industries to heavy and chemical industries.
However, because the large portion of the industrial
facilities located in major cities were destroyed by air
raids in 1944 and 1945, the post-war government's most
urgent goal was to reconstruct them destroyed as quickly as
possible while using the surviving facilities. The
government recognized that the important task of
reconstructing the nation's facilities would depend on the
construction industry. Therefore, this government policy
can be expressed as industrialization through manufacturing
industries, with the support of the construction industry.
This manufacturing-oriented policy remained the fundamental
perspective throughout the postwar period regardless of what
manufacturing industries were most important at any given
time.
Government's Manufacturing-Oriented Policy
Until now, only manufacturing industries have been
recognized as a driving force in Japan's economy. In
addition, with the increasing importance of export-oriented
industries, the fostering of manufacturing industries which
sell commodities has been recognized as the government's
main objective. The construction industry, which sells
services, has never recognized as an exporting industry by
the Japanese government or MITI.
Government's (MITI's) policies and structural changes
in Japanese industry after World War II fall into
the following four periods.
Phase 1 (1945-1954) was the period of reconstruction of
Japan's
economyusing the surviving industrial facilities.
Simultaneously,
MITI developed its manufacturing-oriented policies.
Phase 2 (1955-1964) was the period of initial rapid
growth after post-war reconstruction. This was the
period of widespread innovation, in which MITI encouraged
the building of plants for raw material processing
industries such as steel and chemicals, and basic
industries to support them such as power supply, coal, and
marine transportation.
Because these industries were fundamentally capital
intensive, MITI's implementation of large-scale of capital
investment used means such as 1) special tax measures, 2)
low interest loans by quasi-governmental financial
institutions (Japan Development Bank, Japan Export Import
Bank), 3) import restrictions through duties and non-tariff
barriers, 4) coordination of investment in plants and
equipment, and 5) promotion of economies of scale and
improvement of production efficiency through mergers and
other combined production.
Phase 3 (1965-1973) was the period of composite
structural changes. During the first half, machine
industries (broadly defined to include transportation,
electrical, and all other types of machinery and equipment)
began to form the core of Japan's industrial structure.
Foreseeing this movement, MITI implemented the Machinery
Industry Promotion Provisional Measures and the Electronic
Industry Promotion Provisional Measures. These two laws
were issued in late 1950s and divided the basic machinery,
common parts, and export machine industries. These
industries were supplied with special funds by the
Development Bank.
The second half of Phase 3 saw changes induced by
efforts of the business world to solve environmental
problems by relying on technological progress acheived by
machine industries.
Phase 4 (1974-present) has been the period in which
rapid progress is being made toward becoming a less energy-
consuming, more high-tech-oriented society. This shift was
prompted by the oil crisis and by significant advances in
electronics and other high technologies. To support this
change, MITI established the Special Electronics Industry
and Special Machinery Industry Provisional Measures in 1971
and the Special Machinery Information Industries Promotion
Provisional Measures in 1978.
All of these measures as well as various governmental
means of promoting exports in Japan were intended to support
Japan's economic advances and to construct comparative
advantages over foreign competitors through the export of
specific manufactured commodities at different times.
Although in this period service industries have been
emerging as an equally important economic power since the
late 1960s, this phenomenon will be detailed later in this
Chapter.
2.1.2 Reason 2: Construction Industry as the Reconstructor
of the National Economy, the Nation's Infrastructure
and the People's Welfare
Japan experienced the destruction of residences and
businesses, factories and facilities, and of its
infrastructure, e.g. roads, railroads, power systems, port
facilities. Rebuilding all of these was the immediate
task of the construction industry.
However, Japanese government also perceived that the
infrastructure in Japan originally was much poorer than that
of other advanced countries. The next task, after
reconstruction the destroyed facilities, was to rebuild
nation's infrastructure.
These tasks directed by government policy inevitably
determined the structure and function of the postwar
construction industry to large extent. The volume of the
tasks was so large that the construction industry grew at
much higher rate than GNP for a long time. The
construction industry did not need to look into overseas
markets until Japan's economic growth was weakened
following the oil crisis of 1973.
During these periods, the state of the Japanese economy
shaped the construction industry in several ways.
Following the turbulent reconstruction period immediately
after World War II, Japan's economy experienced the so-
called "Iwato Keiki" (Iwato Economic Boom) (1), a big
economic advance between 1958 and 1961. During this
time, a significant amount of technology was introduced from
advanced countries into Japan. Large-scale investment in
of plants and equipment were made. Figure 2.1 shows the
steep upward curve of construction contracts for
manufacturing industries around this period.
Although plant and equipment investment became dull for
a while after 1962, due to a superfluity of industrial
facilities, a large-scale public construction investment,
(1) This economic boom lasted from July 1958 to December
1961. The economic boom originated from plant and
equipment investment. People called the period, "Steel
calls steel", or "A boom calls a boom". The word "Iwato"
came from the name of a god in Japanese ancient myth.
The implication of "Iwato" was that the boom was larger than
"Jimmu Keiki", prior economic boom of 1945-1957, named after
the first emperor. (Source: 50)
(2) This policy, offered by the Ikeda Cabinet in early
1960s, was attempt to double people's income in ten years by
maintaining an annual growth rate of GNP of 7.2% between
1961 and 1970. (Source: 50)
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was made. In equipping facilities and infrastructure
related to the Tokyo Olympics of 1964. Simultaneously,
the "Income Doubling Plan" (2) stimulated the
economy and as a result, considerable construction
investment was made by non-manufaturing industries in the
form of investment in offices, stores, and amusement
facilities, and by private households. (See Figures 2.1 and
2.2)
During this period, construction investment from non-
manufacturing industries had already surpassed that from
manufacturing industries. For example, in 1964, the
former investment was more than double the latter.
Housing investment in 1965 was more than 50% about that in
1963 (See Figure 2.1).
In the period of recession around 1965, investment in
housing and public investment works sustained the entire
construction industry. The public investment was
especially significant, accounting for 38% of the entire
construction investment compared to 22% in 1963. (See Table
2.1 and 2.2)
The total amount of construction in 1973 was 4.2 times
as large as the level of 1966. Instead of manufacturing
industries, public and private sector investment activated
the national economy and construction investment in this
period facilitated by the government policy of "The Land Re-
development Plan". Among the private sectors, steel,
chemical, and automobile, and private households especially
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Table 2.1: Construction Investment in Japan, 1960-1983
($ billion)
Total Public Priv. Civil Bldg House Non-
Const. Const. Const. Const. Const. Const. House
Year Invest. Const.
1960
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
11.37
20.39
24.83
27.07
30.75
38.51
46.21
56.79
66.36
75.62
97.32
129.99
133.28
143.39
155.06
175.93
193.55
217.29
224.34
227.71
227.03
217.56
3.92
7.81
8.76
10.38
11.81
13.68
16.00
18.38
22.26
28.14
34.50
39.35
47.38
53.78
55.38
68.25
79.72
85.16
88.95
92.01
91.94
88.65
7.45
12.58
16.06
16.68
18.94
24.83
30.21
38.41
44.10
47.47
62.82
90.64
85.90
89.62
99.68
107.68
113.83
132.13
135.39
137.70
135.08
128.91
4.38
8.22
8.73
10.13
11.93
13.84
16.41
19.60
22.29
28.08
36.26
43.58
49.96
53.80
57.25
71.05
79.30
85.79
91.85
96.31
97.38
93.00
6.99
12.18
16.09
16.93
18.83
24.67
29.80
37.19
44.06
47.53
61.06
86.41
83.32
89.60
97.81
104.87
114.25
131.50
132.49
131.41
129.65
124.56
3.20
6.10
7.60
9.24
10.70
13.54
16.30
20.28
23.70
25.81
34.00
46.96
47.12
54.14
59.75
63.48
67.53
74.67
72.63
71.22
72.98
67.02
3.79
6.08
8.49
7.69
8.13
11.13
13.50
16.91
20.36
21.73
27.06
39.46
36.20
35.46
38.06
41.39
46.72
56.83
59.86
60.19
56.67
57.54
Source: 48
Table 2.2: Construction Investment in Japan, 1960-1983
(Percentages of Components)
Total
Const.
Year Invest.
1960
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Public Priv.
Const. Const.
34.5
38.3
35.3
38.4
38.4
35.5
34.6
32.4
33.5
37.2
35.4
30.3
35.6
37.5
35.7
38.8
41.2
39.2
39.7
40.4
40.5
40.7
65.5
61.7
64.7
61.6
61.6
64.5
65.4
67.6
66.5
62.8
64.6
69.7
64.4
62.5
64.3
61.2
58.8
60.8
60.3
59.6
59.5
59.3
(Percent)
Civil Bldg. House Non-
Const. Const. Const. House
Const.
38.6
40.3
35.2
37.4
38.8
35.9
35.5
34.5
33.6
37.1
37.3
33.5
37.5
37.5
36.9
40.4
41.0
39.5
40.9
42.3
42.9
42.7
61.4
59.7
64.8
62.6
61.2
64.1
64.5
65.5
66.4
62.9
62.7
66.5
62.5
62.5
63.1
59.6
59.0
60.5
59.1
57.7
57.1
57.3
28.2
29.9
30.6
34.1
34.8
35.2
35.3
35.7
35.7
34.1
34.9
36.1
35.4
37.8
38.5
36.1
34.9
34.4
32.4
31.3
32.1
30.8
33.3
29.8
34.2
28.4
26.4
28.9
29.2
29.8
30.7
28.7
27.8
30.4
27.2
24.7
24.5
23.5
24.1
26.2
26.7
26.4
25.0
26.4
Source: 48
Table 2.3: Construction Investment,
Expenditure, and Private
in Japan
(Value, $ billion)
GNE PCE
Gross National
Consumption Expenditure
(Growth Rate,percent)
CI GNE PCE
11.37
20.40
24.83
27.07
30.75
38.51
46.21
56.79
66.36
75.62
97.32
129.99
133.28
143.39
155.06
175.93
193.55
217.29
224.34
227.71
227.08
217.56
152.55
179.33
209.88
248.68
294.83
320.61
359.44
411.04
503.72
600.17
660.44
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
40.01
45.82
53.26
62.43
72.67
82.09
93.34
106.81
123.77
142.02
164.56
186.96
214.06
257.22
317.29
374.02
423.73
479.68
525.57
576.16
623.28
658.03
705.13
740.65
21.72
9.02
13.62
25.23
20.00
22.89
16.84
13.96
28.70
33.56
2.54
7.59
8.14
13.46
10.02
12.27
3.24
1.51
-0.30
-4.17
17.56
17.04
18.48
18.56
8.75
12.11
14.53
22.55
19.51
10.04
12.88
12.13
9.95
7.98
7.74
6.85
5.11
3.91
14.54
16.24
17.21
31.49
13.70
14.42
15.89
14.74
15.88
13.61
14.50
14.50
20.16
23.35
17.88
13.29
13.21
9.57
9.62
8.18
5.58
7.16
5.04
Note: CI indicates "Construction Investment".
GNE indicates "Gross National Expenditure".
PCE indicates "Personal Consumption Expenditure".
Source: 58
Year
745.53
835.98
918.14
992.54
1,069.35
1,142.15
1,200.99
1,247.98
_
provided large scale investments in construction at this
time. In one year, from 1972 to 1973, the growth rate in
construction investment rose from 28.7% to 33.5% (See Table
2.3).
As a result, between 1960 and 1973, construction
investment grew at an extremely high rate, 20% annually,
compared with average annual rate of Japan's national
expenditure of 15.9% and average annual rate of personal
consumption expenditure of 15.1% (Table 2.3).
Until the oil crisis of 1973, the construction industry
had, in the domestic construction market, more than enough
jobs from different sectors as the economy developed.
During these years, it was not necessary for general
contractors in Japan to look into overseas markets at all.
For this period, the volume of overseas construction was
only $0.3 billion, less than 0.25% of the total domestic
construction (See Table 2.4).
However, the oil crisis which occurred in November,
1973 and the subsequent government policy of controlling
total demand had considerable effects on the construction
industry.
At this point several energy-related factors
sumultaneously came to bear on the construction industry:
(1) stagnation in private-sector construction investment
because of unforeseeable future, (2) a conspicuous cut in
public sector construction investment, (3) significant rise
in the cost of construction materials, (4) the subsequent
Table 2.4: Domestic Construction vs. Overseas Construction
in Japan
Total
Overseas
Construction
($ billion)
0.33
0.55
1.51
2.47
1.87
2.70
2.84
2.46
3.97
4.21
4.78
4.59
Total
Overseas
Construction as
Percentage of
Domestic
Construction(%)
0.25
0.41
1.05
1.5
1.06
1.39
1.31
1.10
1.73
1.85
2.20
Total
Domestic
Construction
($ billion)
129.99
133.28
143.39
155.06
175.93
193.55
217.29
224.34
227.71
227.03
217.56
Note: $1 = Y220.54 was used as the exchange rate.
Total domestic construction does not include
overseas construction.
Source: 47, 49
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
construction cost increase, and (5) tight control of the
money market by the government. As a result, construction
investment, both private and public, decreased in 1974 for
the first time since World War II (See Figure 2.1 and 2.2).
Although the government offered a relatively large
volume of projects in 1978 and 1979 in an effort to
stimulate the economy, the upward trend was stopped again by
the second oil shock in 1980.
After 1980, both public and private sector investment
have slowly been on a downward trend. The structure of
Japan's industry itself has changed since the oil shock.
The key industries, such as steel, chemicals,
petrochemicals, shipbuilding and other capital intensive
industries which made large investments in the early 1960s
and early 1970s became typical "structural depression"
industries (Figure 2.1). Manufacturing industries which
were still flourishing in this period were high-tech
oriented and less capital intensive industries. They did
not invest in construction as extensively as the key
industries.
Furthermore, these industries began to make direct
investments in foreign countries to maintain cost advantages
and to cope with the protectionist measures of foreign
government. Moreover, the entire economy of Japan has been
shifting toward a more service-oriented society from which a
large scale of capital investment may not be expected. The
budget of the Japanese government has been very tight
since the second oil shock. Also, the building of
private residences was interfered by the hike in
construction and land costs. The pie seems finally to
have stopped growing. All of these factors have been
constricting the domestic construction market day by day.
Its prospects at te moment were dim. This situation has
forced Japanese general contractors to seriously consider
overseas markets. Foreign contracts have been increasing
since 1974, and increased significantly after 1980 (Table
2.4). However, due to various obstacles to be mentioned in
the next section, the amount of overseas contracts remains
only 2% of domestic construction. Nevertheless, top
management in Japanese contractors are aggressively looking
at the world map and trying to determine the best possible
overseas arena.
2.1.3 Reason 3: Characteristics of Japanese General
Contractors
Although the characteristics of Japanese contractors will
be reviewed in detail in Chapter 3, one of their unique
features has a direct bearing on why they have not
penetrated overseas markets.
In the Japanese construction industry, there has been a
clear separation between the building of plant and
industrial facilities and the main stream of Japanese
construction. Construction in Japan traditionally has
included only building construction and civil or heavy
construction. Construction of plants or industrial
facilities were performed by firms other than so-called
construction firms. For example; oil refinery plants
have been designed and constructed by engineer/constructors
which originally were oil refinery firms. Similarly,
chemical plants were designed and constructed by firms which
were originally chemical firms, and offshore plants by
shipbuilding firms and heavy machinery firms.
Furthermore, due to the change in Japan's industrial
structure, heavy electric and communication firms moved into
the plant construction market as did the machinery and plant
departments of general trading firms. General
contractors in Japan have constructed only the building or
heavy construction parts of plants. For example, in
power plant projects, Japanese contractors have constructed
only the containment facilities which surround the main
power generating facilities. They have not been involved
in the mechanical engineering parts of the power plants.
In contrast, the top international contractors from
other countries have developed expertise in the design,
heavy and building construction and are also able to provide
installation, start-up, and operation services for various
plant facilities.
Unfortunately for Japanese contractors, foreign
construction projects often have been most available in
developing countries. Because these countries have been
trying to industrialize, most of their projects have
fallen into the area of industrial facilities construction.
Typical examples include the numerous oil-related industrial
facilities constructed in the Middle East in 1970s.
Japanese contractors have tried to remedy their
weakness in plant engineering and construction by forming
consortia with Japanese plant construction firms originating
from heavy industry, but the result has been disastrous.
They lost many opportunities in the overseas markets and
acquired very few projects, compared to major international
contractors from other countries.
2.1.4 Reason 4: Other Difficulties for Japanese Contractors
in Entering into Overseas Markets
Because of the reasons stated in the previous three
sections, Japanese contractors delayed entering overseas
construction markets. The delay caused secondary problems
compounding the difficulty of competition in that area:
1) Lack of experience delayed the accumulation of
,information and left Japanese contractors out of the network
in overseas countries. Therefore, Japanese contractors
accrued higher costs for investigation before submitting
bids than did other international contractors.
2) The delay left Japanese contractors and financial
institutions unprepared to cope with bonds. In
international bids, several bonds are required, such as bid
bonds, performance bonds, advance payment bonds, and
retention bonds, all of which are not common in the Japanese
economic world. Because the total amount guaranteed
sometimes reach 30 to 40% of the bid price, it is sometimes
difficult for a contractor working alone to be given bonds from
financial institutions. The Japanese government, financial
institutions, and contractors have logged behind other
advanced countries in cooperating to cope with this problem.
3) Similarly, the delay left contractors and financial
institutions unprepared for the financial arrangements which
are sometimes required in the bids submitted to developing
countries.
4) The delay led Japanese contractors to neglect to
foster management techniques or to develop personnel with
the management cability for overseas construction. In
addition to this, the genuine potential of Japanese
engineers has been handicapped by their weakness in using
English.
5) Usually, consultants play an important role in
overseas markets. After finding a project, they may
perform a feasibility study on it, develop a detailed
evaluation for financing, then help clients to prepare a
bid. In the U.S., engineer/constructors have played this
role as well as performing the construction itself. As
will be mentioned in Chapter 3, the power of consultants in
Japan is generally very weak. Only a few are capable of
working internationally. Furthermore, since Japanese
contractors are not closely allied to engineering, they are
not able to function as U.S. engineer/constructors did.
Together, the above mentioned factors (2.1.1 through
2.1.4) reveal were mixed why Japanese contractors have not
penetrated overseas markets.
2.2 Ups and Downs of Industries and Position of the
Construction Industry
In the preceding section, the relationship between the
evolution of manufacturing industries and the construction
industry was discussed for the purpose of illuminating why
Japanese general contractors have not penetrated overseas
markets. In this section, fluctuations in the importance
of Japanese industries will be reviewed to clarify the
position of the construction industry at present in Japan's
industrial structure as a whole. Positioning the
construction industry in Japan's entire industrial structure
is extremely important, because it will show the underlying
potential of the construction industry and will provide a
foundation for the discussion following this chapter.
In this discussion, changes not only in the structure
of Japan's industrial outputs but also in the trade
structure will be reviewed.
2.2.1 Ups and Downs of The Industries
World War II
Table 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 show Japan's national efforts in
military and other industrial production from the beginning
of the war in 1941 to its conclusion in 1945. Table 2.5
describes the targets for the expansion of industrial
capacity enacted in the late 1930s by the military-
controlled government. Table 2.6 and 2.7 demonstrate the
actual industrial production performed during the war.
Steel production peaked in 1943 and then began to
decline. (See Table 2.7) Production of consumption goods,
such as textiles, food products, and paper (including pulp)
had already fallen to 60% of pre-war levels by the time
Japan entered World War II; their subsequent decline was
striking. Even agricultural production broke down in
1944. The war was begun and pursued at the expense of
the people and national economy, and finally led to their
destruction.
However, World War II left Japan with the important
foundation for rapid post-war industrialization.
Table 2.8 presents data on production capacity, comparing
plant and equipment capacities in 1937 with the capacities
at the time of defeat. The chemical and heavy industries
had far more plant and equipment capacity at the end than at
the beginning of the war. The conspicuous reductions in
light industry capacity, particularly textile, were due more
Table 2.5: Industrial Capacity Expansion Targets of
The 1937 Five-Year Plan for Industries in Japan
Production
Target
Capacity
1937
in Rate of
Expansion
Automobiles(1,000)
Machine Tools
(1,000)
Steel
(1,000
Oil
(10,00
Coal
(10,00
Products
tons)
0 kl)
0 tons)
Aluminum
(1,000 tons)
Magnesium
(1,000 tons)
100
50
1,300
565
11,000
100
9
Electric Power 1,257
(10,000 kw)
Shipping
(10,000 tons)
93
Source: 50
37
485
36.4
5,556
2.7
3.8
2.7
15.6
2.0
4.8
18.0
1.7
1.9
0.5
721
50
Table 2.6: Military Production in Japan in World War
Year 1941 1942 1943 1944
Aircraft
Aircraft
Engines
Naval Vessels
# of Ships
Tonnage
Small Arms
(thousand)
Gunpower &
Ammunition
Index of Real
Growth
(1937=100)
6,174 10,185 20,185 26,507
13,022 18,498 35,368 40,274
48 59 77 248
200,860 230,724 145,760 408,118
729 440 630 827
52,342 67,461 71,574 81,324 21,279
474 659 923 1,406
Source: 50
1945
5,823
6,509
101
98,240
207
447
Table 2.7: Production Index in Japan between 1941 and 1945
(1937=100)
Year 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Agriculture & 95.1 99.8 96.3 76.2 59.3
Forestry
Rice 83.0 100.6 94.8 88.2 59.0
Mining 120.0 117.4 118.5 107.8 56.9
Manufacturing 123.1 119.6 121.0 124.2 52.7
Steel 132.0 139.5 156.1 145.8 51.8
Non-Ferrous Metals 111.4 126.1 153.2 170.2 63.2
Machinery 188.2 195.4 214.3 252.3 107.2
Chemicals 120.3 100.3 87.1 80.8 33.2
Paper & Pulp 106.3 83.6 71.5 41.4 19.5
Textiles 60.4 47.7 31.3 16.6 6.4
Food Products 78.1 69.4 57.5 47.4 31.6
Other 60.8 59.2 52.1 31.3 11.3
Source: 50
Table 2.8: Production Plant Capacity for Key Materials
in Japan before and after World War II
Production
Plants
Units Production Maximum
Plant
Capacity
in 1937
Wartime
Production
Capacity
Production
Plant
Capacity
at End of War
(Mining)
Pig Iron
Rolled Steel
Copper
Aluminum
(Chemical)
Oil Refinery
Machine Tool
Sulphuric Acid
Caustic soda
Soda Ash
Ammo. Sulphate
Super Phosphate
Cement
(Textile)
Cotton yarn
Rayon
Staple Fibers
Cotton Looms
(Other)
Paper Pulp
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 kl
unit
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 tons
100 spdl
100 lb
100 lb
units
1000 tons
Source: 50
3,000
6,500
1,200
170
2,320
22,000
4,373
380
600
1,460
2,980
12,894
12,165
570,000
451,000
362,604
6,600
8,700
1,440
1,270
4,157
60,134
6,271
723
889
1,979
2,846
9,621
13,796
570,000
813,000
393,291
5,600
7,700
1,050
1,290
2,130
54,000
5,586
661
835
1,243
1,721
6,109
2,367
88,600
184,000
113,752
1,329 705
to the wartime conversion to military production and
scrapping of equipment than to war damages. (Source: 50)
This shift in emphasis formed the basis for the heavy and
chemical industrialization following the war.
The training of engineers and workers who acquired a
mastery of their technologies in these factories also
directly prepared Japan for post-war development.
Factories that made machine guns turned to making sewing
machines; optical weapons factories began turning out
cameras and binoculars. (Source: 50) In this way, the
facilities, technology, and labor accumulated during the war
exerted a tremendous influence on the subsequent direction
of Japan's economy.
Post-World War II and the Korean War
In May 1948, the Five-Year Economic Rehabilitation Plan
was drawn up by the Japanese government, aimed at economic
recovery as well as industrialization policy. Though
the plan was implemented to some extent for a couple of
years, the achievement was insufficient to catch up with the
advanced countries. A huge trade deficit limited the
capacity for introducing the advanced technologies from
advanced countries and of importing resources needed in
industries (Source: 50).
The advent of the Korean War in 1950, led to the
solution of these problems in a mere two years. This
dramitic turn-around confirmed the validity of Japanese
government policy and virtually determined the direction of
its subsequent policies.
The effects of the Korean were:
1) The increase in world trade by Japanese industry to $19
billion, 34% of the entire amount of world trade at that
time, created a growth rate of 270% during this period.
(See Table 2.9)
2) During the course of this growth in exports,
Japan's production increased by 70%. This increase in
production was accompanied by a remarkable rise in corporate
rates of return, mainly due to rising prices. The
increase in production and corporate profit promoted a
vigorous expansion in plant and equipment investment.
3) Most important, the huge foreign exchange income deriving
from expenditures by the U.S. Army and military personnel,
called the special procurement, amounted to $590 million in
1951 and $800 million in both 1952 and 1953 (Table 2.9).
The combination of export and special procurement income
enabled Japan to import at the rate of $2 billion a year.
Key industries which depended on imports of raw materials
were able to virturally double their scales of production.
Although the Korean War had an invigorating effect on
plant and equipment investment and technological innovation,
mainly in heavy industries serving military procurement, the
Japanese government realized that inadequate capacity in
basic industries, e.g. electric power, steel, marine
Table 2.9: Economic Indicators
Korean War
Year 1949 1950 1951
in Japan During and After
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Export
($million)
510 820 1,355 1,273 1,275 1,629 2,011
Special
Procurement
Income
Import
($million)
Mining & Mfg
Production
Index
Rate of
Return on
Gross Capital
Employed
Wholesale
Price Index
Consumer
Price Index
592 824 809 597 557 595
905 975 1,995 2,028 2,410 2,399 2,471
18.2
3,230
22.4 30.8 33.0 40.3 43.7 47.0 57.5
5.1 6.7 4.2 4.6 2.4 3.6 3.6 4.5
59.3 70.1 97.3 99.2 99.9 99.2 97.4 101.7
72.6 67.6 78.7 82.6 88.0 93.7 92.7 93.0
Source: 50, 53, 60
2,501
transportation, and coal, was the bottleneck that limited
the expansion of production. Therefore, economic
reconstruction was pushed primarily in these four key
industries (See Table 2.10).
With government encouragement, these four industries
flourished during this period. They also increased their
capacities significantly following this period. The
construction industry enjoyed the considerable capital
investment of these industries.
Periods of Growth and after the Oil Crisis
Figure 2.3 shows the clear changes in domestic
industrial production outputs in Japan from 1955 through
1983. As mentioned briefly above, the years 1955 - 1964
covered the period of initial rapid growth since World War
II. In the 1960s especially, industrialization in capital-
intensive industries, such as heavy and chemical industries,
was accomplished through massive technology import and
energetic private sector investment in plants and equipment.
Outputs from these industries represent significant
portions of total output in this period. The combined
shares of the chemical and steel industries reached 21%
of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in 1960, up from 17% in
1955 while the share of the textile industry decreased from
11.7% in 1955 to 8.1% in 1960.
Table 2.10: Plant and Equipment Investment in Japan After
Korean War
(Percent)
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Steel
Marine
Transport
Electric
Power
Coal
Total for
4 Key
Industries
8.4 7.7 6.4 4.8 4.5 6.1 8.8 9.4
14.6 12.4 7.5 5.9 6.5 7.2 7.7 5.8
12.6 21.3 23.7 26.8 24.8 19.6 19.2 22.7
4.8 4.1 3.3 2.6 2.4 1.3 2.4 2.5
40.4 45.5 40.9 40.1 38.2 34.2 38.1 40.4
Note: $1=Y360 was used as an exchange rate.
The figures indicate plant and equipment investment
in the key industries as percentages of total plant
and equipment investment in Japan.
Source: 50
Figure 2.3: Change in The Structure of Manufacturing Industries
in Japan
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However, in the 1970s, because of the oil crisis and
the rapid growth of newly industrialized countries, the
resource-oriented capital intensive industries lost their
competitive cost advantage and declined in importance to
Japan's economy. Increasing in importance were machine
and assembly industries such as the electrical machinery and
automobile industries. These were technology-oriented
industries. Figure 2.3 shows the dramatic.increase in
the shares of these industries and the considerable decrease
in resource-oriented industries. Machine and assembly
industries, which accounted for only 14% of GDP in 1955,
jumped to 43% in 1983 while resource-oriented industries,
which accounted for 42% in 1955, sharply dropped to 31% in
28 years.
2.2.2 Changes in Japan's Export Structure
These changes reflect the history of Japan's export
structure (See Figure 2.4) and the export structures of
advanced countries (Figure 2.5). In the composition of
exports in 1960, textiles accounted for a significant
portion, 30.2%; chemicals and metals (mainly steel) 18%; and
machinery 25.3%. In 1970, textile exports shrank to
12.5% of the total, chemicals and metals increased to 26.1%,
and machinery almost doubled to 46.3%. In 1980, textile
further diminished to 4.8%, chemicals and metals declined to
21.6%, and machinery grew to 62.8% from 40% in 1970. In
Figure 2.4 : Change in Japan's Export Structure
Metal products
Non-metal
mineral
products
Chemical
products
I
Machinery-
6.6
9/6 l.5.8 )2.G) \ N.
1.9(;.6
General
machinery
50%?
Electric
machinery
100%
Automobiles Other
machinery
Ships
Source: 46
Textiles OthersFood
1960
1970
1.2-
1980
1984
"i"•iil
Y I I II I
~1·~(. i,~:"v'~-~\~///~./l/E43lll2ýiI/\X[
3.5 \\ýý9.7a
(13.2) (10.) (4.8 (69' 7.3
9a~) ( 1.)126 17.9) .3,IF
Figure 2.5:
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1984, Japan's total export reached the record-high of $170
billion, with the machinery industries accounting for 70.4%,
or $119.8 billion. In the machinery industries,
electrical machinery accounted for 22.6% of total exports.
Automobile exports ranked 17.5%, and general machinery
16.4%. Metals dropped to 11.8% from 16.4% in 1980;
chemicals also dropped to 4.5% from 5.2% in 1980, and
textiles accounted for only 4.0% in 1984, only 1/13 of its
share of 1960.
Table 2.11 shows the top 10 export commodities since
1960. In 1960, steel was ranked No.1, accounting for
9.6% of total exports and ships were No.3, accounting for
7.1%. Cotton textile stayed at No.2, and apparel at
No.4. Seven places out of the top 10 were shared by
commodities from light industries while two places were held
by heavy industries and one place by an assembly industry.
The top 10 commodities changed remarkably in 24 years,
reflecting the change in Japan's industrial structure.
In 1984, automobiles (passenger cars) were ranked at No.1,
accounting for 12.9%, trucks, motorcycles, and car parts were
ranked at No.6, 8, and 9 respectively.
Furthermore, electronic commodities, such as video tape
recorders, semi-conductors, office machinery, and radios
were ranked at No.4, 5, 7, and 10. Figure 2.5 describes
the outstanding shares of "Machine Industries" which include
all of these commodities. Steel and ships still stayed
at No.2 and 3 respectively in 1984 because Japanese
Table 2.11: Top 10 Export Commodities of Japan
(1960)
Commodity ($ mil) (%)
(1970)
Commodity ($ mil) (%)
Steel
Cotton Textiles
Ship
Apparel
Automobile
Toy
Shoes
Pottery
Laminate
Canned Food
388
351
288
214
106
90
72
68
63
58
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
9.6
8.7
7.1
5.3
2.6
2.2
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.4
12.4
11.9
3.6
3.0
2.5
2.3
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.8
Steel 2,844 14.7
Ship 1,410 7.3
Automobile(l) 1,337 6.9
Radio 695 3.6
Synthetic Fiber 626 3.2
Apparel 462 2.4
Tape Recorder(2) 451 2.3
Plastic 427 2.2
TV 384 2.0
Motorcycle 384 2.0
(1984)
Automobile 21,900
Steel 13,852
Ship 7,353
VTR 6,819
Semi-conductor 5,816
Truck 5,526
Micro-processor 4,566
Parts of cars 4,513
Prime mover 3,835
Radio 2.820
12.9
8.1
4.3
4.0
3.4
3.2
2.7
2.7
2.3
1.7
Note: The figures indicate value of Japanese commodities
exported and their percentages to the total value of
export.
(1) Parts are excluded.
(2) VTRs are excluded.
(3) VTRs are included.
Source: 46
(1980)
Automobile 16,115
Steel 15,454
Ship 4,682
Truck 3,916
Tape Recorder(3)3,305
Radio 3,009
Motorcycle 2,802
Prime mover 2,548
Chassis 2,373
Semi-conductor 2,307
technology for these products is the most advanced in the
world.
2.2.3 General Trends in Changes in The Industrial Structure
As shown above, there have been significant changes in
the industrial structure of Japan following its domination
by the textile and chemical industries in the 1950s. In
the 1960s, the textile industry declined and heavy and
chemical industries sustained Japan's economy. In the
1970s, the strength of the machinery industries began to
emerge and they finally have become the leading industries
in Japan in 1980s.
In this general trend, the most striking characteristic
has been the changes in the hierarchy of industries by
growth rate. Leadership in growth has changed several
times. Before the oil crisis, many industries grew at high
rates. However, only a limited number of industries
could grow following the oil crisis (See Figure 2.6).
Machine industries, especially electric and precision
machinery industries, performed at a high rate of growth
after the oil crisis while growth in resource-oriented
industries such as textiles, steel, and oil refinery
industries leveled off. This trend was reinforced by the
second oil crisis in 1980. (Source: 60)
Several reasons for the differences in growth rate by
industry can be discerned. The first reason is the
Figure 2.6: Differences in Growth of Production Indexes
among Industries in Japan
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competitive advantages in technology and cost lost by some
industries. Figure 2.7 shows the changes in
competitiveness among manufacturing industries using "trade
specialization coefficient". Competitve edges of the
technology-oriented industries in Japan represented by
general and electric machinery industries have been
increasing in 1970s and 1980s, while the U.S. and E.C.
countries as a whole have been losing their competitive
advantages.
Figure 2.8 represents the change in the shares of
Japanese comodities in the international markets.
Chemicals, textiles and miscellaneous commodities have been
losing cost advantages against not only the newly devoloping
countries but also the other advanced countries. The
rise in energy costs since the oil crisis created
significant cost increases in these industries in which
energy cost accounts for a large portion of their cost
structure or which use oil-related resources (See Figure
2.9). For instance, the aluminum refinery industry,
which uses electricity produced through thermal power
generation, and the oil refinery industry, which uses
traditional naphtha, have obviously been losing their
comparative cost advantages over these industries in the
U.S. or Canada where cheap resources, such as ethane from
natural gas, can be used and cheap energy, such as
electricity generated through natural gas or water power can
be provided (Source: 65). In addition, because
Figlre 2.7: Competitive Advantage of Industries among Advanced Countries
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Figure 2.8: Change in Shares of Japanese Products in The World
Market
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Figure 2.9 : Coefficient of Direct and Indirect Input of Energy
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Note: Coefficient of direct and indirect input of energy indicates
a coefficient of input of energy (electricity, gas, petroleum
products, and coal products) to an industry in case of one unit
of increase in demand for production of the industry.
Source: 46
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technology in these commodities is already highly developed,
the differences in technologies used in Japan and other
countries has been shrinking rapidly. As a result, these
commodities have lost their competitive edges both in cost
and technology.
In contrast, Figure 2.8 also shows the commodities
which belong to the technology-oriented industries, such as
home electrical appliances, office machines, automobile,
watches, machine tools, medical apparatuses and so on.
The share of these commodities have been increasing, because
all of these industries enjoy competitive advantages in
technology which translate into cost advantages for their
products. Recently technological advantages have enabled
even the steel and ship building industries, which had been
among the declining industries, to increase their shares
slightly. AS mentioned before, these two still remain among
the top 10 export commodities.
The second reason for the differences in growth
rate among industries is a conspicuous change in demand.
Resource-oriented industries
rely mainly on private-sector expenditure (See Figure 2.10).
Such industries have suffered greatly from the generally
low level of domestic demand for these industries' products.
In contrast, machinery or assembly industries were
sustained by relatively high levels of demand from the
domestic private sector as well as by the growth in exports
created by strong international demand.
Figure 2.10: Degree of Production Inducement by Investment
In Japan (1982)
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The third reason is the decrease in expenditure on
resources and materials after the oil crisis of 1973. The
decrease created the cost reduction in machinery and
assembly industries but affected the resource-oriented
industries as reduction in demand (See Figure 2.11).
Because thorough energy-saving methods were taken throughout
Japan, consumption of resources and materials declined since
the first oil crisis of 1973. The trend was.significant
especially after the second oil shock of 1980.
2.2.4 Construction Industry and Japan's Industrial Structure
Figure 2.12 portrays the changes of Japan's industrial
structure in a rough classification of industries in Japan's
GDP including the share of the construction industry.
First, a consecutive decline can be seen in agriculture,
forestry and fishery industries. Second, there was a
growth in manufacturing industries through the 1960s, a
decline in 1970s and another period of growth after 1980.
Taken together, the shares of manufacturing industries in
Japan's GDP increased a little, though not significantly.
Manufacturing industries still play a key role in Japan's
economy. Third, the percentage of construction output in
GDP had been increasing until 1975, accounting for slightly
over 10%, then declined in the 1980s. Finally, a sectoral
increase in the shares of service industries can be seen
(1). The most conspicuous change among these was perhaps
64
Figure 2.11: Change in Resource Consumption in Japan
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Figure 2 .12 : Change in The Industrial Structure in Japan
in Gross National Products
GDP(nominal)
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Total production output of construction industry in 1983 is
not available because it is calculated in every five years.
Source: 46, 48, 58
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Figure 2.13:
the increasing importance and share in GDP of service
industries and the relative decrease in shares and
importance of other industries. It is interesting to
analyze impacts of each industry' orientation to service on
its own performance and on the construction industry;
Figure 2.13 portrays the increasing importance of
service industries in Japan's national economy. Service
industries' outputs accounted for 56% of GDP and the
workforce in service industries accounted for 54% of the
total workforce in Japan in 1983. Furthermore, even in
manufacturing industries there has been an increase of
services in the forms of intermediate inputs. (Source: 46)
Because of the diversification of needs for goods,
manufacturers have begun to deploy strategies for producing
and selling goods of higher quality in more efficient ways.
In order to achieve this, manufacturers are putting more
emphasis on their management and service departments, such
as planning, investigation, sales promotion and advertising,
rather than on production alone.
Besides their greater empahsis on services internally,
manufacturing firms are increasing their purchase from firms
which provide services and establishing subsidiaries to
perform services for them (Source: 65). Concomitantly,
service firms now need more sophisticated manufacturers'
(1) Service industries include industries such as retail
sales, wholesale, insurance, finance, real estate,
transportation, communication and the so called service
industries (hotel, restaurant, entertainment etc.).
products. Service industries are using more hardware
such as computer systems to increase their own efficiency.
Thus, there two kinds of relationships exist between service
industries and manufacturing industries, that is, inputs to
and outputs from service industries. As a result, in
manufacturing industries, there has been an increase of
direct and indirect input from service industries in almost
all manufacturing industries (See Figure 2.14). Also,
Figure 2.15 shows the increase in production of service
industries induced by increases in production in all
manufacturing industries.
For the construction industry, there probably has been
a couple of impacts from 1) the increasing bilateral
dependency between manufacturing and service industries and
2) the increasing importance of service industries. One of
the impacts will be, as has been mentioned, the decrease in
volume of construction because of both the less capital-
intensive nature of service industries and the more service-
oriented nature of manufacturing industries. (The latter
trend eventually diminishes the capital-intensive nature of
these firms.) Another one will be the need to establish
countermeasures to the movement towards a service
orientation as jobs increasingly are generated by the
service industries and service-oriented manufacturers.
Obviously the nature of jobs coming from both industries
will be changing rapidly. These jobs not only will be
shaped up by state-of-the art technology, such as
Figure 2.14: Direct and Indirect Input Coefficient from
Service Industries
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Figure 2.15: Coefficient of Production Inducement of Service
Industries in Japan
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intelligent buildings or computer-controlled clean rooms,
but also will require different categories of jobs not
traditionally included in the construction firms. Clients
may request work which has not been done by
design/construction firms. Furthermore, such jobs may
previously have been done by different industries or not
done at all. The issue of countermeasures for the changing
industrial structure will be developed further in Chapter 4
in discussing the strategies to be taken by Japanese
contractors at entering to the U.S. construction market.
2.3 Financial Structure of Japanese Industries
Financial structure of Japanese industries will be
analyzed in this section from three points of view:
profitability, cost structure, and the capital structure of
industries. Statistics on firms' financial structures
were generally taken from "Analysis of Major Firms'
Management "(1985) by The Bank of Japan (1).
1. In this book, statistics are based on the selected firms
with capital of more than Y1 billion ( $4.5 million).
Enough firms were selected from each industry to accurately
reflect the characteristics of the industry. 619 firms
were selected. (379 firms from manufacturing industries and
240 firms from non-manufacturing industries.) (Source:59)
2.3.1 Profitability of Industries
Among the many ratios and indexes which describe firms'
business operations, the best parameter to monitor firms'
fluctuations is the ratio of net income as percentage of
total sales. This figure summarizes firms' entire efforts,
adding up various factors characterizing the firms.
These profits ratio will be reviewed in this section.
Industries can be divided into four groups by the
degree of profitability;
1) highly profitable (more than 3% of net income as
percentage of total sales)
2) moderately profitable (2.9% - 2.0%)
3) making little money (1.9 - 1.0%)
4) Not making money or losing money (below 1.0%) (See
Table 2.12).
Each group is composed of the following industries with
their percentages of net income in 1984:
Group 1): manufacturing industries--communication equipment
& electronics (3.72%), home electrical appliances (3.07%),
precision machinery (3.54%), ceramics (3.02%) and medicine
(3.89%); non-manufacturing industries-- gas supply (5.21%),
electric supply (3.38%), and private railway (3.49%).
Group 2): general electric machinery (2.72%), industrial
machinery (2.89%), machine tools (2.24%), metal products
(2.36%), pulp & paper (2.23%).
Group 3): manufacturing industries--food (1.40%), textiles
(1.57%), steel (1.56%), and ship building (1.46%); non-
manufacturing industries--construction industry (1.33%) in
non-manufacturing industries.
Group 4): manufacturing industries--general chemicals
(0.67%), oil refinery (0.54%), aluminum (-0.16%), and other
non-ferrous metals (zinc, lead, copper) (0.80%); non-
manufacturing industries--whole sales (0.14%) and marine
transportation (-0.14%).
Group 1) is composed of two sub-groups. The first
sub-group can be described as technology-intensive
industries. These have high competitive technological
advantages in the international market as stated in the
previous section. The second group is comprised of
utility and transportation industry. The Japanese
government controls the utility industries.
Group 2) is, generally speaking, composed of machinery
and assembly industries which are also technology-oriented.
Groups 3) and 4) are composed of former key industries
in Japan's history of industrialization and the construction
industry.
Figure 2.16 portrays the trends of industries' net
income. There is a clear separation between the
industries in Groups 1,2 and Groups 3,4. The former
shares the upper portion of the graph while the latter may
be found in the lower portion and fluctuating significantly.
As previously stated, this grouping clearly coincides
Table 2.12: Trend in Net Income as Percentage of Total Sales
of Major Firms by Industries in Japan
Industry\ Year 1975 1980
(Percent)
1984 Group
Mfg Industries:
Food 0.07
Textile -0.98
Pulp,Paper 0.53
General Chemical 0.29
Medicine 3.65
Oil Refinery -0.01
Ceramics 1.40
Steel 0.38
Non-Ferrous Metal -0.01
Aluminum -5.20
General Machinery 2.66
Gen.Elec.Machinery 1.16
Home.Elec.Appliance 2.83
Communi/Electron 1.77
Automobile 2.13
Ship Building 1.75
Precision Machinery 2.22
Non-Mfg Industries:
Construction
Whole Sales
Retail Sales
Private Transport
Marine Transport
Electric Supply
Gas Supply
Service
2.24
0.11
1.18
2.70
0.81
3.08
2.84
2.00
1.60
1.56
1.44
0.88
4.38
0.56
2.86
2.68
0.53
1.38
3.29
2.66
3.84
2.79
2.53
0.99
5.00
1.63
0.19
1.37
2.44
0.92
4.97
4.85
2.14
1.40
1.57
2.23
0.67
3.89
0.54
3.02
1.56
0.80
-0.16
2.91
2.72
3.07
3.72
2.14
1.46
3.54
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with the grouping discussed in the historical review of the
ups and downs of Japan's industries. High-tech
industries, such as communication, electronics, and home
electrical appliances, have been seen the most growth since
the latter half of 1970s. Their high level profitability
was followed by that of the machinery and automobile
industries which also have been leading Japan's economy
since early 1970s. The capital-intensive industries (the
former key industries) are clearly separated from these
groups and have been struggling to survive in the changing
environment.
The construction industry originally fell into the
profitable group. For example, it recorded more than 2% of
net income in 1975. However, since then, its profits
have been on a continuing downward trend. As a result,
the construction industry now is among the unprofitable
group. Firms in the construction industry are not making
money, and are struggling to servive in the changing
economic environment.
2.3.2 Cost Structure of Industries
Table 2.13 shows a breakdown of expenditures as
percentage of sales in each industry. Capital intensive
industries have generally high rates of material cost and
parts costs. The total of these costs in the capital-
intensive industries accounts for 60 - 75% of the sales
while these costs in the high-tech industries account for 45
- 55%. This difference comes from the nature of the
capital intensive industries, which are resource-intensive
as well as capital-intensive.
Industries with high material and parts costs are very
vulnerable to rapid rises in the cost of raw materials. The
capital-intensive industries lost their cost leadership
after the rapid rise in material costs caused by the oil
crisis of 1973. Table 2.14 demonstrates the difference
in cost competitiveness between the high-tech and capital-
intensive industries. The competitive advantages of the
high-tech industries appear in their high gross margins.
(Gross margin = Total Sales - Cost of Goods Sold) The
high-tech industries generally claim 17.5 - 31% of gross
margins while the capital-intensive industries gain only 7.6
- 19.1% of sales as gross margins.
Furthermore, some of the high-tech industries, such as
general machinery, home electrical appliances, and
automobile industries, are gaining additional income from
sources other than their manufacturing operation. For
example, their investment return (dividend or capital gain)
and interest income from savings surpass their miscellaneous
loss (unforeseeable or accidental loss) and interest payment
for lending (See Table 2.13).
The financial structure of the construction industry
will be detailed in Chapter 3. It will be treated only
briefly here in comparison with other industries.
Table 2.13: Breakdown of Expenditure of Major Firms by
Industries in Japan
Industries
Mater- Parts, Per-
ial Goods son-
De-
1984
(Percent)
Inter- Others Profit
preci- est
nel ation
Food
Textile
Pulp,Paper
General
Chemicals
Medicine
Oil Refine
Ceramics
Steel
Non-Ferrous
Aluminum
General
Machinery
Gen.Elec.
Machinery
Home Elec.
Appliance
Commun/
Electronics
Automobile
Ship Build
Precision
Machinery
37.3
36.9
48.2
37.9
16.9
55.3
24.7
44.2
48.3
36.9
40.4
41.1
13.5
21.2
10.2
27.3
28.8
22.5
24.4
0.9
26.6
33.3
7.6
9.9
10.6
6.5
18.2
1.6
11.6
13.1
4.9
8.1
9.8 14.1
6.0 14.7
33.3 34.2 7.7
41.4 10.5 12.2
62.8
37.9
43.0
1.6
0.3
1.8
8.2
13.5
14.8
2.0
2.9
3.8
3.3
2.9
1.0
4.4
6.4
2.0
2.0
3.0
4.4
2.3
4.5
3.3
2.0
4.1
1.2
3.4
4.0
5.4
1.0
2.4
3.7
6.0
4.4
5.7
35.4
22.9
18.4
16.0
22.0
16.2
25.6
28.9
12.4
14.2
2.3 24.8
1.5 26.2
0.9 15.4
1.9 22.6
1.0
4.6
2.2
18.3
38.9
27.8
Non-Mfg
Construction 16.0
Whole Sales 0.1
Retail Sales 0.1
Priv.Trans. 1.5
Marine Trans.17.2
Elec. Supply 31.4
Gas Supply 37.5
Services 10.7
Note: The figures indicate breakdown of expenditures as
percentage of total expenditure of major firms
industry.
in each
Source: 59
3.1
2.9
4.8
3.7
10.2
0.9
5.5
2.7
1.5
-0.2
5.7
6.2
6.3
6.9
4.7
2.8
6.4
2.6
96.0
74.8
7.6
0.0
10.1
1.1
42.3
16.1
0.8
9.0
33.2
6.7
7.7
13.0
16.1
0.7
0.1
1.1
8.7
5.1
12.5
10.1
2.3
1.9
1.0
1.5
15.4
3.7
11.0
3.5
1.4
59.6
1.6
11.2
29.7
66.6
20.4
23.7
21.7
3.2
0.4
2.3
4.0
0.7
6.9
11.1
5.5
Table 2.14: Breakdown of Revenues of Major Firms by
Industries in Japan
Industries
1984
(Percent)
Cost General Other Earning
of Sales Admi. Cost Income/Cost Before
Interest Tax
Payment/
Revenue
Manufacturing:
Textile
General Chemical
Oil Refinery
Steel
Aluminum
Other Non-Ferrous
Metal
Ship Building
Ceramics
General Machinery
Home Appliances
Communication/
Electronics
Automobile
Precision
Machinery
Non-Manufacturing:
Construction
Marine Transport
Electric Supply
Gas Supply
83.7
80.9
92.4
83.2
89.1
91.0
87.1
72.1
79.7
80.5
69.0
83.5
73.9
89.1
93.0
71.0
44.4
11.3
11.8
4.5
8.8
8.0
4.3
8.6
20.6
14.9
15.3
22.4
12.6
18.4
7.4
4.8
11.2
40.8
1.8
3.3
2.1
5.1
3.1
3.2
1.4
1.5
-0.6
-2.5
0.8
-1.0
0.5
3.2
4.0
1.0
2.9
-0.2
1.5
2.9
5.8
6.0
6.7
7.8
4.9
7.2
0.2
1.4
10.8
2.9
3.3
0.8
7.0
11.9
Note: The figures indicate breakdown of revenues as
percentage of total revenue of major firms in each
industry.
A minus sign in "Other Income or Cost, Interest
Payment or Revenue" means revenue.
Source: 59
One of the unique characteristics of the Japanese
construction industry is its considerable subcontracting
ratio, generally more than 50% regardless of the type or
size of a construction firm. As a result, we see in Table
2.13, that the high subcontracting ratio is reflected in the
very high rate of other costs in which subcontract cost is
included. Low rates of material and parts costs,
relatively high rate of personnel cost and small
depreciation costs also characterize the construction
industry.
The construction industry has a very weak cost
advantage. Its gross margin is only 10.9%, very small
compared to the gross margin of 17.5 - 31% enjoyed by the
high-tech industries (See Table 2.14).
It may not appropriate to compare the construction
industry with manufacturing industries because their cost
structures are quite different. However, generally speaking,
However, the weak competitive cost advantage of the Japanese
construction industry makes it more comparable to the
capital intensive industries than to the high-tech
industries.
2.3.3 Capital Structure of Industries
Table 2.15 shows the debt-to-equity ratios of major
firms in each industry. There is an apparent difference
in debt-to-equity ratios between both Group 1,2 and Group
Table 2.15: Debt to Equity Ratio and Interest Payment
of Major Firms by Industries in Japan
Industries
Debt to
Equity
Ratio
Interest
Payment
for Sales
1984
Interest ,Dividend
Received for
Interest ,Dividend
Payment
(Mfg)
Food
Textile
Pulp, Paper
General Chemical
Oil Refinery
Steel
Aluminum
Non-Ferrous Metal
General Machine
Gen.Elec.Machine
2.00
3.11
4.59
6.80
9.83
5.77
11.52
7.24
1.78
3.18
Home Appliances 1.08
Commun/Electronics 2.34
Automobile 1.39
Ship Building 7.35
Precision Machine 1.05
(Non-Mfg)
Construction
Whole Sales
Retail Sales
Private Transport
Marine Transport
Electric Supply
Gas Supply
Services
4.34
13.54
2.42
7.83
5.03
5.59
2.18
1.92
1.20
3.74
4.06
5.78
2.55
6.52
5.91
4.52
2.41
1.53
0.94
2.15
1.07
4.75
2.45
1.89
1.03
1.55
16.06
3.84
11.11
3.78
1.44
0.69
0.49
0.25
0.28
0.24
0.27
0.41
0.29
0.87
1.01
2.64
0.63
1.59
0.76
0.94
0.77
0.86
0.42
0.20
0.49
0.04
0.19
0.76
----- G3
----- G3
------- G2
---G4
---G4
----- G3
---G4
---G4
------- G2
------- G2
--------- G1
--------- G1
------- G2
----- G3
--------- G1
----- G3
---G4
----- G3
---------- G1
---G4
---------- Gi
---------- GI
-------- G2
Note: Debt to equity ratio
= (Amount of debt)/(Amount of equity)
Interest payment for sales
= (Amount of interest payment)/(Amount of total sales)
Interest,dividend received for Interest, dividend paid
= (Amount of interest and dividend received)
/(Amount of interest and divident paid)
G1 indicates Group 1
G2 indicates Group 2
G3 indicates Group 3
G4 indicates Group 4
Source: 59
3,4. Firms in Group 1,2 have very low debt-to-equity
ratios, ranging from 1.0 to 2.0 while firms in Group 3,4
have considerably higher ratios, around 10.
As a result, interest payments by the industries in
Group 3,4 obviously are suppressing their profitability.
Their interest payments account for 3 to 6% of their total
sales. In contrast, industries in Group 1,2 spend only 1 to
2% of their total sales for interest payment.
Figure 2.17 shows the historical record of the interest
payment by each industry after 1975. Although interest
payment, as a whole, has been in a downward trend in each
industry, industries in Group 3,4 still have much larger
percentages than industries in Group 1,2. Most
significant here are the high ratios of industries in Group
3,4 at around 1975 and 1980. Similarly, high debt-to-
equity ratios can be seen around 1975 and 1980 (See Figure
2.18).
Characteristics of the capital structure of Japanese
industries can be summerized as (1) originally high debt-to-
equity ratio in all industries, (2) especially high ratios
of industries in Group 3,4 around the two oil crises, (3)
downward trend of the debt-to-equity ratios in all
industries, and (4) recent steep downward curves in Group
1,2 and a clear separation between Group 1,2 and 3,4.
Several factors have shaped these characteristics.
First, the special nature of Japan's capital market, and
consequenct investment policies of government and business
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Figure 2.17 : Trends of Interest Payment as Percentage of
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must be considered. Originally, the stock market in
Japan was an expensive and unreliable source of capital.
In Japan's stock market, stocks are issued at par rather
than at market value, and the sales of stocks thus yield
less cash than in the stock markets of other countries.
Furthermore, because of the cyclical nature of Japan's stock
market since World War II, investment by stockholders
traditionally has been risky and hence has required a high
rate of return on equity. In addition, individual
stockholders in Japan put less pressure on companies to
issue scheduled dividends so that the money which otherwise
would be paid to stockholders can be used for other
purposes, such as interest payment (Source: 37, 53).
In the context of the objective of government and
business to rapidly expand the economy, debt financing was a
commonly accepted idea during the period of post-war
reconstruction. If plant and equipment investment had been
made using only equity capital, the scale of such
investments would have been limited by the size of capital
increases and internal reserves. Accordingly, expansion
would have fallen behind other companies in Japan as well as
in the world. Therefore, firms in Japan originally
functioned with high debt-to-equity ratios (characteristics
(1)) though the degree of dependency differed industry by
industry.
Second factor: The differences in natures of industries
between Groups 1,2 and 3,4 may have created the especially
high debt-to-equity ratios for Groups 3,4 at the time of the
oil crises. Industries in Group 1,2 are generally
technology-intensive or technology-oriented industries less
dependent on capital. Because, they never had to make
heavy investments in plants and equipment, they originally
had smaller debt-to-equity ratios than the capital-intensive
industries.
In contrast, the industries in Group 3,4 are capital-
intensive industries. They include steel and aluminum
production, oil refineries, chemical and ship building
industries, all of which require giant plants and much
heavy equipment. As a result, the much heavier capital
investment by industries in Groups 3,4 gave them an
originally high debt-to-equity ratios.
A third factor was the timing of the change in the
world economic situation which affected Japanese industries'
financial structure, causing a downward trand in debt-to-
equity ratios for all and creating a clear split between
Groups 1,2 and 3,4. Before the capital intensive
industries were able to improve or even decide to improve
their capital structures, the oil crisis altered the
economic environment so rapidly that these industries lost
the chance to do so. (Once profitability is lost, it is
difficult to improve a debt-to-equity ratio, which may
generally be reduced by plowing profit back in the form of
retained earnings.)
As mentioned above, debt financing has two
contradictory effects on a firm's performance. When the
profit margin exceeds interest payment, firms can gain extra
profit from debt financing and stockholders can be benefited
in the same way.
However, once the profit margin drops to a level
comparable to interest payment, debt financing presses
profit considerably, and may force a firm to the edge of
bankruptcy. Stockholders will also be seriously affected
by the priority in payment to debt holders.
This has been the story for Japan's capital-intensive
industries. Table 2.16 shows the positive effects on the
profit margins of Japanese firms in 1965 as from heavy debt
financing in the late 1950s. Although their debt-to-
equity ratios were especially high in the 1960s and early
1970s due to heavy investment in plants and equipment, they
were able to take advantage of economies of scale in
modernizing plants and equipment through heavy investment.
However, the oil crisis suddenly undercut these industries'
comparative advantages.
On the other hand, the high-tech industries were well
suited to the new economic situation created by the oil
crisis. Since their comparative cost advantages lay in
the use of inexpensive materials, these business made
remarkable profits which they were able to use to improve
their capital structures (See Table 2.17 and Figure 2.18).
The debt-to-equity ratio of the construction industry
was originally high, but not as high as the capital-
Table 2.16: Pre-war and Post-war Comparison of Business
Firms' Financial Conditions in Japan(All
industries; figures in parentheses are figures
for manufacturing industries.)
(Percent)
Year 1935 1950 1955 1960
Equity Capital As a 61 23 39 29
Proportion of Gross (67) (26) (41) (32)
Capital
Fixed Assets As a 60 29 54 53
Proportion of Gross (51) (23) (42) (45)
Capital
Turnover-Ratio of 0.42 1.64 1.08 1.12
Total Liabilities (0.67) (1.42) (0.86) (0.84)
and Net Worth
Profit Ratio on 5.7 2.2 2.4 5.8
Employed Capital (7.8) (2.8) (5.2) (7.9)
Profit Ratio on 12.1 18.3 21.6 40.5
Paid-in Capital (16.3) (23.6) (40.1) (50.6)
Corporate Debenture 21.1 30.9 33.1 39.1
Borrowings As a (13.1) (28.5) (28.2) (35.3)
Proportion of Total
Capital Employed
Depreciation Rate on 3.9 8.0 8.3 10.1
Fixed Assets (5.8) (6.3) (10.9) (13.7)
Source: 50, 60
Table 2.17: Net Income and Payout Ratios of Major Firms by
Industries in Japan
1984
(Percent)
Net Income Payout
Ratio
(Mfg)
Food 1.40 0.33
Textile 1.57 0.42
Paper, Pulp 2.23 0.27
General Chemical 0.67 0.42
Medicine 3.89 0.30
Oil Refinery 0.54 0.33
Ceramics 3.02 0.33
Steel 1.56 0.61
Non-Ferrous Metal 0.80 0.51
Aluminum 
-0.16 0.00
General Machinery 2.91 0.36
Gen.Elec.Machinery 2.72 0.29
Home Elec. Machinery 3.07 0.22
Communi/Electronics 3.72 0.21
Automobile 2.14 0.27
Ship Building 1.46 0.50
Precision Machinery 3.54 0.34
(Non-Mfg)
Construction 1.33 0.42
Whole Sales 0.14 0.38
Retail Sales 1.00 0.46
Private Transport 3.49 0.58
Marine Transport 
-0.14 0.00
Electric Supply 3.38 0.58
Gas Supply 5.21 0.39
Service 2.61 0.23
Note: Payout ratio (%) = (Dividend paid)/(Net Income)
Plow-back ratio (%)= 1 - Payout ratio
Therefore, (Net Income) x (Payout Ratio) equals the
amount paid out to stockholders. (Net Income) x (Plow
back ratio) equals the amount plowed back to business.
Source: 59
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Figure 2.18: Trends in Debt to Equity Ratios by Industry in Japan
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intensive industries because construction firms possessed
relatively small long-term assets (land, plants and
equipment) compared to the capital-intensive industries.
However, the debt-to-equity ratio of the construction
industry has been remained in the same level since 1975.
Accordingly, the ratio is now closer to capital-intensive
industries. Now that Japan's economy has entered a
period of moderate growth, the Japanese construction
industry may now need to move its capital structure closer
to an equity financing structure.
2.4 Summary of Japan's Industrial Structure Analysis
Japanese construction firms have long depended on the
domestic market alone. The course of Japanese industry has
been significantly affected by the following factors; 1) the
government policy of fostering manufacturing industries, 2)
the supporting role played by the post-war construction
industry in reconstructing facilities and people's
dwellings, 3) the traditional emphasis of Japanese
contractors on building and heavy construction firms alone,
to the exclusion of plants and industrial facilities
construction, and several other problems which were created
by the delay in entering the overseas markets. The
interplay of these factors held Japanese contractors far
behind other countries' international contractors in
entering the overseas markets.
In Japan's efforts to reconstruct its economy, there
were clear fluctuations in Japan's industrial structure.
These changes were directed primarily by the Japanese
government, but were sometimes forced by changes in economic
situation, especially by the two oil crises. Japan's
economy after World War II was led by heavy and chemical
industries and other industries which ultimately became a
bottleneck in the expansion of heavy and chemical
industries. At the same time, machinery industries
adapted from wartime munition industries grew rapidly.
Then, high-tech industries began to develop significantly,
especially after the first oil crisis. The economic
characteristics of these industries were very well suited to
the change in the world economy and in Japan's new economic
situation. Japan's economy is heading for a service-
oriented economy.
The driving force of Japan's post-war economic
expansion was debt financing which was directed by Japanese
government and accepted by Japanese firms. This strategy
succeeded until the oil crisis. The slowly growing and
less energy consuming economy allowed the high-tech
industries to expand and made an equity financing policy
more suitable.
The construction industry's financial structure has not
improved so far. Its debt financing structure is now
more comparable to the declining capital-intensive industries
than to the high-tech industries.
Until the oil crisis came, various industries,
government, and households provided enough work at diiferent
times to keep the construction industry growing faster than
Japan's GNP. The slowing of the entire economy stopped
the construction industry's growth. The construction
industry now must find new markets somewhere other than in
Japan.
Among several candidates, the U.S. construction market
is the largest and one of the healthiest in the world. To
develop strategies for Japanese contractors wishing to enter
the U.S. construction market, a comparative study of the
U.S. and Japanese construction industries will be made in
Chapter 3 based on the underlying characteristics of
Japanese construction industry discussed in this chapter.
The focus will be on the differences between the two
industries and on the impact of the differences on Japanese
firms. Also, the impacts of the Japanese entry on the U.S.
market will be discussed.
Chapter 3
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese
Construction Industries
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the growth of
Japan's domestic construction industry was hampered by the
first oil crisis in 1973. After a couple of years of
struggle, it began to grow again. However, it was again
checked by the second oil shock of 1980. Since then, the
value of Japan's construction has been decreasing
continuously. The cessation of growth of Japan's domestic
construction market was the primary reason why Japanese
general contractors began to rush into the foreign
construction market.
The major markets for Japanese general contractors
originally were in South-East Asia and Middle East countries
in the late 1970s and 1980s. The total contracts won in
these two regions in 1980 accounted for 83.7% of the total
overseas contracts won by Japanese contractors (See Table
3.1). However, with the sudden downturn in oil prices and
demand, the Middle East countries were beset by cash flow
problems and their ability to invest in construction faded
away. The share of contracts won by Japanese contractors
in Middle East countries dramatically decreased and
accounted for only 8.1% in 1984 (38.7% in 1980).
Recently, China (Mainland), Australia, and the United States
became the most important new markets. Especially,
Table 3.1: Overseas Contracts Won
by Region
1980 1981
by Japanese Contractors
1982 1983
(Percent)
1984
South-East Asia
Middle East
Africa
North America
(Mainly
in the U.S.)
Latin America
Oceania
(Mainly
Australia)
West Europe
East Europe
Total Overseas
Construction
($ million)
Note: The figures indicate contracts won by Japanese
contractors in each region as percentage of total
contracts won by Japanese contractors.
Source: 47
45.0
38.7
1.0
3.4
10.1
1.2
61.4
26.8
2.3
3.1
5.7
0.4
75.6
12.8
1.0
3.6
3.6
0.9
66.6
16.1
1.0
8.2
1.4
5.8
53.7
8.1
0.4
22.1
2.4
12.3
5.4
0.1
2,457
0.4
0.1
3,967
0.9
1.5
4,205
0.7
0.0
4,777
1.0
0.0
4,585
contracts won in the United States were the greatest in
terms of value, of contracts won in any single country by
Japanese contractors in 1984 (See Table 3.2). The share of
contracts won in the U.S. accounted for 22.1% of the total
overseas contracts (See Table 3.1 again).
Japanese contractors' choice of the U.S. as a
construction market niche seems reasonable, mostly because
the U.S. construction market is the world largest (See Table
3.3). The U.S. domestic market was three to four times
larger than the entire international market shared by the
top 250 international contractors which ENR (Engineering New
Record) picked up in 1984. Furthermore, the U.S.
construction market is, generally speaking, composed of
well-established participants, such as clients, design
firms, engineering firms, contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, and so on. Within the market, competition is
performed fundamentally through an open bid system.
Therefore, the market is maintained fairly efficiently.
The U.S. has the largest and the most powerful economy
and construction cost is, as a whole, kept under control
through relatively stable costs for labor, material, and
daily necessities. Also, transportation and communication
are easily performed through advanced nationwide systems.
Furthermore, in the U.S. there are no sudden change in
policies, such as enforcement of capital localization or
expropriation, cancellation of projects after order,
freezing of commenced works, or abrupt adaptation of new
Table 3.2: Top 10 Countries by Contracts Won by Japanese
Contractors
1983
($ bil) Country
1984
($ bil) Country ($
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Singapore
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Thailand
U.S.
Brunei
Sri Lanka
East Germany
1,109
885
585
392
256
136
98
88
88
62
Singapore 1,198
Malaysia 736
Indonesia 482
Hong Kong 361
U.S. 354
Kuwait 317
Australia 248
Saudi Arabia 198
Sri Lanka 97
Algeria 87
U.S. 694
Malaysia 638
Singapore 489
Australia 487
Hong Kong 383
Thailand 273
China 212
Saudi Arabia 196
Hawaii 153
Indonesia 127
Note: Contracts won in Hawaii is separately listed because
of the special nature of Hawaii for Japan. (See 4.4
in Chapter 4.)
Source: 47
1982
Country bil)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Table 3.3: Trends of The
Markets
U.S., Japanese, and International
($ billion)
1972 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84
U.S. 125 174 206 230 231 239 237 269 313
Japan 130 197 217 224 228 227 218 221
Int'l 52 62 108 147 123 94 81
Note: Values of U.S. construction reflect new domestic
construction put in place.
Values of Japanese construction are total domestic
construction.
Values of international construction include the
value won by the top 250 international contractors.
Sources: 13.b., 18.a.-h. 47
laws or regulations.
Finally, the U.S. is absolutely free from unrest,
revolution, guerrilla warfare, riots, war, and violent
racial confrontation within the country. In this chapter,
a a review and analysis of the U.S. construction industry,
in comparison with its Japanese counterpart, will be made
with the objective of considering the U.S. as a market niche
for Japanese general contractors.
3.1 Scale and Importance of the Construction Industry in the
U.S. and Japan
Construction Industry and National Economy
The construction industry is considered to be one of
the most important industries in both the U.S. and Japan.
The U.S. construction market is the largest in the world,
with the value of its new construction put in place
amounting to $313 billion in 1984 (See Figure 3.1). The
Japanese construction market is the next largest, claiming
$220 billion in 1984, about 70% of the value U.S. new
construction put in place in the same year.
However, the degree of importance of the construction
industry in the national economy differs remarkably between
the two countries. For example, construction investment
was a steady 20% of GNP (Gross National Product) in Japan
until 1981, though it declined slowly thereafter (See Figure
3.2). New U.S. construction accounted for around 10% of
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Figure 3.3 : New Construction Put in Place as Percentage of GNP
in the U.S.
Source: 12, 13.a, b
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GNP until the late 1970s and more recently 8.0 to 8.5% (See
Figure 3.3) (1). Table 3.4 graphically represents the
difference in percentages of GNP between the two countries.
The U.S. had a GNP, 2.9 times larger roughly speaking, than
did Japan in 1984 (2.5 times in 1982) while the U.S. new
construction was only 1.23 times larger than Japanese total
construction (1.04 times in 1982). Therefore, the
percentage of Japanese construction compared to GNP was
almost twice as large in the U.S. (See Table 3.4).
The greater importance of Japanese construction to
Japan's national economy compared to the U.S. situation is
also evident comparison when input-output tables of both
countries are compared. Table 3.5 shows the inputs to the
construction industry in the form of intermediate products
from other industries as percentages of other industries'
total outputs. The larger the percentages of the outputs
to the construction industry are, the more dependent the
production of such industries are on the construction
(1) The volume of maintenance and repair (M&R) work accounts
for a considerable portion of the total U.S. construction.
However, because statistics relating to M&R work are scarce,
it is very difficult to determine its exact figures.
According to a calculation in Construction Review (Sept/Oct
1985), M&R receipts increased from $10.5 billion in 1967
(14% for the total construction receipts in the U.S.) to $35
billion in 1977 (19% for the net construction receipts).
Furthermore, during the past decade, M&R and other works
that are not categorized as new construction, such as
commercial/industrial renovation or hazardous waste clean-
up, have grown rapidly (Source: 13.a). Therefore, the U.S.
"total" construction as percentage of GNP could be a little
higher than the percentage for only "new" construction,
probably higher by around 2% assuming that M&R work accounts
for 20% of new construction put in place.
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Table 3.4: Scale of Construction Industry for the National
Economy in the U.S. and Japan
U.S. Japan
billion)
3,304.8
3,069.3
* GNP
*
($
(1983)(1982)
billion)
1,263.2
1,212.1
New (1983)
Construction (1982)
Put in Place
New Const-
ruction Put
in Place as
Percentage of
GNP
(1983)
(1982)
268.9 * Construction (1983)
236.9 * Investment (1982)
*
(%)
8.1
7.8
* Construction (1983)
* Investment (1982)
* as Percentage
* of GNP
217.5
227.0
(%)
17.2
18.7
Note: New construction put in place was used for U.S.
construction whereas construction investment was used
for Japanese construction.
Source: 13.a., 47, 59, 70
GNP
($(1983)
(1982)
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Table 3.5: Input from Other Industries to Construction
Industry in the U.S. and Japan
Input Percentage
from Other for Each
Industry Industries'
to Construction Total Output
Industry
U.S.: (1977) ($ million) (%)
from Mining Other Than Metal 2,115 9.0
Wood Products & Furniture 18,688 33.6
Chemicals & Chemical Products 3,489 3.1
Petroleum & Coal Products 7,137 7.2
Rubber, Plastics & Leather 3,040 6.5
Stone, Clay & Glass Products 15,913 46.0
Primary & Fabricated Metals 32,460 17.2
Machinery, except Electrical 5,657 4.8
Electrical Equipment & Supplies 7,216 8.1
Transportation and Trade 28,945 5.7
Japan: (1980)
from Mining Other Than Metal 5,045 52.5
Miscellaneous Textile Products 1,522 19.3
Wood, Wooden Product Mfg 12,961 57.7
Furniture & Fixture 4,235 28.8
Coal Products 1,550 13.8
Stone, Clay & Glass Products 21,615 57.8
Iron and Steel Rolled Products 7,839 11.9
Cast and Forged Steel Products 1,212 6.9
Basic Non-Ferrous Products 3,031 14.5
Metal Products 22,035 46.7
Machinery except electrical 5,834 5.6
Heavy Electrical Apparatus 1,271 8.0
Miscellaneous Industrial Products 3,478 9.4
Gas Supply 363 5.6
Wholesale and Retail Sale 16,136 6.9
Real Estate Rental 1,406 6.5
Transport except Private 4,961 5.3
Private Transport 4,701 8.8
Other Communication Services 1,004 6.3
Others 2,947 8.8
Source: 44, 59
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industry. For example in the U.S. in 1977, output from
the "Stone, Clay, and Glass products" industry to the
construction industry accounted for 46% of the total
output of the industry. Outputs from "Wood Products and
Furniture", "Primary and Fabricated Metals", "Mining Other
Than Metal" and "Electrical Equipment and Supplies"
industries accounted for 33.6%, 17.2%, 9.0%, 8.1%
respectively.
In contrast, there were, in Japan, three industries
which had higher percentages. For example, outputs to the
construction industry from "Mining Other Than Metal", "Wood
Mining, Wooden Product Manufacturing", and "Stone, Clay, and
Glass Products" accounted for more than 50% of total outputs
to construction in 1980. Five more industries recorded
more than 10%. Although the difference in the number of
industries recorded in the two input-output tables (U.S.--23
industries vs. Japan--72 industries) has to be taken into
consideration, the contributions that the construction
industry is making to other industries in Japan were
obviously much greater than the contributions of the U.S.
construction industry to other U.S. industries.
In terms of national employment, again the Japanese
construction industry has been making much more
contributions to Japanese national employment than has U.S.
construction to the national employment in the U.S..
There are 5.4 million employees and workers in the Japanese
construction industry in 1983 compared to 5.1 million in the
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U.S. construction industry in the same year. Japan and
the U.S. have almost the same number of people in the
construction industry, but Japan has half the population of
the U.S.. Therefore, the Japanese construction industry
employed 8.9% of the total workforce in 1984 compared to
4.9% in the U.S. (See Figure 3.4). The percentage in
Japan had incrdased until 1980, but has been rapidly
decreasing since then, while the percentage in the U.S. has
been on a gentle downward trend since 1965.
It is clear that the construction industry in Japan is
playing a more important role in its national economy than
is the U.S. construction industry in the U.S. economy.
One of the reasons has been Japan's energetic efforts to
reconstruct the nation's destroyed infrastructure,
facilities, and residences in a relatively short period
following World War II. Also, the stock of the social
resources already accumulated in the U.S. has been making
construction less important in the U.S. than it is in Japan.
3.2 Characteristics of U.S. and Japanese Construction
Markets, Industries, and Firms
3.2.1 General Trend of U.S. and Japanese Construction
Markets
The domestic construction volume in the U.S. in real
term has remained within a certain range since 1965, but it
fluctuated considerably in two- to four-year cycles. In
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Figure 3.4 : Workforce in Construction Industry as Percentage of
the Total Workforce in the U.S. and Japan
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contrast Japanese domestic construction volume in real terms
had grown at a significantly high rate until the oil crisis
of 1973. However, it has been on a downward trend,
especially after 1980.
Figure 3.5 shows total new construction put in place in
the U.S. in 1977 constant dollars. While the amount has
remained within the range of $150 and $200 billion, it has
fluctuated cyclically. There were at least three major
lows, in 1970, 1975, and 1982 and two peaks in 1973 and
1978. After the lows of 1982, U.S. domestic construction
has been on a steep upward curve.
As clearly indicated in Figure 3.5, the fluctuation of
U.S. new construction in dollar value corresponds exactly to
the fluctuation of new private housing construction in
dollar value. Annual changes in total construction
spending equals variation in housing construction. Ups
and downs in all U.S. domestic construction are highly
influenced by the ups and downs of new housing construction.
Construction other than new housing is stable in the U.S..
Japanese domestic construction, as stated in the
previous chapter, had shown tremendous growth until the oil
crisis. (See Figure 3.6) Its value almost tripled in real
terms between 1965 and 1973. After the sudden drop in
construction demand caused by the oil crisis, the
Japanese construction market expanded again, but more slowly
compared to the rate before the oil crisis. After the
second oil crisis in 1980, the Japanese domestic
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Figure 3.5 : U.S. Total New Construction Put in Place and
New Housing Construction in 1977 Constant Dollars
Source: 13.a, b
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construction market has been slowly shrinking in its scale.
Japanese housing construction investment has
characteristics quite different from U.S. housing
construction. As indicated in Figure 3.6, changes in the
annual rate of Japanese housing construction are moderate
and proportional to that of Japanese total construction
investment. Unlike in the U.S., the change in housing
construction in dollar value is not necessarily equal to the
change in construction investment in dollar value.
3.2.2 Components of U.S. and Japanese Construction Markets
(U.S. Construction Market)
Public construction in the U.S. accounted for 30% of
total construction in 1965. However, since then, its
share has been decreasing. Public construction in the
U.S. accounted for below 20% in 1984 (See Figure 3.7).
Conversely, U.S. private construction has been gaining
shares and accounted for 80% in 1984. Among U.S. private
construction, residential private construction is the
largest category. It has been accounting for around 40%
of the U.S. total new construction on average though it has
been fluctuating between 30 to 50% of the total new
construction. Private residential construction is more
than half of U.S. private construction.
The same thing can be said in the classification of
building and non-building construction. Although building
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Figure 3.7 : Rough Breakdown of U.S. New Construction Put in Place
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construction has been accounting for 70% of the total
construction constantly, only private residential
construction fluctuated a lot (See Figure 3.8). As
mentioned already, ups and downs in the U.S. new housing
construction exactly parallel variation of total U.S. new
construction. New housing construction is not only the
largest but also the most influential type of construction
in the entire U.S. construction industry.
The fluctuation in new housing construction in the U.S.
is related to loan interest rates and, more closely, to the
entire economic situation in the U.S. Figure 3.9 shows
the relationship between U.S. new housing construction and
interest rates. In the period of 1965 - 1984, there were
three highs and three lows in the new housing construction
in the U.S. The three highs occurred in 1973, 1978, and
1984 (1984 might be in the middle of an upward slope) for
and the lows in 1970, 1975, and 1982. When interest rates
for new-home mortgage loans went up and stayed at a high
level, the rate of new house construction fell. When
interest rates for mortgage loans became relatively low and
flat, new housing construction went up one or two years
after the rates came down.
However, the movement of interest rates for new-home
mortgage loans does not entirely explain the mechanism of
the upward movements in new housing construction. For
instance, the movements in the period of 1970-1973, 1975-
1978, and 1982-1984 do not fit the above pattern exactly.
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Figure 3.8 : Building and Non-building New Construction in the U.S.
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Figure 3.9 : New Housing Construction and Interest Rate in the U.S.
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Figure 3.10: New Housing Construction and Change in Real GNP
in the U.S.
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Figure 3.10 illuminates remainder of the story; it shows
that fluctuations in new housing construction exactly
corresponds to the changes in the GNP of the U.S. The
relationship may be as follows: When the economy is
faltering, overall interest rates are dropped to stimulate
investment and activate the economy. The consequent
upturn in the entire U.S. economy relieves peoples'
uncertainty for the future and encourages them to invest in
new houses. Also, during a period of economic upturn in
the U.S., interest rates for new-home mortgage loans drop
and stabilize, as an effect of lower overall interest rates.
Low-cost mortgages certainly contribute to the economic
optimism of households considering investment in a new home.
As the economy reaches its peak and begins to decline,
people who are still undecided abandon the idea of
investment in housing, because they feel uncertain about the
future. Finally, the value of housing construction declines
as the houses already under construction are completed one
after another. In the U.S. housing construction closely
reflects changes in the overall U.S. economy, not simply the
movements of interest rates on mortgage loans.
Among U.S. non-residential private construction, the
fastest growing categories have been office buildings and
other commercial buildings, especially after 1981 (See
Figure 3.11). The new tax law enacted in 1981
precipitated so much investment in construction in these two
categories because it offered attractive tax shelters for
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Figure 3.11 : Breakdown of U.S. New Construction Put in Place
Percentage for Total
Construction Put in Place
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Note: Data on industrial construction before 1968, office buildings
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Others in public construction include military facilities, conserv-
ation and development, sewer systems, and water supply facilities.
Others in nonresidential private construction include religious
buildings, educational, hospital and institutional buildings.
Source: 13.a, b
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depreciation and investment tax credit. Although the U.S.
construction market is facing less attractive potential tax
law changes in the near future, investment in these two
categories is still active as of early 1986 as investors
hurry to take advantage of the existing tax law.
Other incentives which have affected non-residential
private construction recently include more easily availabile
financing, such as lower yields on corporate bonds and
short-term business loans compared to yields at the
beginning of 1980s; surging business profits accompanying
the overall economic boom in the U.S. after 1982; and the
record-high inflow of foreign capital to the U.S. (Source:
17.a., b.)
Seventy percent of non-residential private construction
has been recently performed in southern and western regions
of the U.S., such as California, Arizona, Texas, and
Georgia. (Source: 13.a.)
Among U.S. non-residential private construction,
industrial facilities construction increased between 1972
and 1982, but is decreasing after 1982. The key in this
category of construction may be the solid growth of the U.S.
economy and general improvement of U.S. manufacturers'
competitiveness. Depreciation of the foreign exchange
value of the dollar will also help.
In public construction in the U.S. before 1970, new
highway and street construction accounted for more than 10%
of U.S. total construction. However, after the completion
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of the nationwide highway system at around 1970, this market
declined rapidly and has provided only 3% of the total U.S.
construction market. Public building construction has
been slowly and continuously declining since 1965.
(Japanese Construction Market)
Because the details of the components of the Japanese
construction market have been discussed already as part of
the discussion of fluctuations in all Japanese industries in
Chapter 2, only a general overview of Japanese construction
market is necessary here.
Private construction in the Japanese construction
market had been increasing until the oil crisis of 1973,
supported by energetic construction investment in non-
residential private construction (See Figure 3.6).
Private construction investment recorded its peak and
accounted for 70% of total construction investment in 1973
(See Figure 3.12). Since 1973, however, the share of
private construction in total construction investment has
been declining continuously. Its share has reached
slightly below 60%.
Conversely, public construction has been increasing
since 1973 and has been accounting for more than 40% of
Japanese total construction investment recently.
Fluctuations in building construction in Japan have
followed almost exactly the activity in private construction
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Figure 3.12 : Rough Breakdown of Construction Investment in Japan
Percentage for Total
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Figure 3.13: Building and Non-building Construction in Japan
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as a whole because a large portion of non-building
construction has been offered by public sector (See Figure
3.13).
Residential private construction in Japan has been
proportional to the movement of Japan's total construction
investment as mentioned already. Private residential
construction had been almost half of non-residential
construction until 1973, but it has accounted for more than
half since then. However, the share of private
residential construction has been declining also since
around 1975 although not as significantly as non-residential
private construction.
3.2.3 Structure of the Construction Industry
The construction industry is highly fragmented both in
the U.S. and Japan, but more so in the U.S. There were
1.36 million establishments in the U.S. construction
industry in 1982. Of these, 66.9% reported no payroll,
that is, they were very tiny firms having no employees (See
Figure 3.14). In addition, establishments with 1-4
employees accounted for 20.6% and establishments with 5-9
employees accounted for 6.2% of the total establishments.
Taken together, 93.7% of the total establishments in the
U.S. construction industry were small firms with less than
10 employees.
Only 0.08% of the establishments were large firms with
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Figure 3.14: Industry Structure by Number of Workforce in the U.S.
and Japan
U.S. Without # of Employee
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Total: 5.15(mil)
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All Business
Receipts
Total: $356(bil)
Japan
(1983)
Composition of
Establishment
Total: 514(Thou)
Composition of
All Business
Receints
Total: $ 218(bil)
Note: ComposLtion of workforce of Japan is not available.
Source: 12.c
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more than 250 employees. Medium-sized firms (with 10 -
249 employees) were also scarce, accounting for 6.22%.
However, the 93.7% of small firms employed only 39.4% of the
total workforce of 5.15 million and shared only 27.1% of
total business receipts in the construction industry.
Large firms, only 0.08% of establishments, employed 14.5% of
the total workforce and shared 19.4% of total business
receipts in the industry. The performance of medium sized
firms is also interesting. With 6.22% of all
establishments, they employ 46.1% of the workforce and
accrue 53.6% of total receipts in the industry.
Firms may be classified in greater detail on the basis
of total receipts (See Figure 3.15). In Figure 3.15,
establishments are classified as;
Very tiny firms : annual receipts -- below 0.1 mil
Small firms : " -- $0.1 mil-$1 mil
Medium sized firms: " -- $ 1 mil-$5 mil
Large firms : -- over $5 mil
In the industry as a whole, similar proportions characterize
the number of workforce of firms in each group. Very tiny
and small firms comprised 96.3% of all establishments in
1982. They accounted for 40.4% of the total workforce,
and 29.3% of the total business receipts. Large firms
included 0.7% of all establishments. These firms
accounted for 34.2% of the total workforce and 47.0% of the
total business receipts.
Fragmentation was especially significant among special
trade contractors. One million out of 1.36 million
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Figure 3.15: Detailed Construction Industry Structure in the U.S.(1982)
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establishments were special trade contractors. Among
special trade contractors, 97.5% were very tiny to small
firms. General building contractors are similarly
fragmented as indicated by the large number of small
residential builders in this category.
The least fragmented were heavy construction
contractors. Although many small firms existed in this
category (86.6%), large firms accounted for 3.8% of
the total establishments, 64.2% of the total workforce, and
74.0% of the total business receipts.
In the construction industry in Japan, there were
514,000 establishments, 37.7% of the total number of
establishments in the U.S.. Of the total number of
construction firms in Japan, 61.5% fell into the "small"
category of establishments with less than 9 employees (See
Figure 3.14). These firms shared only 4.3% of the total
business receipts of the construction industry. Large
firms with more than 200 employees accounted for 0.14% of
the total establishments, but 26% of the total business
receipts.
Also significant in the construction industry in Japan
were medium-sized firms with 10-200 employees. These
firms accounted for 38.4% of the total establishments and
69.7% of the total business receipts. Table 3.6 shows
the increase in number of establishments in Japan.
Between 1975 and 1983, the fastest growing firms were medium
sized firms with capital of Y5-10 million ($20.7-41.3
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Table 3.6: Change in Construction Establishments in Japan
by Size of Firms
III
76.6
75.2
73.2
72.6
71.2
70.4
68.7
66.8
64.9
63.3
51.5
12.9
13.5
13.4
13.6
13.6
14.1
14.7
15.3
16.0
16.4
4.9
5.3
6.5
6.6
7.2
7.5
7.9
8.6
9.3
9.8
IV
4.3
4.7
5.9
6.3
6.8
7.0
7.6
8.1
8.5
9.2
1968
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
(Percentage)
V VI VII
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.14
Number of Firms
1975 256,870
1983 316,066
Rate of +23.0
Increase
(1975-
1983)
46,866 22,915 20,590 1,257 1,749
86,590 53,754 50,615 3,506 2,791
+84.7 134.6 +145.8 +178.9 +59.0
Note: Capital sizes of firms in Yen value are as below in
Dollar value.
I Below Y2 mil (Below $8.2 thousand)
II Y2 mil- Y5 mil ($8.2- $20.7 thousand)
III Y5 mil- Y10 mil ($20.7- $41.3 thousand)
IV Y10 mil- Y50 mil ($41.3- $206.7 thousand)
V Y50 mil- Y100 mil ($206.7- $413.2 thousand)
VI Y100 mil- Y1 bil ($413.2- $4,132 thousand)
VII More than Y1 bil (More than $4,132 thousand)
Note: Total of percentages from I through VII equals 100%.
Source: 48, 49
16.8 10.5 9.8
550
725
+31.8
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thousand), Y10-50 million ($41.3-206.7 thousand), and Y50-
100 million ($206.7-413.2 thousand). These firms' rates
of growth in this period were 134.6%, 145.8%, and 178.9%
respectively. These medium sized firms accounted for
47.0% of the construction completed in Japan in 1983 whereas
large firms with capital of more than Y1 billion (more than
$4.1 million) accounted for 26.0% (See Table 3.7).
These medium-sized firms are now competing successfully
with large firms in the Japanese domestic construction
market, a phenomenon which has apparently been lowering
marginal profit in the industry.
Compared to the U.S., Japan has a relatively small
number of special trade contractors (35.5% of the total in
Japan while 73.4% of the total in the U.S.) (Figure 3.16).
Japanese special trade contractors shared a smaller portion
of the total workforce (45.6%) and business receipts
(37.7%), compared to U.S. special trade contractors (60.1%
and 42.6% respectively). There were more heavy
construction general contractors in Japan (22.7% of the
total establishments); they had more employees (34.1% of
the total workforce) than their U.S. counterparts which
comprised 4.3% of the total number of establishments, and
received 17.1% of the total business receipts.
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Figure 3.16 : Industry Structure by Type of Firms in the U.S. and Japan
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Table 3.7: Number of Construction Establishments and
Value of Construction Completed by Size of
Capital
III IV
(1983)
V VI VI I
Number 316,066 86,590 53,754 50,615 3,506 6,297 725
of
Firms
(%) 61.5 16.8 10.5 9.8 0.7 1.2 0.1
Const. 4.3 9.2 10.6 29.5 6.9 13.5 26.0
Completed(%)
Total
Number
of Firms 514,047
Total
Construction
Completed $217.5 billion
Note: Capital sizes in Yen value are as below in Dollar
value.
I Below Y2 mil (Below $8.2 thousand)
II Y2 mil- Y5 mil ($8.2- $20.7 thousa
III Y5 mil- Y10 mil ($20.7- $41.3 thousa
IV Y10 mil- Y50 mil ($41.3- $206.7 thousa
V Y50 mil- Y100 mil ($206.7- $413.2 thousa
VI Y100 mil- Y1 bil ($413.2- $4,132 thousa
VII More than Y1 bil (More than 94.132 thousa
nd)
nd)
nd)
nd)
nd)
nd)
Each total of percentages from size I through VII in
number of firms and value of construction completed
equals 100%.
Source: 48, 49
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3.3 Construction Cost
3.3.1 Construction Cost as a Whole
Cost increase was significant after the oil crisis of
1973 in both countries; the rate of increase in costs was
almost identical until 1980. However, construction costs
ceased to increase after 1980 in Japan while they continued
to rise in the U.S.. As a result, if the construction
costs in 1965 are set at 100, the construction costs index
were about 370 in 1984 in the U.S., but only around 330 in
Japan in the same year (See Figure 3.17 and 3.18).
In the U.S., increases in labor costs had mainly
determined the rise in construction costs until 1974.
Thereafter, increases in construction costs were due mainly
to other factors. Especially, after 1978, material cost
and financing cost have become major factors in increased
construction costs.
In Japan, on the other hand, the main factor in rising
construction costs has been the increase in material cost as
shown in Figure 3.18. Although the rate of increase in
wages has been much more significant in Japan than in the
U.S., it has been balanced by the low financing costs. (In
real term, financing cost in Japan actually has been
decreasing.)
Furthermore, although the increase in wages has been
significant in Japan, it has not affected total construction
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Figure 3.17 : Trend in Construction Cost and Input Prices in the U.S.
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Figure 3.18: Trend in Construction Cost and Input Prices in Japan
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cost as much as has rising material cost because wage for
construction workers were originally very low compared with
the wages of U.S. construction workers. A worker's monthly
wage in 1984 in Japan ($1,316 in average) was still lower
than that of U.S. workers. ($9.94/hour x 7 hours x 22 days =
$1,530, Source: 58, or 443.42/week x 4 weeks = $1,773.7,
Source: 70)
3.3.2 Cost Structure of Construction Firms
Conspicuous differences between U.S. and Japanese
contractors' cost structures appear in the share of
subcontract cost and labor costs (See Table 3.8 and 3.9).
In the construction industry as a whole, Japanese
contractors have more than twice as a large share of
subcontract costs in the total cost but less than half as
large a share of labor cost as U.S. contractors. Building,
heavy, and even special trade contractors show more or less
the same tendency.
However, this does not necessarily mean that Japanese
contractors' subcontract rates are simply more than twice as
large as U.S. contractors or that Japanese contractors are
performing works with less than half the labor.
These differences arise from the two things, first, the
multi-layer subcontract system in Japan, and second, the
differences in what entity may be considered the "employer"
of construction labor in the Japanese and U.S. industrial
structures. Although further detail will be argued later
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in this chapter, basically the multi-layer subcontract
system is one of the most conspicuous characteristics in
Japanese construction industry. For example, general
contractor A subcontract a portion of work to contractor B
(usually a special trade contractor). Contractor B
subcontracts a part of the work to contractor C (other
special trade contractor) and contractor C subcontract it to
contractor D and so on, down to very tiny and highly
specialized firms.
As a result, Japanese contractors, from large general
contractors through small special trade contractors,
subcontract their work to other contractors. Therefore,
the typical pattern in Japan may be for a general contractor
on the top of the layer to provides only engineers to
coordinate and manage the subcontractors on a project. The
first layer subcontractors also provide one coordinator and
several workers. Contractors below the second layer
fundamentally provide the majority of construction workers.
Japanese general contractors, therefore, do not employ
any workers in their firms whether they are building or
heavy contractors. Instead, they usually employ many
various types of engineers who manage any jobs related to a
given construction project, but not any workers.
On the other hand, U.S. contractors have their own
workforce in addition to engineers who manage projects.
U.S. contractors, even large general contractors, have a
considerable number of their own construction workers on
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Table 3.8: Cost Structure of U.S. Contractors by Type of
Firms
(Percentage,1982)
Material Subcontract Labor Other
Cost Cost Cost Cost
Construction 30.9 25.2 29.8 14.1
Industry
General Building 22.6 49.3 17.8 10.3
Contractors &
Operative Builders
Single-Family 34.2 28.2 37.7
House Contractors
Other Residential 22.0 54.5 23.5
Bldgs Contractors
Operative Builders 24.2 43.4 32.4
Industrial Bldgs 21.4 47.9 30.7
Other Non- 18.3 58.8 22.9
Residential Bldgs
Heavy Construction 33.2 18.8 34.1 14.0
General Contractors
Special Trade 37.0 7.5 38.1 17.5
Contractors
Note: "Labor Cost" and "Other Cost" are not available
separately in general building contractors & operative
builders.
Material cost includes all payment to parts and
materials purchased by contractors.
Subcontract cost includes all payments made for
construction work subcontracted out to other
contractors. If materials are purchased directly
by the subcontractors, the payment will be included in
subcontract cost.
Labor cost is equal to payments for all employees
(construction workers and other employees).
Other cost includes power, fuel, and lubricants,
rental payments for machinery, equipment and
structures, purchased services (such as communication
services, repairs to structures, related facilities,
machinery and equipment), capital expenditure for
assets, and employer costs for fringe benefits.
Source: 12.c.
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Table 3.9: Cost Structure of Japanese Contractors by Type of
Firms
(Percentage,1982)
Material Subcontract Labor Other
Cost Cost Cost Cost
Construction 26.0 50.3 10.1 13.6
Industry
Heavy & Building 23.7 54.5 9.0 12.8
Contractors
Bldg Contractors 19.1 64.5 7.9 8.5
Heavy Contractors 27.4 39.0 14.0 19.2
Special Trade 37.1 37.0 12.3 13.6
Contractors
Note: Heavy and building contractors are those who are
involved in both heavy and building construction and
percentage of neither one is less than 20%.
Material cost includes all payment for material and
parts purchased by contractors.
Subcontract cost includes all payments made for
construction work subcontracted out to other
contractors. If material is purchased directly
by the subcontractors, the payment will be included
in subcontract cost.
Labor cost includes all payments made to
subcontractors which provides the contractor with only
labor.
Other costs include all payments to employees, power,
fuel, and lubricants costs, payments for purchase,
repair, lease, and depreciation for machinery and
equipment, and tax payments.
Source: 48
139
their jobs. U.S. general contractors contract with labor
unions or with open-shop workers directly to obtain workers,
then put these workers on their payroll. General
contractors consider these workers to be company employees,
at least, in the interpretation of payment to workers. (The
payment to such workers is on the payroll.)
Therefore, Japanese contractors' labor cost in Table
3.9 means the labor cost paid to subcontractors who provide
only workers while U.S. contractors' labor cost in Table 3.8
means the mixed cost paid to engineers originally employed
by general contractors and to construction workers
temporarily on the payroll or permanently employed by
general contractors. In Japan, "labor cost" usually means
the work done by other contractors' workers. "Labor cost"
as figured in Table 3.9 is created for statistics purpose.
Also, "labor cost" is usually considered a part of
"subcontract cost" because as mentioned, all the workers are
provided by subcontractors in Japan.
Almost 20% of wages are paid to engineers and
administrative personnel and 80% is paid to construction
workers in the U.S. industry as a whole (See Table 3.10).
(Percentages have to be modified to apply to each type of
construction firm.) In this context, subcontract cost plus
80% of labor cost incurred by a U.S. contractor correspond
to subcontract cost plus labor cost for a Japanese
contractor. Japanese contractors have subcontract rate of
60.4% while for U.S. contractors the subcontract rate is
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Table 3.10: Breakdown of Payments to Employees in
Contructors
the U.S.
1982 1977 1972
($ bil) (%) ($ bil) (%) ($ bil) (%)
Payments to Employees 18.5 23.5 11.9 21.6 7.8 19.5
(Engineers and Admi-
nistrative personnel)
Payments to Employees 60.2 76.5 43.1 78.4 32.2 80.5
(Construction Workers)
Total 78.7 100.0 55.0 100.0 40.0 100.0
Source: 12.a., 12.b., 12.c.
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49.04% (29.8% x 0.8 + 25.2%) as defined for Japanese
contractors. Twenty percent of labor cost for a U.S.
contractor should be added up to "other cost" when the
Japanese-oriented deffinition is applied to U.S.
contractors. It is important to keep in mind these basic
differences in the notions of subcontract and labor cost in
the U.S. and Japan when considering the cost structure of
U.S. and Japanese contractors.
Both U.S. and Japanese contractors, as a whole, spend 25
-30% on materials. General building contractors in both
countries have the lowest material cost and special trade
contractors have the highest material cost. General
building contractors in both countries have the highest
subcontract cost and special trade contractors have the
lowest. U.S. building contractors, single-family house
builders (usually very small and having characteristics
similar to special trade contractors) have a low rate of
subcontracting and use more workforce of their own.
Although Japanese special trade contractors appear to
have a higher subcontract rate than U.S. special trade
contractors, this is also the combined effect of the multi-
layer subcontract system and differing relationships to
labor. Japanese special trade contractors subcontract to
other special trade contractors while U.S. special trade
contractors employ their own in-house workers (whether
permanently or temporarily) and U.S. special trade
contractors also recognize these workers as employees, at
142
least on payroll. "Other cost" for the U.S. contractors
is generally higher than Japanese contractors both in the
industry as a whole and for each type of contractors. Given
the definition applied by Japanese contractors, 20% of labor
cost for the U.S. contractors must be added to to Japanese
"other cost". This further increased the difference in
"other cost" between U.S. and Japanese contractors. Such
differences are considerable in heavy and special trade
contractors. Probably, much "other cost", generally
considered to be administrative cost, may be attributed to
the lower productivity of large U.S. heavy and building
contractors compared to Japanese contractors, as will be
detailed later.
Material cost goes down as the size of firm goes up in
both countries (Table 3.11 and 3.12). In contrast,
subcontract cost goes up as the size of firm goes up.
Small Japanese contractors, firms with capital below $8,000,
still have a large subcontracting rate because of the
effects outlined above.
Labor cost for U.S. contractors does not vary greatly
between firms of different sizes because workers are counted
in labor cost to the contractors. Labor cost for Japanese
contractors (labor cost paid to subcontractors who provide
only labor) goes down as the size of firm goes up because
large contractors in Japan traditionally tend to treat labor
costs all together and package them in the negotiation with
the subcontractors providing the workers.
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Table 3.11: Cost Structure of U.S. Contractors by Size of
Firms (Number of Employees)
Material
Cost
Subcontract
Cost
(Percentage-1982)
Labor Other
Cost Cost
Const. Industry 29.9 24.3 24.5 21.3
(# of Employees)
1 - 4 35.8 17.3 19.3 27.6
5 - 9 35.3 18.0 24.8 21.9
10 - 49 32.1 23.3 25.4 19.2
50 - 249 27.8 28.3 23.7 20.2
More Than 250 26.0 28.1 26.9 19.0
labor,
Source: 12.c.
Note: Total of percentages of material, subcontract,
and other costs equal 100%.
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Table 3.12: Cost Structure of Japanese Contractors by Size
of Capital
Size of # of
Capital Employees
Material
Cost
Subcontract
Cost
(Percent,
Labor
Cost
1982)
Other
Cost
Construction
Industry
I 1 - 9
II 10 - 19
III 20 - 29
IV 30 - 49
V 50 -100
VI 100 -199
VII Over 200
Note: Size
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VI
of capital
Below
Y 2 mil
Y 5 mil
Y 10 mil
Y 50 mil
Y100 mil
of
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
More than Y
rirm Is catecorized as below!
2 mil (Below $ 8.2 thou)
5 mil ($ 8.2 - $20.7 thou)
10 mil ($ 20.7 - $41.3 thou)
50 mil ($ 41.3 - $206.7 thou)
100 mil ($206.7 - $413.2 thou)
1 bil ($413.2 thou-$4.1 mil)
1 bil (More than $ 4.1 mil)
Total of percentages of material, subcontract, labor,
and other costs equal 100%.
Source: 49
26.0
31.1
33.1
33.3
26.7
21.9
21.4
21.4
50.3
36.1
39.3
39.8
51.6
56.9
56.5
55.1
10.1
16.3
15.2
12.1
10.4
7.9
6.9
8.0
13.6
16.5
12.4
14.8
11.3
13.3
15.2
15.5
~
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Generally, "other cost" for U.S. contractors is larger
than that for Japanese contractors. In addition, by the
deffinition applied to Japanese contractors, 20% of labor
cost has to be added to "other cost". Therefore, U.S.
contractors have twice as large "other cost". This is
partly because they incur more administrative costs by
employing more workers as employees in their firms.
3.3.3 Productivity in the Construction Industry
It is very difficult to measure productivity in the
construction industry because of its character as a service
industry. Also, it is further difficult to compare
productivity between the U.S. and Japanese construction
industries because statistics are not comparable. However,
in this section a comparison will be made, first, of the value of
annual construction completed per employee (1), and second,
of productivity index usually applied to manufacturers.
The U.S. construction industry as a whole show higher
value of construction completed per person. The U.S. had
$268.7 billion in domestic new construction and 5.10 million
employees and workers in the industry in 1983. Therefore,
(1) As for Japanese employees, total construction completed
by all construction firms/number of total employees or
workers. As for U.S., total construction receipts received
by all establishments/number of employees or workers.
Although both construction completed by all construction
firms and total construction receipts by all establishments
have duplication because of subcontract, those figures still
are meaningful to be compared as measuring productivity.
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goes down as the size of a firm approaches the largest.
In contrast, Japan had $217.5 billion in domestic
construction and 5.41 million workforce in the construction
industry in the same year. In Japan, $40,200 was
attributable to each one. Therefore, the U.S. construction
industry had higher productivity than the industry in Japan
in terms of construction completed per employee/worker.
Table 3.13 (1) and (2) show both industries'
productivity by size of firm, as measured by the number of
employees. Although the U.S. construction industry shows
more productivity than Japan in the smallest firms,
including two thirds of all establishments, medium to large
U.S. firms show less productivity than Japanese firms.
Large U.S. firms are only one third to one-half as
productive as largest Japanese firms.
Furthermore, the most notable aspect of the
productivity of U.S. firms is that the level of productivity
Lower productivity in medium to large U.S. firms, especially
large firms, arises partly because U.S. firms employ more
construction workers within firms and count workers as
employees in their payroll so that, as defined here, the
total value of a firm's product is spread across a greater
number of total personnel. Japanese large firms employ
only engineers and administrative personnel and use workers
formally hired by subcontractors. This structural factor may
distort the statistics to make Japanese firms look more
efficient.
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Table 3.13 (1): Construction Completed Per Employee by Type
and Size of Firms in the U.S.
# of
Employees
Cons
Indu
($ thousand per year per employee, 1982)
truction General Heavy Special
strv Bldq. General Trade
as a Whole Contractors Contractors Contractors
& Operative
Builders
Total
Without Payroll
1 -
5 -
10 - 49
50 - 249
500 - 1000
Over 1000
Source: 12.c.
67.1
38.4
53.8
56.5
72.0
93.0
n.a.
n.a.
111.6
77.3
77.4
82.3
111.6
153.9
n.a.
n.a.
83.1
75.7
63.1
63.4
79.1
89.2
89.1
82.4
49.1
26.7
43.4
46.0
56.0
65.7
63.0
53.9
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Table 3.13 (2): Construction Completed Per Employee by Type
and Size of Firms in Japan
($ thousand per year per
Size of Construction General Heavy
Industry
as a Whole
Bldg.
Contractors
General
employee, 1
Special
Trade
Contractors Contractors
Below Y50
Y 50- 100
Y100- 500
Y500-5000
Over 5000
37.5
(4.0)
61.2
(5.6)
102.0
(10.0)
158.0
(62.4)
223.3
(746.7)
39.6
(4.1)
73.0
(4.7)
100.0
(11.0)
150.2
(60.2)
201.8
(510.3)
43.0
(3.2)
84.3
(4.1)
148.0
(6.7)
220.6
(46.3)
260.8
(550.6)
38.2
(3.9)
52.4
(6.4)
98.1
(10.4)
144.2
(60.9)
177.0
(390.9)
Note: The figures in patetheses are average numbers of
employees in the size and type of firms.
Source: 47, 48, 66
Sales
(Y mil)
982)
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However, the differences in productivity figures
between large U.S. and Japanese large firms are too great to
be attributable only to the variation in the distribution of
productivity among workforce alone. In fact, U.S. medium
and especially large firms have less efficient management,
especially personnel management, again because of the large
numbers of workers within major companies.
In the statistics used here for U.S. contractors
(Census of Construction), architectural and engineering work
are not included. Also, treatment of CM (construction
management) which recently has gained a considerable portion
of sales in large firms is not treated separately in the
statistics. Therefore, the comparison made here should be
understood as qualitative not quantitative.
"Traditional" productivity index in the U.S.
construction industry, (modified a little for application to
construction), has been slowly but constantly declining (See
Table 3.14). Although a slight improvement can be observed
after 1982, the level of productivity remains at around 80%
of that in 1965.
In Contrast, productivity in the Japanese construction
industry increased at a fast rate and recorded its peak of
190 in 1972, letting the productivity in 1965 being 100.
However, since then it has remained at slightly lower level,
170 - 180, probably because of the recent shrinkage of the
domestic market though having capability and resources to
perform much more work.
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Table 3.14: Productivity in the Construction Industries in
the U.S. and Japan, 1965 - 1984
Productivity
U.S.
100
97
98
101
94
88
93
94
92
81
81
87
85
82
76
70
71
75
82
84
Index (1965 = 100)
Japan
100
100
117
131
152
157
168
190
188
168
178
174
186
184
181
168
170
171
165
n.a.
Note: Productivity index =
(1965 = 100)
Source: 13.a, 48
Construction Completed per
person per hour
Total Construction Completed/
(# of Workers x Weekly Working
Hours x 52 Week)
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
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3.3.4 Profitability
Because statistics on profitability as well as details
of costs to U.S. contractors as a whole are not available,
this discussion on profitability will be based on selected
statistics of contractors in the U.S. and both selected and
industrywide statistics for Japanese contractors.
Figure 3.19 and 3.20 show characteristics of profits
for contractors in both countries. U.S. contractors show
generally high profitability. However, profitability
differs considerably firm by firm as well as year by year.
Contractors held by conglomerates, such as Kellog Rust,
Inc., Steam Catalytic, Lummus Crest and United Engineering,
Co., show high profitability. while contractors with primary
expertise only in construction, such as Foster Wheeler Corp,
Turner Corp, and Jacobs Engineering Corp, Inc. show
relatively low profitability. Small firms, such as
Cenvill Co., also are gaining high profits. Contractors
held by conglomerates and diversified firms have relatively
moderate term-to-term fluctuation in profits while
contractors with primary expertise in construction show
considerable ups and downs in their profits year by year.
On the other hand, Japanese contractors show very
moderate term to term changes in profitability although
profits themselves are low, compared with those of U.S.
contractors. Also, Japanese firms generally show the same
moderation as fluctuation of their profitability. The
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Figure 3.19 :
Net
10
0
-5
Net Income as Percentage of Total Sales of Selected
U.S. Contractors
Income
(
1975 1980( Year
Note: Numbers in the fPiure indicate the following contractors;
(1) Kellog ýust, Inc., (2) Fluor Corp., (3) Steam Catalytic
(4) Lummus Crest, Inc., (5) Foster T'jheeler Corp., (6) Turner Corp.,
(7) !orrison-Knudsen Co., (8) Ebasco Services, (9) Dravo Corp.,
(10) Centex Corp., (11) United ELngineering, Co., (12) Koppers
Company, Inc., (13) Jacobs Jnoineerinq Group Inc., (14) Cenvill Co.
Source: 3.a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,k,m,o,p,cq,s,u,w and x
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Figure 3.20 : Net Income as Percentage of Total Sales of Selected
Japanese Contractors
Net Income
(T)
Average Net Income in the
Construction IndustryC___(5)
(6)
L IL 1 i
1975 1980
-a-- --- ,
I i I I
Year
Note: Numbers in the figure indicate following contractors;
(1) Taisei Construction Co., (2) Kajima Construction Co.,
(3) Shimizu Construction Co., (4) Ohbavashi-Gumi
(5) Kumagai-Gumi, (6) LHazama-Gumi
Source: 3.j,l,n,r,t, and v
10 Ii
--A -----------
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~
(2) -- ·- ~L -4
,, -0- -T- -·
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profits of individual firms parallel average industry
profits with profit distributed evenly. This is probably
because Japanese firms are quite similar and
undifferetiated. This characteristic will be detailed
later in the comparison of both countries' top contractors.
3.3.5 Detailed Composition of Costs to Japanese Contractors
The percentage of construction cost in total sales is
generally high in heavy, building, and heavy and building
contractors and is low in special trade contractors in Japan
(See Table 3.15). Construction cost rises as the size of
firms increases. The percentage of construction cost has
declined for the industry as a whole, especially in
building, heavy, and heavy and building contractors since
1978 but is rising for special trade contractors. Medium
to large firms have been improving construction cost.
General administrative cost is small in building, heavy
and heavy and building contractors while but large for
special trade contractors (See Table 3.16). Also, general
administrative cost diminishes as firms become large.
General administrative cost has been increasing slowly in
the industry as a whole, but it has been decreasing for
special trade contractors.
Net income before tax (= Total sales - Construction
cost - General administrative cost) has been rising in
building, heavy, and heavy and building contractors but
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Table 3.15: Change in Cost of Sales by
Construction Firm in Japan
Type of Firms
Type and Size of
(Percentage)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Construction Industry 87.4 87.2 87.0 86.5 86.4
Heavy & Bldg Contractors 89.4 89.7 89.3 88.9 87.5
Heavy Contractors 87.3 87.9 87.4 87.5 86.9
Bldg Contractors 88.1 89.0 88.8 87.6 87.3
Special Trade Contractors 81.0 81.9 81.9 82.1 82.9
I 80.8 80.9 80.3 79.8 80.3
II 82.5 82.7 82.2 81.7 81.3
III 85.2 84.4 84.8 84.0 84.1
IV 88.4 87.4 87.6 86.8 86.4
V 88.7 89.7 89.1 88.6 88.1
VI 89.3 89.6 89.7 89.2 88.9
VII 90.0 89.8 89.4 89.0 89.0
Note: Figures are cost of sales as percentages of total
sales in major construction firms.
Size of capital of a firm is categorized as below;
I Below Y 2 mil (Below $ 8.2 thou)
II Y 2 mil - Y 5 mil ($ 8.2 - $ 20.7 thou)
III Y 5 mil - Y 10 mil ($ 20.7 - $ 41.3 thou)
IV Y 10 mil - Y 50 mil ($ 41.3 - $206.7 thou)
V Y 50 mil - Y 100 mil ($206.7 - $413.2 thou)
VI Y100 mil - Y 1 bil ($413.2 thou-$4.1 bil)
VII More than Y 1 bil (More than $4.1 bil)
Source: 49
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Table 3.16: General Administrative Cost for Construction
Type of Firms
Firms by Type and Size of Firms in Japan
(Percentage)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Construction Industry 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.3 10.6
Heavy & Bldg Contractors 8.1 7.8 7.9 8.0 9.0
Heavy Contractors 9.6 9.5 10.1 9.5 10.3
Bldg Contractors 10.1 8.7 8.5 9.1 9.5
Special Trade Contractors 15.8 15.2 14.6 14.8 14.8
I 17.2 17.5 18.0 18.5 18.4
II 15.6 15.5 15.9 16.2 16.9
III 12.5 13.8 12.8 13.3 14.0
IV 9.4 9.8 10.0 10.2 10.7
V 8.4 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.8
VI 7.9 7.7 7.3 7.5 8.0
VII 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7
Note: Figures are general administrative costs as
percentates of total sales in construction firms.
Size of capital is categorized as below;
I Below Y 2 mil (Below $ 8.2 thou)
II Y 2 mil - Y 5 mil ($ 8.2 - $ 20.7 thou)
III Y 5 mil - Y 10 mil ($ 20.7 - $ 41.3 thou)
IV Y 10 mil - Y 50 mil ($ 41.3 - $ 206.7 thou)
V Y 50 mil - Y 100 mil ($206.7 - $ 413.2 thou)
VI Y100 mil - Y 1 bil ($413.2 thou -$4.1 bil)
VII More than Y 1 bil (More than $4.1 bil)
Source: 49
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falling for special trade contractors (Table 3.17). Also,
net income before tax has been falling in small firms while
large firms have been gaining a little.
Heavy, building, and heavy and building contractors
incur higher construction cost than special trade
contractors but compensate for high construction cost by
smaller administrative cost. As a result, they are making
more profits than are special trade contractors. The same
characteristic applies to large versus small firms.
3.4 Various Characteristics of the Construction Industries
and Contractors in the U.S. and Japan
In this section, various unique characteristics of the
construction industry and firms in the two countries are
contrasted; those that have not been mentioned so far will
be reviewed. Some of the considerable differences between
the two countries could be crucial to the entry of Japanese
contractors into the U.S. construction market.
3.4.1 Characteristics of the Top Contractors in the U.S. and
Japan
The top ranking contractors show clear differences
between the U.S. and Japan. Table 3.18 and 3.19
demonstrate some of the most important. U.S. top ranking
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Table 3.17: Change in Net Income Before Tax by
of Construction Firms in Japan
Type of Firm
Type and Size
(Percentage)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Construction Industry 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7
Heavy & Bldg Contractors 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.9 3.2
Heavy Contractors 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.3
Bldg Contractors 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.9 3.1
Special Trade Contractors 2.5 2.1 2.7 2.4 1.6
I 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.5
II 1.3 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9
III 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.5
IV 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.7
V 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7
VI 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.8
VII 3.1 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.1
Note: Figures are net income before tax
total sales of major construction
Size of capital of a firm is cate
I Below Y 2 mil (Belo
II Y 2 mil - Y 5 mil ($ 8
III Y 5 mil - Y 10 mil ($ 20
IV Y 10 mil - Y 50 mil ($ 41
V Y 50 mil - Y 100 mil ($206
VI Y100 mil - Y 1 bil ($413
VII More than Y 1 bil (More
as percentages
firms.
for
gorized as below;
w $ 8.2 thou)
.2 - $ 20.7 thou)
.7 - $ 41.3 thou)
.3 - $206.7 thou)
.7 - $413.2 thou)
.2 thou-$4.1 bil)
than $4.1 bil)
Source: 49
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contractors, including all of the top 10 contractors,
specialize in plant and industrial facilities construction.
Because most of the recent opportunities for plant and
industrial facilities construction has been offered by
developing countries and oil-producing countries, the
percentages of foreign contracts in total contracts received
by these contractors are generally very high. Also,
because of the complex nature of such plant and industrial
facilities construction, CM (Construction Management)
contracts comprise a large portion of such contracts.
Furthermore, all such plant contractors fundamentally
provide customers with services on a design/construct base.
In contrast, the all top 20 Japanese contractors, like
all Japanese contractors, specialize only in building and
/or heavy construction. These firms do not provide
engineering and construction services for plant and
industrial facilities. (Such services are performed by other
types of firms as listed in the middle of Table 3.19. Plant
construction in Japan will be discussed later in this
chapter.) Top ranking Japanese contractors as well as
other contractors in Japan do not provide customers with CM.
Also, as detailed in Chapter 2, these firms' major arenas
are fundamentally located in the Japanese domestic
construction market.
Figure 3.21 and 3.22 portray changes in the rankings of
the top ranking contractors in both countries in terms of
the value of annual contracts received. U.S. top ranking
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Table 3.18: Detailed Business Operation of U.S. Top
Contractors
Total A
Contract (%)
($ mil)
(1984)
B Type of work CM
(%) Plant Bldg. Heavy (%)
Kellog Rust, Inc. 10.855 83.5
Fluor Corp. 8,353 80.8
Bechtel Group Corp. 8,220 68.4
The Parsons Corp. 7,514 73.9
Stearn Catalytic 4,932 100
Brown & Root, Inc. 3,884 85.6
Lummus Crest, Inc. 3,200 100
Stone & Webster 2,923 78.0
Foster Wheeler Corp.2,413 100
Raymond Int'l, Inc. 2,347 100
Turner Corp. 2,154 ---
Morrison-Knudsen Co.2,086 85.6
Ebasco Services 1,580 100
Jones Group, Inc. 1,535 ---
Guy F. Atkinson Co. 1,499 ---
BE & K, Inc. 1,255 ---
Dravo Corp. 1,232 100
Gilbane Bldg. Co. 1,149 ---
Perini Corp. 1,139 ---
Barton-Malow Co. 1,126 ---
79.5
18.3
59.7
40.1
11.1
33.2
71.9
69.0
80.1
59.5
1.5
22.2
8.5
0.2
25.6
0.0
30.6
0.0
43.4
0.0
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
x
x
x
x
x
xxx
x
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x 25
x 8
xxx 35
x 83
3
x 20
68
76
12
xxx 43
1
x --
xxx --
5
-- m
94
xxx --
xxx 94
Note: "A" indicates design/construct contracts as percentage
of total contracts received.
"B" indicates foreign contracts as percentage of total
cotracts received.
"xxx" indicates the area of work primarily involved.
"x" indicates the area of work involved also but not
so much.
CM column indicates the percentage accounted for by
construction management contracts.
Figures in "Total Contract" include prime construction
contracts, shares of joint ventures, subcontracts,
design-contract and construction management contracts
in which the firm is exposed to financial liability
similar to a general contractor (greater than
$500,000). Parent company's total includes
susidiaries' performance. A design-contract is based
on the erected value of plant including installed
equipment.
Construction management contracts are based on the
erected value of project managed.
Source: 18.a. - h., 3.a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, k, m, o, p,
q, s, u, w, x.
Rank Firm
xxx
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Table 3.19: Detailed Business Operation of Top Japanese
General Contractors
(1985)
Rank Firm Total % of Type of work CM
Contract Foreign Plant Bldg. Heavy (%)
($ mil) Contract
1. Taisei Const. 4,192 6.8 xxx xxx 0
2. Kajima Const. 4,034 6.9 xxx xxx 0
3. Simizu Const. 3,998 8.9 xxx xxx 0
4. Ohbayashi-Gumi 3,317 5.3 xxx xxx 0
5. Takenaka Komuten 2,972 7.4 xxx 0
6. Kumagai-Gumi 2,660 21.0 xxx xxx 0
7. Fujita-Kogyo 1,894 5.1 xxx xxx 0
8. Hazama-Gumi 1,540 17.2 xxx xxx 0
9. Toda Construction 1,488 2.8 xxx xxx 0
10. Tobishima Const. 1,362 4.3 xxx xxx 0
11. Maeda Construction 1,360 4.2 xxx xxx 0
12. Nishimatsu Const. 1,228 13.6 xxx xxx 0
13. Goyo Construction 1,186 32.1 x xxx 0
14. Tokyu Construction 1,171 4.7 xxx xxx 0
15. Sato Kogyo 1,167 11.0 xxx xxx 0
16. Mitsui Construction 1,065 2.0 xxx xxx 0
17. Kohnoike-Gumi 991 1.8 xxx xxx 0
18. Okumura-Gumi 982 1.3 xxx xxx 0
19. Sumitomo Const. 838 2.9 xxx xxx 0
20. Hasegawa Komuten 837 0.0 xxx 0
(Top Plant Design/Constructors) (1985)
Rank Firm Total % of Type of work CM
Contract Foreign Plant Bldg. Heavy (%)
($ mil) Contract
1. Chiyada Chemical 1,321 82.0 xxx 0
2. Nikki (JGC Corp.) 1,314 58.0 xxx 0
3. Toyo Engr. Corp. 748 86.0 xxx 0
Note: "xxx" indicates the area of work primarily involved.
"x" indicates the area of work involved also but not
so much.CM column indicates the percentage accounted
for by construction management contracts.
Figures in "Total Contract" include prime construction
contracts, shares of joint ventures, subcontracts,
design-contract and construction management contracts
where the firm is exposed to financial liability
similar to a general contractor (greater than
$500,000). Parent company's total includes
susidiaries' performance. A design-contract is based
on the erected value of plant including installed
equipment. Construction management contracts based on erected
value of project managed.
Source: 3.j, 1, n, r, v.
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Figure 3.21 : Change in the Rankings of the U.S. Top Contractors
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Figure 3.22 : Change in the Rankings of the Japanese Top Contractors
1944 1965 1982 1983 1984
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Note: Rankings are based on value of annual contracts received.
Source: 3. j,1, n, r, t, v,51
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contractors fluctuate considerably year by year. For
example, Brown and Root, Inc. was ranked No.6 in 1984, but
was No.7 in 1983 and No.14 in 1982. Stone & Webster was
ranked No.8 in 1984, but was No.25 in 1983 and No.17 in
1982. Moreover, only two firms in the top 10 in 1972 were
still in the top 10 in 1984.
Japanese contractors, on the contrary, are very stable.
Six firms from the top changed places only among themselves
between 1982 and 1984. Firms at No.7 through No.10
remained the same places during this period. All the top 10
firms in 1965 were still in the top 10 in 1984 and
surprisingly, seven out of the top 10 firms in 1944 were still
among the top 10 in 1984. The other three firms in the top 10
in 1944 were still within the top 25 in 1984.
Figure 3.23 also shows the clear contrast in the
degrees of fluctuation in the value of annual contracts
received by the top five contractors in both countries.
The value of contracts received by U.S. top five contractors
fluctuate significantly year by year while the value of
contracts received by Japanese contractors has been very
stable. These Japanese firms are competing each other with
very narrow margin.
Probably the major reason for the comparatively wide
fluctuation in the rankings and value of contracts received
among U.S. firms is because they specialize in plant and
industrial facilities construction. Such projects are
generally very large in scale so that the acquisition or
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Figure 3.23 : Change in the Annual Construction Contracts Received
by U.S. and Japanese Top 5 Contractors
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loss of a particular contract may affect considerably the
value of a firm's total annual contract. Also, because the
majority of such contracts are offered by foreign countries,
a change in the situation of the world economy or of the
economy in a client country will affect the availability of
projects considerablly.
The importance of wide year-by-year fluctuation
inevitably determines the way in which U.S. contractors are
operated and maintained. As mentioned, some of the top 20
firms are owned by large holding companies (conglomerates),
or are highly diversified within themselves. These modes
of operation protects these firms from the risk inherent in
year-by-year fluctuation. Table 3.20 describes details of
the business operations of U.S. and Japanese contractors.
Among the U.S. contractors in the table, the small number of
contractors which performing mainly or only engineering &
construction include Foster Wheeler Corp. (98.6% of its
sales is from construction. Percentages of other firms
in the parentheses below indicate amount of sales from
engineering & construction.), Turner Corp.(82.4%), Centex
Corp.(88.2%), and Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.(100%).
However, these firms are different from Japanese contractors
in the following points; Foster Wheeler and Jacobs
Engineering Group, Inc. provide construction and engineering
services, but in plant and industrial facilities which
Japanese contractors do not touch, such as chemical
processing plants, energy-related facilities, fertilizer
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Table 3.20: Detailed Structure of U.S. and Japanese
Contractors-(1)
Kellog
Rust
Fluor
Corp.
Stearn Lummus
Catalytic Crest
Foster
wheeler
Rank 1 2 5 7 9
Parent The Air Combustion
Firm Signal Products Engr. Co.
company Co.
Areas of Engr. & Engr. & Engr. & Engr. & Engr. &
Exper- Const- Const- Const- Const- Const-
tise ruction ruction, ruction ruction ruction
(Metal, Metal,Coal(Gas, (Gas, (Process
Energy, Mining Chemical, Process, Plant,
Mining) Operation Energy) Energy), Energy)
Special Oil&Gas Equipment Electro- Real Estate
Chemical drillion of Air- nics Engr.
Mfg. plane
($ mil)
Asset 5,511 3,892 2,327 2,508 897
Sales 6,005 4,401 1,735 3,057 1,327
Contract (10,855) (8,353) (4,932) (3,200) (2,413)
(by ENR)
(%)
Income 4.8
Property & 16.9
Equipment
in Assets
(% in Sales)
Const. n.a.
Real Estate n.a.
Others n.a.
Total 100.0
0.02
60.1
72.8
0.0
27.2
100.0
8.1
68.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
100.0
3.3
55.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
100.0
2.7
24.7
98.6
1.4
0.0
100.0
Source: 18.a. - h.,
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Table 3.20: Detailed Structure of U.S. and Japanese
Contractors-(2)
Morison- Ebasco
Knudsen
Dravo Centex
Rank 11 12 13 17 23
Parent Enserach
Firm
Areas of Const- Engr. & Engr. & Engr. & Const-
Exper- ruction, Const- Const- Const- ruction,
tise Real ruction, ruction, ruction Const.
Estate Ship(Gas, Gas dis- (Natural Material
Stone Operation tribution,Resource),Produc-
Product- Mfg. of Oil Pro- Cargo tion
ion Railway- duction, Produc-
cars) Oil Field tion, Pipe
Operation Mfg.
($ mil)
Asset 514 830 3,363 540 846
Sales 1,694 2,022 3,545 845 1,215
Contract (2,154) (2,087) (1,581) (1,232) (1,014)
(by ENR)
(%)
Income 0.8
Property & 3.1
Equipment
in Assets
(% in Sales)
Const. 82.4
Real Estate 11.9
Others 5.7
Total 100.0
2.2
27.8
77.5
0.0
22.5
100.0
2.6
65.4
24.8
0.0
75.2
100.0
-2.4
38.0
43.1
0.0
56.9
100.0
3.6
18.7
88.2
0.0
11.8
100.0
Turner
Corp.
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Table 3.20: Detailed Structure of U.S. and Japanese
Contractors-(3)
United Kopper Jacobs Cenvill Maccor-
Engr. Engr. mick
Rank 109 50 47 251 349
Parent Raytheon
Firm
Areas of Engr. & Const- Engr. & Const- Const-
Exper- Const- ruction, Const- ruction, ruction,
tise ruction, Chemicals ruction, Real
Airplane Product- (Power, Estate,
Parts ion, Elec-Fertilize,Community
Mfg. tric Mineral, Services
Appliance Hazardous,
Mfg. Oil)
($ mil)
Asset 3,600 1,167 98 111 21
Sales 5,996 1,816 220 84 54
Contract (195) (380) (457) (121) (60)
(by ENR)
(%)
Income 5.7 1.6 9.9 5.7 2.5
Property & 26.3 49.6 17.7 10.1 1.4
Equipment
in Assets
(% in Sales)
Const. 11.3 38.9 100.0 61.9 100.0
Real Estate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others 88.7 61.1 0.0 38.1 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 3.20: Detailed Structure of U.S. and Japanese
Contractors-(4)
Tiasei Kajima Shimizu Ohbayshi Kumagai Hazama
Rank 1 2 3 4 6 8
Parent
Firm
Areas of Const- Const- Const- Const- Const- Const-
Exper- ruction ruction ruction ruction ruction ruction
tise (Heavy, (Heavy, (Heavy, (Heavy, (Heavy, (Heavy,
Bldg.) Bldg.) Bldg.) Bldg.) Bldg.) Bldg.)
($ mil)
Asset 4,757 4,972 3,980 3,881 3,782 1,513
Sales 5,040 4,304 4,226 3,066 2,695 1,475
Contract -- -- -- -- -- --
(by ENR)
(%)
Income 1.02 1.45 1.46 1.61 2.32 1.01
Property & 8.1 5.9 4.7 4.5 3.7 8.5
Equipment
in Assets
(% in Sales)
Const. 91.0 95.2 98.8 97.1 92.8 98.2
Real Estate 7.4 4.8 1.2 2.9 7.2 1.8
Others 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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plants, and hazardous waste facilities. Also Jacobs
Engineering provides construction services on a CM basis.
Turner Corp. and Centex Corp. are perhaps the closest to
Japanese contractors in terms of range of expertise, such as
building construction, real estate, and design services
related to building construction. However, they differ
from Japanese contractors in the role they play and the
coverage they provide in construction projects, as will be
discussed later in a separate section.
Diversified firms' sales from construction and
engineering are smaller, c.f. Fluor Corp.(72.8%), Morrison-
Knudsen(77.5%), Dravo Corp(43.1%), Kopper Co.(38.9%).
Contractors held by conglomerates show an even smaller
percentage of construction and engineering sales, c.f.
Ebasco Services(24.8%), United Engineering, Co.(11.3%).
(Percentages of Kellog Rust, Inc., Steam catalytic, and
Lummus Crest, Inc. are not provided in their annual
reports.) Because these diversified firms and
conglomerates holding construction firms operate plant
and/or other industrial facilities themselves, and sometimes
manufacturing other products not related to construction,
their assets are generally quite large and include a high
proportion of property and equipment.
Japanese contractors' stability comes fundamentally
from the bidding system in Japan and the similarity among
Japanese contractors as well as their orientation to
Japanese domestic building and heavy construction market.
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The scale of domestic building and heavy construction
projects is not large compared to foreign plant and
industrial facilities construction. Therefore, the
availability of one particular project does not seriously
affect firms' total performance. The performance of
Japanese firms depends on an accumulation of small to medium
projects.
The bidding system provides Japanese contractors with
stable amount of work. Because bidding system will be
discussed in more detail later, only one form, Special
Nominative Bidding, the most important for the top ranking
contractors, will be discussed here. In this bidding
system, a client chooses a particular contractor which the
client believes to be the most suitable for the project
reliable and negotiates a price. Because more than 70% of
total contracts of large firms are made through this bidding
method, each top ranking contractor tries to develop close
relationships with its own particular clients (often
privately) as well as to enhance its reputation for
technological proficiency and efficient management.
Also, Japanese firms are fundamentally similar and not
differentiated from each other. Firms of the same size and
recently even of different sizes of firms perform the same
types of building and heavy construction except plant
construction. Each company possesses comparable
technology. Any innovation attempted by one firm will soon
be tried by other firms. All the large firms have their
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own in-house design departments (including architectural,
structural, and geotechnical sections). All of them have
in-house research laboratories and perform R&D individually,
spending 0.5% to 1.0% of total sales. All of them provide
their customers with a variety of vertically integrated
services in more or less the same way. (Difference in the
provision of services between U.S. and Japanese contractors
will be discussed in the separate section later.) This
close similarity among firms promotes great conservatism in
defending the territory each firm has carved out in the
market. As a result, Japanese contractors coexist with
very narrow but stable profit margins.
3.4.2 Coverage of Activities by Participants in Construction
Projects
Construction is composed of various, complex
activities, including 1) finding a project, 2) feasibility
study and schematic planning, 3) actual design, 4)
construction of a facility, and 5) operation and
maintenance. Coverage of these activities, the role of
participants, and the identity of the participants
themselves differ between U.S. and Japanese construction.
Table 3.21 and 3.22 portray the participants and their
coverages in the two countries. In the U.S., the
participants, each usually an independent organization
selected on the basis of bidding price and qualifications,
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are gathered together on a project-by-project basis with
little provision for ensuring organizational compatibility
and leave little room for continuity of working
relationships.
In addition, each participant generally comes into the
project only when he is absolutely needed. In U.S.
construction, the most powerful or leading participant is an
architectural or engineering firm acting as the owner's
agent. The owner may have his own staff in architecture or
engineering, but usually has to hire an architect. Because
architects and engineers are highly specialized, no one
architect or engineer will be able to cover all aspects of
design and engineering. An owner usually must hire several
architects and engineering firms or one architect plus
several specialty engineering firms. Because of this
fragmentation, architects or engineers, while very
influential in projects in the U.S., don't necessarily
control the project from beginning to end.
General contractors in the.U.S. simply construct the
facility as the drawings indicate or as architects or
engineers direct. Cooperation between a general contractor
and an owner or between a general contractor and an
architect during a project is usually rare.
Subcontractors and suppliers may serve a general contractor,
but they do not share the responsibility of the general
contractor. This poor cooperation among participants,
especially between a design firm and a general contractor or
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Table 3.21: Major Participants, Their Function in Steps in
the U.S. Construction
Conception Analysis Design
&Planning
Planning
Const-
ruction
Operation
&
Ma in-
tenance
Input: market/needs monitoring, start-up,
Owner analysis, feasibility reviewing, planning
/economic analysis, approving & imple-
site evaluation & mentation
----------
selection
Outputs: needs state-
Investor ment, schedules, financing
plans, finance
Architect,
Engineer
Inputs: monitoring resolu-
------------------- design & reviewing, tion of
Inputs: market/needs engr., approving, operat-
Design/ analysis, feasibility alterna- changes ing
Const- /economic analysis, tive problem
ructor site evaluation & Outputs: modern-
selection planning ization
Outputs: needs state- specifi- /up-
ment, schedules, cation, grading
planning, finance contracts
Inputs: alter-
General site & ations,
Contractor resource major
/Sub- mgt. repair,
Contractor Outputs: defici-
physical ency
correc-
tion
Inputs:
operat-
Operator/ ion, mfg
User Outputs:
operat-
ing fac-
ility
Source:
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Table 3.22: Major Participants, Their Function in Steps in
Japanese Construction
Conception Analysis Design
&Planning
Planning
Const-
ruction
Operation
&
Main-
tenance
Input: market/needs monitoring, start-up,
Owner analysis, feasibility reviewing, planning
/economic analysis, approving & imple-
site evaluation & mentation
----------
selection
Outputs: needs state-
Investor ment, schedules, financing
plans, finance
Inputs: monitoring resolu-
design & reviewing, tion of
engr., approving, operat-
Architect alterna- changes
/Engineer tive problem
Outputs: modern-
planning ization
specifi- /up-
cation grading
Inputs: market.needs Inputs: Inputs: alter-
analysis, feasibility design & site & ations,
/economic analysis, engr. resource major
General site evaluation & analysis,mgt. repair,
Con- selection alterna- Outputs: defici-
tractor Outputs: nees state- tives physical ency
ment, Outputs: facility correc-
plans, tion
contracts
Sub- Same as
contractor General
Contractor
Inputs:
operat-
Operator/ ion, mfg
User Outputs:
operat-
ing fac-
ility
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between an owner and a general contractor, usually creates a
huge amount of claims from a general contractor. Some of
them end up in court. Also, such poor cooperation probably
reduces productivity, and causes final construction often to
go well over original budget and fail to meet completion
dates.
Vertical integration, in which architects and engineers
form a single firm, is one way these probles may be avoided.
This type of firms have been increasing in number and share
of the design market. For example, in 1985, design
contracts won by engineer-architect firms accounted for 40%
of the U.S. design-only market occupied by the top 500
design firms. (Source: 18.o.) Also, engineer-architect
firms dominated 24% of the design market. Therefore,
engineer-architect and architect-design firms dominated two-
thirds of the market. Architecture firms captured only 7%
of the market.
In the U.S., plant and industrial facilities
construction is predominantly carried out by
design/constructors which are the most vertically integrated
type of firms in the U.S. construction industry as described
in Table 3.21. This type of firm performed most
successfully. For example, 133 design contracts based on
design-construct were received by U.S. design-constructors.
They earned $27.3 billion in 1984, an amount 50% larger than
the design-only contracts.
In addition to these vertically integrated firms, the
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field of Construction Management (CM) is helping alleviate
the effects of poor cooperation between the diverse
participants in U.S. projects. A CM firm coordinates a
project from the beginning to the end as an agent of the
owner.
Among the participants in U.S. construction, a
design/constructor may be the most comparable to Japanese
contractors in terms of the range of services offered.
However, Japanese contractors not only provide more services
but also maintain closer relationships with other
participants and take more responsibility for the entire
project.
As mentioned above, large Japanese contractors have
their own in-house design departments which are much larger
than usual design firms. These departments cover not only
architectural, structural, geotechnical, mechanical, and
electrical design but also nuclear, electronics, and
sometimes biological fields. Also, having budgets of 0.5
to 1.0% of the firms' total sales, these labs can perform
R&D using the most modern facilities, some of which are
larger than facilities in universities. These research
labs are not only helping to solve field problems, but also
to create new markets for the future by developing
technology in the fields their clients may enter in the
future. Large contractors often operate real estate
departments or subsidiaries which not only execute
development but act as sales agents for developed
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facilities.
Furthermore, each Japanese general contractors works
with a particular group of subcontractors on an on-going
basis. There traditionally have been close relationships
between general contractors and subcontractors. These
subcontractors provide skilled workers as demanded by
their general contractors. Therefore, mmeting deadline
for projects is a great strength of Japanese construction
industry. (Of course, because reputation is so important
among these very similar firms, they make major efforts to
meet deadlines.)
Furthermore, power and authority of design firms to
control projects are weak in Japan; general contractors
inevitably have to take full responsibility.
As a result, Japanese general contractors are in touch
with projects from the beginning to the end. For example,
they study the needs of owners, search for projects, look
for sites (sometimes provide sites out of their own stocks
of land), perform feasibility studies for clients, provide
finance needed for the projects, of course provide
construction service, and even find tenants to occupy the
completed facilities. It is no exaggeration to say that
the Japanese construction industry which would be otherwise
diverse and fragmented is organized and integrated by
general contractors.
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3.4.3 Plant Construction in Japan
As already mentioned, separation of plant construction
from other construction activities in Japan may be one of
the most significant ways in which differs from the U.S.
construction industry. This fact also has confusion and
bias against the Japanese construction in the construction
industries of other countries. Plant and industrial
facilities construction has been performed by firms other
than the well-known top ranking contractors in Japan. The
firms listed in the middle of Table 3.19 are performing
plant and industrial facilities engineering and
construction, basically on a design/construct basis.
The meaning of "plant" is very vague in Japan and thus,
"plant" construction has neither been recognized as a
distinct class of work nor involved as a separate unit in
any classification of industries. The notion of "plant"
appears only in MITI's (Ministry of International Trade and
Industry of Japanese government) statistics on "plant
export". Therefore, there has been no statistics on
domestic production of plants. Usually, a "plant" is
divided into all its parts and components which are then
recorded in economic statistics as products in numerous
industries. This is why plant construction has not been
recognized as a part of construction in Japan.
However, plants are actually one of the key export
products of Japan. In 1981, the total amount of plant
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export was $12 billion, 8.1% of Japan's total exports and
equalled almost half the export value of automobiles, the
No.1 export commodity. Also, the amount of plant export
was three times larger than the amount of overseas
construction in that year (See Table 3.23).
In Japan, plants can be divided into several
categories:
1. Heavy electric plants
2. Communication plants
3. Synthetic fiber plants
4. Chemical and oil plants
5. Steel plants
6. Paper, pulp plants
7. Cement plants
Many types of plant engineering firms specialize in one of
the types of plants listed above. Such plant engineering
firms are listed in Table 3.24. General contractors in
Japan take part only in the building and heavy construction
portion of a plant project; they act as subcontractors of
the plant engineering firms.
3.4.4 Subcontracting System
The unique multilayer subcontracting system of Japan
provides one of the important differences between the U.S.
and Japanese construction industries. As mentioned in
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Table 3.23: Plant Export and Overseas Construction in Japan
Value of
Japan's
Total
Plant
Export
($ mil)
327
965
5,241
8,932
12,313
10,986
5,992
Value of
Plant Export
as Percentage
for Japan's
Total Export(%)
3.3
4.8
9.2
6.5
8.1
7.9
3.9
Value of
Overseas
Construction
for Japanese
Contractors
($ mil)
N.A.
117
1,082
2,239
4,166
3,980
4,446
Source: 51
1966
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
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Table 3.24: Firms Providing Plant Engineering Services
in Japan
Type of Firm Name of Firm
1. Firms which originally
were oil refinery or
chemical processing firms
2. General machinery firms
(Mainly ship-building,
heavy machinery firms)
3. Engineering department of
steel firms
4. Engineering department of
heavy electric or commu-
nication machinery firms
5. Machinery and plant
department of general
trading firms
(Mainly serving as
coordinators)
Nikki(JGC Corp.),
Chiyoda Chemical,
Toyo Engineering
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry,
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industry (IHI), Kawasaki
Heavy Industry, Mitsui Ship-
Building, Hitachi Ship-
Building
Shin-Nippon Steel, Nippon
Steel, Kobe Seiko
Hitachi Seisakusho, Toshiba,
Mitsubishi Electric, NEC,
Fujitsu
Mitsubishi-Shoji, Mitsui-
Bussan, Marubeni, Itochu-
Shoji
Source: 51
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comparing the cost structures of contractors in both
countries, the subcontract rate does not differ essentially
for heavy and building contractors or for large contractors
in the two countries despite differences in the definitions
of subcontract and labor, but does differ considerably for
special trade contractors and small contractors. This
difference arises from the multilayer subcontract system in
Japan.
Although general contractors in Japan take full
responsibility for projects and engineers from general
contractors control entire projects, they do not execute
any work physically. Instead, they employ
subcontractors for each type of work, such as concrete work,
excavation, carpentry, roofing, or interior finishing,
These subcontractors perform the physical work.
There are two reasons why the multilayer subcontract
system exists in Japan. Firstly, by using subcontractors,
contractors or subcontractors, both large and small firms,
can minimize their own resources, and thus protect
themselves from risks created by fluctuations in available
work. Furthermore, because it is rare to have many
projects in one particular region, general contractors large
an small are wise to use local subcontractors. Secondly,
by using labor forces and equipments only at the time
general contractors or subcontractors need to use them, they
can perform more rationaly and efficiently. This concept
prevailed throughout the construction industry in Japan.
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Even small subcontractors or special trade contractors
consistently use smaller subcontractors.
Most importantly in Japan, each large general
contractor acts as an umbrella under which many
subcontractors are layered, each serving a particular
general contractor. In the U.S. construction industry, a
general contractors gathers together the subcontractors
required for a given job on an ad hoc basis, without
establishing any ongoing working relationship. In Japan,
intimate relationships usually exist between a general
contractor and subcontractors in various specialties. The
relationships between a general contractor and the first
layer of subcontractors especially have been maintained
often for a long time and are very strong.
These relationships have contributed the efficiency and
productivity of general contractors, especially of large
general contractors which have significantly higher
productivity, compared to smaller firms (See Table 3.13 and
3.14). The enormous productivity of large Japanese
contractors, ability to bring in projects on time,
flexibility to perform many types of projects, and
willingness to assume considerable responsibility for an
entire project, are all dependent on the efforts of numerous
tiny subcontractors, located far beneath the umbrella held
by each contractor.
186
3.4.5 Bidding System
The bidding systems in the two countries also show
clear differences. The bidding system in the U.S. is
sustained fundamentally by free open competition, though
large contractors in the U.S. increasingly are receiving
contracts on a negotiation basis (except in public
projects).
In contrast, Japanese contractors are highly
dependent upon negotiation. There are
fundamentally three types of bidding methods in Japan. They
are;
1. Open Competition Bid (Ippan Kyoso Nyusatsu)
2. Nominative Competition Bid (Shimei Kyoso Nyusatsu)
3. Special Nominative Bid (Tokumei Nyudatsu)
An open competitive bid is fundamentally the same as
the open bid system in the U.S. Any firm can take part in
this system if it meets certain conditions. Although this
type of bidding system seems to provide the soundest way of
choosing contractors, most bids are not made in this way
except in purchasing machines or equipment on small-scale
projects because this system is believed to create excessive
competition among bidders.
The nominative competition bid is the method used most
frequently both in private and public projects. In this
type of bid, a client nominates a certain number of firms
(usually below 10) which the client considers capable and
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suitable for the project. Then, contractors nominated bid
against each other for the job.
As for public construction, almost all projects are
contracted for using this method because public facilities
need to be of the highest quality possible within the
project budget. It is important to chose a firm having
sufficient technology, management ability and financial
capability to build excellent facilities.
In this system, the public client develops a list of
contractors on the basis of scores given contractors for
various characteristics, such as its annual construction
contract amount, capital composition, level and number of
engineers and administrative personnel, profitability,
length of time in business, past records of projects by type
and size, adequacy of construction machines and equipment,
safety record in performing past projects, degree of
employee welfare and so on. In order to be nominated,
general contractors are always making efforts in all of
these areas. Research and development by Japanese
contractors are also aimed at this objective. Moreover,
this system is being used to support the entire Japanese
construction industry by providing small projects to small
firms, medium-size projects to medium-size firms, and large
projects to large firms.
The special nominative bid is used only by private
clients. In this type of bid, a client nominates only one
contractor considers to be the best suited to the project
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and asks the nominated contractor to submit an estimate for
the project. The client and the general contractor
negotiate not only the price but also various conditions.
Finally, after both of them agree on everything, they make a
contract.
Large general contractors in Japan have enjoyed this
bidding system. Apparently they have comparative
advantages over small to medium-size firms in financial,
technological, and managerial ways, so that the percentage
of contracts received through this system by the top ranking
contractors account for more than 70% of their total
contracts received. This is why it is very important for
contractors to establish and maintain close relationships
with their clients, not only on a business basis but even on
a private basis between the top managements of a client and
a general contractor.
Like the nominative competition bid, the special
nominative bidding system has provided the Japanese
construction industry, especially large contractors, with a
very useful system for coexistence. As mentioned in the
comparison between the top 10 contractors in both countries,
Japanese contractors are fundamentally homogeneous but have
been able to coexist. One of the reasons is the
functioning of the bidding system. By establishing
relationships with particular customers individually, large
homogeneous Japanese contractors have been able to avoid
aggressive invasion of other contractors' territories.
189
3.4.6 Labor Unions
Labor unions in both countries also are clearly
different from each other. Although recently unions in the
U.S. have been losing their grip on the construction
industry, they still have a considerable effect on the
industry. Labor unions in Japan are comparatively weak and
small because management has been based on close
relationships between employers and employees, who have
enjoyed such benefits as life-time employment and seniority
salary systems. More importantly, the relationship between
contractors and workers is different from the U.S., because
the close relationships between general contractrors and
their own subcontractors provide general contractors with
all the workers needed to perform construction projects.
In the U.S., corporate management is fundamentally
founded on the direct relationship between general
contractors and workers. There is no such buffer between
them comparable to that provided by subcontractors in Japan.
The United Automobile Workers Union and United Steel Workers
have developed enormous bargaining power. Since the 1920s,
labor unions in the U.S. construction industry have
dominated this industry also, providing a degree of
stability to the highly variable and unstable demand market
for construction. The characteristics of construction
unions include; 1) organization on a craft or craft-
industrial basis, and the concept of exclusive jurisdiction
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of each union over specific work operations; 2) extensive
organization and financing of unions at all levels; 3)
considerable autonomy of locals in the conduct of their
affairs, particularly in the area of collective bargaining.
Contractors in each area have joined together in trade
association (e.g. Associated General Contractors of America
(AGC)). Contractors associations frequently serve as the
bargaining unit in union contract negotiations, which
controls competition among contractors and gives them
greater strength in negotiating with the various unions.
However, unions in the U.S. have been rapidly losing
their power to dominat industry. For example, union
contractors (e.g. contractors which utilize union labor)
accounted for 60 to 70% of the total number of contractors
in 1970, but the percentage declined to 35% in 1980. This
occurred first because union contractors no longer competed
with non-union contractors in cost competition, especially
in the area of union wage rate and fringe benefit to workers
which had troubled union contractors. Second, wage rates did
not vary with skills so that individuals were not motivated
to compete inside the unions. Third, union contractors
were controlled by strict jurisdictional lines, for
example, sharply restricted use of helpers or workers. As
stated above, unions in the U.S. are fading as a whole, but
they still a serious concern in certain areas, particularly
in the Northeast and Atlantic regions.(1)
In Japan, only 783,000 out of 5,270,000 people in the
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construction industry in 1984 were involved in unions. Union
members accounted for 14.9% of the total population in the
construction industry. This percentage is very small
compared to 35% union memberships in the U.S.construction
industry. In addition, all the existing Japanese unions
are very weak and do not possess any significant bargaining
power. There are four types of unions in the Japanese
construction industry (Members often join several unions
simultanously so that the total number of union members can
not be over 783,000). They are:
1. Firm-based unions -- unions operated on a firm by firm
basis and fundamentally for
employees of general contractors.
2. Individual unions -- unions joined by individual workers in
the construction industry
e.g. Zenkoku-Ippan(123,000 members)
Kensetsu-Ippan(68,000 members)
3. Compounded unions -- joined by employees and workers in
1 and 2 but fundamentally
composed of technical workers in
local construction firms
e.g. Zenken-Soren(351,816 members)
4. Industry-based union-industry-wide unions
(1) According to ENR (Nov.5), the exact reasons and patterns
of the open shop's gains vary by type of construction and
geography. Part of the open shop's current strength is due
to the large amount of new construction now concentrated in
the sunbelt, never a union stronghold.
192
e.g. Kensetsu-Roren(652,000 members)
Sohyo-Zennikken(15,659 members)
Nikken-Kyo(66,000 members)
(Source: 51)
Although there are several unions as shown above, they
are closer to social groups rather than to bargaining
unions. Members meet to discuss current concerns, but
they do not have the power or tradition for bargaining with
general contractors. Exceptions are firm-base unions
created by employees (not workers) of general contractors to
negotiate their salaries. As mentioned at the beginning
of this section, general contractor do not bargain directly
with workers in Japan. Subcontractors provide workers.
In addition, general contractors and subcontractors maintain
close relationships. Similarly, subcontractors and workers
are also closely linked often through personal
relationships. Therefore, Japanese general contractors
have not confronted workers. As a result, there has been
almost no strikes in the Japanese construction industry.
This coherent web of relationships linking general
contractors and workers has helped Japanese general
contractors perform work of high quality with enormous
safety, relatively low cost, and on-time completion, and
high responsibility to clients in the domestic Japanese
construction market.
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3.4.7 Management, Operation and Ownership of Japanese
Contractors
The construction industry is probably one of the most
conservative and least modernized industry in Japan in terms
of operation and management. One typical example of such
characteristics of the construction industry is management
by owner-family, which still prevails throughout the
industry. Because construction firms did not need capital
investment as intensive as manufacturers did, most
construction firms in Japan were originally initiated by
owners' funds. The owners and their families managed the
firms for a long time. At present, in the majority of
construction firms in Japan , owners of capital and
management of the firms are not still separated. In other
words, the owner of equity in the firms are managing the
firms. For example, 30% of equity in Kajima Construction,
ranked at No.2 in 1984, is owned by the Kajima family.
Total equity owned by the Kajima family and the employees
exceeds 50%. Takenaka Komuten, ranked No.5 in 1984, has not
issued stock to the public. The majority of stocks is
owned by the Takenaka family and its employees. Among the
top 50 contractors in Japan, 70% are headed by descendants
of the founders and the founders' families still own large
portion of stocks. The percentages increase inversely to
the size of firms. Firms in which management and ownership
of equity are clearly separated are still rare in Japan
_.V1
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today. Also, many contractors were named after their
founders and, in the conservative spirit, still use the
names, which include Kajima, Shimizu, Takenake, Ohbayashi,
Kumagai, Fujita, Toda, Sato, Maeda, Okumura, all of them the
top-ranking firms in Japan.
However, among Japanese contractors, modernization, in
such forms as separation of management and ownership of
equity, has been progressing year by year, as firms grew and
large amounts of capital became necessary. Table 3.25
shows changes in percentages of the numbers of stocks owned
by management and individuals that include owner family
members. Since 1965, stocks were increasingly owned by
banks, life, and non-life insurance firms. Table 3.26
shows such trends. Financial institutions and insurance
firms have been investing more and more in firm stocks,
including stocks of contractors. At present, several banks
are major owners of equity in contractors as shown in Table
3.27. Consequently, Japanese contractors have begun to
have source of funds, and with that source, they are
strengthening their relatively weak financial structures
typified by their high debt-to-equity ratios as discussed in
Chapter 2. This is one way that Japanese firms can
survive with net incomes only 1%.
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Table 3.25: Change in Ownerships of Equity of Japanese
General Contractors
Number of
Stocks
Issued
Percentage
of Stocks
Owned by
Individuals(%)
Percentage
of Stocks
Owned by
Management(%)
2,059,338
4,047,362
7,227,665
7,704,030
8,345,144
8,951,700
9,272,942
9,495,917
9,845,648
10,126,467
10,779,788
11,284,516
11,709,471
Source: 51
1965
1970
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
63.1
54.6
49.5
48.9
48.5
49.0
45.8
46.0
45.7
44.0
41.9
40.9
40.5
14.5
11.0
8.9
8.1
7.9
7.0
6.6
6.0
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.0
4.7
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Table 3.26 Change in Number of Stocks Owned by Financial
Institutions and Insurance Firms in Japan
(1985)
Number
of Firms
Investing
in Stocks
City B
Number of
Stocks
Owned by
City Banks
(million)
877
1,836
2,281
3,120
3,338
3,516
3,666
anks Trust Banks
Percentage Number of
of Stocks Stocks
Owned by
City Banks(%)
21.7
25.4
27.3
30.8
31.0
31.2
31.3
Percentage
of Stocks
Owned by Owned by
Trust Banks Trust Bank
(million) (%)
499
1,134
1,409
1,820
1,954
2,066
2,073
12.3
15.7
16.9
18.0
18.1
18.3
17.7
Life Insurance Firm
Number of Percentage
Stocks of Stocks
Owned by Owned by
L.I. Firm L.I. Firm
(million) (%)
Non-Life Insurance Firm
Number of Percentage
Stocks of Stocks
Owned by Owned by
N.L.I.Firm N.L.I.Firm
(million) (%)
1970 161 4.0 74 1.8
1973 421 5.8 181 2.5
1975 486 5.8 223 2.7
1980 795 7.9 311 3.1
1981 847 7.9 334 3.1
1982 912 8.1 355 3.1
1983 1,000 8.5 368 3.2
Source: 51
1970
1973
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
99
123
129
133
134
136
141
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Table 3.27 City Banks Which Are Major Owners of Equity in
Construction Firms in Japan
Fuji Bank Dai ichi-
Kangyo
Bank
Sumitomo
Bank
(1985)
Mitsubishi
Bank
(1)
Nishimatsu
Const.,
Goyo Const.,
Tekken Const.,
and 3 others
(2)
Tobishima
Const.,
Maeda Const.,
Totetsu
Industry,
and 3 others
(3)
Taisei Prefab,
Takasago
Netsugaku
Ando Const.
Shimizu
Const.,
Hazama-Gumi,
Sato
Industry,
and 5 others
Asahi Kogyo,
and 5 others
Kajima Const.
Asanuma-Gumi,
Tomoe-Gumi,
Daiwa House,
Taiho Const.
Okumura-Gumi
Takasago-
Netsugaku
Tekken Const.,
Katsumura-Gumi
and 3 others
Matsumura-Gumi,Toda Const.
Morimoto-Gumi and 3 others
Note: Banks above are the owners of the largest number of
stocks in construction firms in (1), the second
largest number of stocks of firms in (2), the third
largest number of stocks of firms in (3).
Source: 51
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3.4.8 The Housing Industry in Japan
In Japan, residential construction was originally
performed by tiny house builders, using the traditional
Japanese-style wooden structure. General contractors have
not impinged upon this area of construction except in some
cases of condominium construction and large scale of public
housing projects. Residential construction plays no part
in the businesses of general contractors. In fact, this
market is still considered by people in the industry as a
special area of construction like plant construction.
However, in economic terms residential construction
actually is a very important portion of Japanese
construction industry. As mentioned early in this chapter,
the value of residential construction accounts for more than
30% of the value of Japanese total construction. Also,
several residential construction firms are as large as
general contractors.
Types of residential construction firms and their
shares in residential construction market in Japan are
presented in Table 3.28. In Japan, there are essenentially
three types of residential construction firms. They
traditional Japanese-style wooden house builders. They
are mostly small builders who originally were carpenters.
This type of firm shares 60 to 65% of the entire Japanese
residential construction market. Prefabricated house
builders comprise another type of firms. They originally
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Table 3.28 House Builders and Their Share in Japan
Type of builder Characteristics
(1985)
Share of
Market
Traditional
Japanese-Style
Wooden House
Builder
Prefab House
Builder
Condominium
Builders
Fundamentally small
builders who originally
were carpenters
60 - 65
Specialising prefab houses 12 - 13
using pre-cast concrete,
but recently introducing
2 x 4 houses successfully
Fundamentally performed by
general contractors
25
Source: 51
Note: Share indicates value of construction buildt by each
type of builder as percentage of total value of
housing construction in Japan.
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began erecting houses out of precast concrete panels.
Because this type of firm needed large facilities to produce
precast concrete panels and needed their own designers for
prefab houses, the size of these firms is much larger than
traditional wooden house builders. The last type of firm
is a general contractor, constructing condominiums and
large-scale housing. Although many general contractors
are involved in this type of construction, Hasegawa Komuten
is the leader and has unique expertise in condominium
construction. This firm provides vertically integrated
services from planning and land development through sales
and operation of them by investing their equity. Large
firms in each type of residential construction are listed in
Table 3.29.
3.5 Research and Development in the Construction Industry
This section will. be devoted to research and
development (R&D) in the construction industry in the U.S.
and Japan because R&D is perhaps one of the most important
key to the future of the construction industry. In order
to clarify the R&D stances of the construction industries of
the two countries, R&D statistics not only for other
industries but also for other advanced countries will be
compared.
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3.5.1 Scale of R&D in Advanced Countries
Among the advanced countries, the U.S. spends by far
the most on R&D in terms of both scale and growth. Growth
of U.S. R&D expenditure was especially significant after
1975 (See Figure 3.24). R&D expenditure in the U.S. in
1983 amounted to $87,7 billion in current dollars. The
value of R&D in the U.S. was 3.2 times larger than R&D
expenditure in Japan of $27,4 billion and 4.8 times and 7.9
times larger than R&D expenditure in West Germany and France
respectively.
However, the differences between the U.S. and the other
three countries are actually less in constant dollars
because inflation was more significant in the U.S. than in
the other three countries (See Figure 3.25). Differences
further shrink when the value of defense related R&D is
subtracted from total R&D expenditure in the U.S. R&D
(excluding defense-related R&D) in the U.S. was only about
two times larger (much smaller than 3.2 times) than the R&D
expenditure in Japan.
R&D expenditure in Japan, West Germany, and France grew
considerably in real terms between 1965 and 1975 while
growth of R&D expense in the U.S. almost stopped during the
period. However, since 1975, R&D expenditure in the U.S.
has been growing faster than that in the other three
countries. In real monetary terms, the gap between the
U.S. and other three countries has continued to widen.
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Table 3.29: Large House-Builders in Japan
(Traditional Japanese-Style House Builder)
Name of Firm Total
Sales
($mil)
Total
Asset
($mil)
Net
Income
(Smil)
Number
of
Employee
Shokusan Jutaku Sogo 459 863 -0.6 2,510
Taihei Jutaku 426 n.a. 0.5 3,117
Kobori Juken 162 235 1.4 674
(Prefab House Builder)
Name of Firm Total Total Net Number
Sales Asset Income of
($mil) ($mil) ($mil) Employee
Sekisui House 2,085 2,640 1.7 8,342
Daiwa House Industrial 1,443 1,449 2.2 6,374
Misawa Home 556 606 1.7 1,158
National House Indust. 477 327 1.2 2,108 (1)
Mitsui Home 401 n.a. n.a. 1,158
Taisei Prefab 257 179 1.2 1,084 (2)
Note: (1) An affiliate of Matsushita Electric Industrial and
Matsushita Electric Work.
(2) An affiliate of Taisei Construction.
(Condominium Builder)
Name of Firm Total Total Net Number
Sales Asset Income of
($mil) ($mil) ($mil) Employee
Hasegawa Komuten 878 1,691 2.6 1,688 (3)
Note: (3) Although many medium to large general contractors
in Japan engage in condominium construction, Hasegawa
Komuten is the expert and leader of this field. This
firm is operating an integrated construction business
from planning to sales, and is now placing emphasis on
development and built-for-sale buildings.
Source: 51
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Figure 3.26 shows the rate of growth in R&D expense in these
four countries. Although rates of growth in Japan, West
Germany, and France were much higher than that in the U.S.
before 1975, rates of growth in the four countries have been
at almost the same level since then. Only in Japan has
the rate of growth been slightly higher than the rate of the
U.S. Therefore, the differences in R&D in real monetary
terms has been actually expanding because with the same
growth rate, originally large values grow faster than do
lower value in absolute value.
The number of researchers in the U.S. stayed between
500,000 to 600,000 between 1965 and 1975, but the number
has been increasing since 1975 as the real R&D expenditure
in the U.S. has expanded. The rate of growth after 1978 was
especially remarkable (See Figure 3.27). The number of
researchers in Japan has been increasing at a constant rate
and reached 340,000 in 1983, almost half the number as in
the U.S. Numbers of researchers in both West Germany and
France have been increasing at a very low rate (now about
100,000 each) and are still far fewer than in U.S. and
Japan.
3.5.2 Components of R&D in Advanced Countries
Research and development are two separate, though
related, processes. Research can be divided further into
basic and applied research. The shares of these
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Figure 3.24: R&D Expense in Advanced Countries in Nominal Term
R&D Expense in Current Dollar
(t hillinn)
C
Note: Average exchange rate in 1980 was used for each currency as below;
$1 = K220.54, $1 = DM2.26, $1 = f4.12
Japan's R&D incl.udes onl.v R&D in "natural science and technol.ogyv"
while other countries' R&D includes both R&D in "natural science
and technology" and "human and social science".
Source: 65
~3C ·
.c-SC·--~
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Figure 3.25 : R&D Expense in Advanced Countries in Real Terms
R&D Expense in 1980 Dollar
1965 1970 1975 1980 Year
Note: Average exchange rate in 1980 was used For each currency as below;
$1 = ;220.54, $1 = DM2.26, $1 = f4.12
Japan's R&D includes only "natural science and technology" while
other countries' R&D includes both"science and technology" and
"human and social science".
Source: 65
($
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Figure 3.26: Rate of Growth in Real R&D Expense in Advanced Countries
Rate of Growth in
R&D Expense in Real Terms
(%)
2C
10
0
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1965 1970 1975 iaon v
Source: 65
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Figure 3.27 : Researchers in Advanced Countries
Number of Researchers
(thousand)
900
800
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0
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Source: 65
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components in R&D expenditure differ among the four advanced
countries.
In the U.S. as a whole, the share of the components has
not changed since 1965 (See Figure 3.28). The share of
development has been around 65% while shares of basic and
applied research have been 12 to 13% and 22 to 23%,
respectively.
In Japan, the share of development was 38.6% in 1965
but it grew between 1965 and 1975, reaching 64.3%. Since
1975, the share of development has remained at 60%. In
contrast, research expenditure in 1965 accounted for more
than 60% but shrank to 35% in 10 years. The share of basic
research declined by half and the share of applied research
by one third in the period. Since 1975, basic research has
constantly accounted for about 14% and application research
for 25%. Japan puts more emphasis both on basic and
applied research but less emphasis on development than does
the U.S. Although Japan is usually believed to put
emphasis on development, the opposite is actually true.
In France, the percentage of research is more than 50%.
Also, percentages of basic research in France and West
Germany are much higher than in the U.S.and Japan.
In terms of components of R&D in the industry, the
percentage of each component remained roughly constant
in the U.S.. U.S. industry has consistently performed
development, and less research (See Figure 3.29). In
Japan, the development component of R&D in industry was
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Figure 3.28: Components of R&D Expense in Advanced Countries-(1)
(1) Total
Japan
Development
Appli-
cation
Research-
Basic
U.S. (
1
Development
rAppli-
Research-cation
LBasic
West Germany
Development and
Application
Research
Basic Research
France
Development
e Appli-
Research-cation
LBasic
(
1
19701965(%) 1975 1980 1983
I
10(J
Note: Numbers in the figure indicate percentages of components for
total R&D expense.
Source: 65
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Figure 3.29 : Components of R&D Expense in Advanced Countries-(2)
(2) Industries
Japan
Development
[Appli-
Research cation
Basic
U.S.
Development
ResearchAAppli-cation
Basic
West Germany
Development and
Application
Research
Basic Research
France
Development
rAppli-
Research- cation
catasic
.Basic
19701965
(M)
1975 1980 1983
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Source: 65
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57.5% in 1965 but expanded to 75.8% by 1975. Conversely,
research, which accounted for 42.5% in 1965, shrank to 24.3%
in 1975. In industrial R&D, Japan again show more emphasis
in research than the U.S.. In France, research accounted
for a higher percentage than in either the U.S. or Japan.
3.5.3 R&D Expense and Finance by Organization in Advanced
Countries
In the U.S., Japan, and West Germany, around 70% of R&D
is performed by industries (See Figure 3.30). In France,
R&D performed by industry accounts for slightly below 60%.
In the four countries, R&D has been performed by industries
as indicated by the growth of the percentage of R&D by
industries between 1965 and 1980s. In Japan and West
Germany, universities performed the second largest amount
R&D. In the U.S., R&D by universities has grown since 1965
and to equal the percentage performed government
organizations.
Among the four countries, the percentage of R&D
financed by government is largest in the U.S., accounting
for 46% of the total R&D expenditure because of the huge
government financing of defense and space programs. The
percentage is smaller in West Germany and France and the
smallest in Japan, accounting for only 22.1% in 1980.
The financing of R&D by industry is largest in Japan,
accounting for 98.1% while the percentages in the other
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three countries range from 67 to 80%.
As shown above, Japan's R&D has been essentially
achieved independently by industry. Because of this
characteristic, Japan's R&D is advanced for products, such
as electric machinery, electronics, machinery, home
appliances, automobile and so on. (Of course, Japan's R&D
is advanced in the field specially relevant to Japan's
geographical conditions, such as disaster prevention,
seismic or geotechnical engineering, and so on.) However,
it is not so advanced in fields, such as 1) artificial
satellites, rockets, airplanes, and deep sea investigation ,
for which systematic R&D must be performed on a scale to
large for industry; 2) CAD, CAM, data base, which require
an enormous amount of basic technology difficult to achieve
individually, 3) resource-related areas for which private
firms in the industries have little demand, and 4)
assessment of safety of chemicals or biotechnological and
genetic research, requiring long-term development of
technology and having unclear benefits.
However, the domination of R&D by industry has been
changing recently. The amount of R&D funding from
government in 1983 was 2.5 times more than in 1978 because
R&D in Japan has been tending toward basic research on a
scale so large that industry can no longer afford to risk it
(See Figure 3.32). Also, research funds granted by
industry to both universities and to government have been
growing at 25 to 30% a year recently.
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Figure 3.30: R&D Expense by Organization in Advanced Countries
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Figure 3.31(1): Finance of R&D in the U.S.
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Figure 3.31(2): Finance of R&D in Japan
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Figure 3.31(3): Finance of R&D in West Germany
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Figure 3.31(4): Finance of R&D in France
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1. R&D expense includes only the expense in natural science and
technology.
2. Each organization means as follows:
Financing side
Industries
Government
Universities
Private
research
organizations
Expending side
Industries
Government
research
organization
Universities
Private
research
organizations
--- Firms and corporations which do not
specialize in research and development
--- Central and local governments, national
and other public research institutes,
national and other public universities
--- Private universities, including colleges
--- Non-profit private research organization
--- Same as financing side
--- National and other public research organi-
zations, and special corporations special-
izing in research and development
--- National, public, and private universities
--- Same as financing side
1. R&D expense includes both the expense in "natural science and
technology" and "Human and social science".
2. Each organzation means as follows:
Financing side
Industries
Government
Universities
Private research
organizations
Expending side
Industries
Government
research
organizations
Universities
--- Industries literally
--- Federal government, their research organ-
zati on
--- Private universities
--- Non-profit private research organizations
--- Industries, including government financing
research institutes operated by government
--- Research organizations operated by federal
government
--- State and private universities, including
government financing research institutes
operated by government
Note:
Japan
U.S.
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West Germany
1. R&D expense includes both the expense in "natural science and
technology" and "human and social science".
2. Each organization means as follows:
Financing side
Industries
Government
Private research
organizations
Expending side
Industries
Government
research
organizations
Private research
organizations
--- Industries, including public corpor-
ations
--- Federal and local governments
--- Non-profit research organizations and
research organization subsidized by
government
--- Same as financing side
--- research organizations operated by central,
state, and local governments
--- Same as financing side
1. R&D expense includes both the expense in "natural science
and technology" and "human and social science".
2. Each organization means as follows:
Industries --- Industries literally
Government --- Central government
Private research --- Non-profit research organizations, including
organizations private universities
Expending side
Industries
Government
research
organizations
Universities
Private research
organizations
--- Same as financing side
--- National research organizations
--- National universities
--- Same as financing side
France
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3.5.4 R&D in Industries
R&D in Industries in Japan
Based on the ratio of R&D to total sales, Japanese
industries fall into three groups;
Group A: industries with ratios of more than 4%
Group B: industries with ratios of between 1.8% and 4%, and
Group C: industries with ratios of more than 4%
(See Table 3.30).
Industries in Group A are generally those
emphasizing high-tech products, e.g. communication,
electronics, electric instrumentation, medicine, electric
machinery and equipment, and precision machinery.
Group B is composed of industries producing high value-
added products, e.g. automobile, ceramics, and general
machinery.
Group C industries include the former key industries,
e.g. steel, textile, oil refinery, and non-manufacturing
industries such as public utilities, construction.
The rate of R&D to total sales in the entire industry
has been increasing. For example, the ratio rose from 1.39
in 1975 to 1.97 in 1983, led mainly by the increases in
manufacturing industries. The ratio for Group A
industries increased most significantly, both in the amount
of R&D expediture and in the share of R&D expenditure by any
of the three groups in the nation-wide R&D effort in Japan
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Table 3.30: R&D Expense as Percentage of Total Sales
in Firms by Industry in Japan
(Percent)
Industries 1975 1980 1983
All Industries 1.39 1.48 1.97
Food 0.49 0.58 0.70
Textile 0.71 0.77 0.90
Pulp, Paper 0.49 0.41 0.63
General Chemical 2.46 2.55 3.34
Oil Refinery 0.18 0.18 0.26
Steel 1.05 1.14 1.60
Non-Ferrous Metal 1.01 1.03 1.49
Metal Products 1.10 1.15 1.30
General Machinery 1.74 1.90 2.57
Gen.Elec.Machnery 3.29 3.35 4.40
Commun/Electonics 4.17 3.94 4.85
Automobile 1.77 2.38 2.89
Precision Machine 2.74 3.02 4.02
Construction 0.49 0.46 0.53
Public Utility 0.27 0.32 0.39
Source: 65
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(See Table 3.31).
The construction industry, which did not perform a
significant amount of R&D until early 1960s, began investing
considerably more in late 1960s. In 1973, the industry
ranked No.11 in terms of the amount of R&D spending.
However, due to the relatively large scale of R&D by high-
tech industries since then, the position of the construction
industry fell to No.14 in 1983 although its share of R&D
expenditure in the total R&D expenditure in Japan did not
change (2.2%).
In Japan, $19 billion were spent on R&D in 1983. The
electric machinery industry spent $6 billion, 31.1% of
Japan's total R&D. General chemical was second and the
automobile industry was the third (Table 3.32).
Among firms conducting R&D, the general machinery
industry has the most number (2,240 firms), accounting for
12.7% of the total number of firms (17,646 firms) conducting
R&D. Electric machinery and general chemical industries
are the second and third, respectively.
In terms of number of researchers, the electric
machinery industry has the largest number (68,243 in 1983),
accounting for 33.9% of the total number of researchers in
Japan. The general chemical industry has the second
largest group, followed by automobile and general machinery
industry.
In the construction industry, 1,319 firms performed R&D
using 4,604 researchers and spent $427 million on R&D. The
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Table 3.31: Ranking of R&D Expense by Industry in the U.S.
and Japan
U.S. (1978)
Industry R&D
($mil)
R&D
% in
Total
Sales(%)
R&D
% in
Total
U.S.
R&D
(%)
Japan (1983)
Industry R&D
($mil)
1.Air-
craft,
Missile
2.Automo-
bile
3.Office
machine,
Computor
4.Chemical
7,700 12.3 23.1 Communi-
cation,
4,036 4.9 21.0
Electronics
3,782 3.3 11.3 Automo-
bile
3,129 7.7 9.4 Electric
machinery
1,835 3.5 5.5 General
Machinery
5.Other 1,340 2.1 4.0 Chemicals
machinery
6.Medicine 1,281
7.Optical, 1,248
medical,
equipment
6.3 3.8 Medicine
5.8 3.7 Steel
2,551 2.9 13.3
1,927 4.4 10.0
1,312 2.6
1,254 3.3
1,220 9.9
784 1.6
6.8
6.5
6.4
4.1
8.Oil
refinery
1,071 0.8 3.2 Transport, 759 0.4
Communication,
Public uti-
lity
9.Steel
10.Rubber
546 0.5 1.6 Precision
machinery
485 1.9 1.5 Ceramics
14.
669 4.0
477 1.8
--- --- - Construction 427 0.5
Note: Statistics on R&D
not available.
Source: 65
by U.S. construction industry are
R&D
% in
Total
Sales(%)
R&D
% in
Total
Japan's
R&D
(%)
4.0
3.5
2.5
2.2
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Table 3.32: R&D Expense and Number
Industry in Japan
Industries
Number
of Firms
Conduct-
ing R&D
R&D
Expense
($ mil)
of Researchers by
Number
of
R&D
Expense
(1983)
Researchers Per
Researcher
($ thousand)
All Industries 17,646
All Industries 17,646
All Mfg Industries 16,101
Construction 1,319
Food 1,354
Textile 1,128
Pulp, Paper 322
General Chemical 2,100
Oil Refinery 143
Rubber Products 164
Ceramics 804
Steel 152
Non-Ferrpis Metal 236
Metal Products 1,949
General Machinery 2,240
Electric Machinery 2,096
Automobile 678
Precision Machinery 722
Transportation, 57
Communication, Public
Utility
Source: 65
19,201
17,925
427
468
215
108
3,261
210
243
477
784
311
349
1,312
5,963
3,008
669
759
201,137
190,608
4,604
8,096
2,933
1,532
35,822
1,572
3,492
4,473
4,907
3,185
4,404
17,024
68,243
18,615
8,270
5,207
95.5
94.0
92.7
57.8
73.2
70.7
91.0
133.5
69.6
106.7
159.7
97.8
79.2
77.1
87.4
161.6
80.8
145.8
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number of such firms in the construction industry accounted
for 7.5% of the total number of researchers. The number of
researchers in construction accounted for 2.3% of the total,
and R&D expense in the construction industry accounted for
2.2% of the total R&D expense in Japan.
In terms of R&D expense per researcher, transportation,
communication, public utilities, steel, and automobile have
relatively high amounts because expensive large-scale plant
and equipment are necessary in research for these industry.
Industries in Group A possess 300 to 800 researchers
per 10,000 employees and 500 on average. The number ranges
from 300 to 600 in Group B and below 200 in Group C (See
Figure 3.33). The more intensively industries depend on
advanced and new technology, the more human resources they
need in R&D.
The construction industry unfortunately is located in
Group C in Figure 3.33, staying at a low level in both
dimensions. Also, the rates of growth in both dimensions
are not significant compared to industries in Group A and B.
Figure 3.34 shows characteristics of R&D by industry.
In industries producing metal products, general machinery,
electrical machinery and equipment, automobile, and
precision machinery, weight on basic research in R&D is low
because their emphasis is on application, adaptation, and
further development of given technologies.
On the other hand, industries like medicine, food,
chemicals, textiles, and ceramics place a relatively high weight
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Figure 3.32 : Increase in Research Funds Flow in Japan
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Fugure 3.33 : Grouping of Japanese Industries by R&D Expense per
Researcher and Number of Researchers per 10,000 Employees
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Figure 3.34 : Ratios
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on basic research. The construction industry is located
at around the middle of the two extremes.
R&D in Industries in the U.S.
In the U.S., the industry with the largest of
expenditure, faster rising level of funding, and the largest
number of researchers is the aircraft and missile industry
which is closely linked with the defense and space programs.
R&D in this industry in 1979 accounted for 23.1%, financed
75.8% by federal funds. In the U.S., 20.5% of all
researchers are working in this area (See Table 3.31 and
33). The automobile industry spent the next amount in R&D
and the office machine and computer industry was the next.
Taking R&D as a percentage of total sales, again firms
in the aircraft and missile industry had the largest rate of
12.3%; firms in the office machine and computer industry
ranked next, spending 11.7% out of their sales. Firms in
medicine, communication, and optical and medical equipment
also had high percentages.
R&D as a percentage of total sales in the entire U.S.
were more than two times higher than in Japan comparing 1980
figures from Japan to 1978 figures in the U.S. The
percentages were higher in the U.S. in communication, office
machine and computers, general machinery, medicine,
automobile, etc. but lower in steel, home appliances, non-
ferrous metal, etc.
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In the construction industry in the U.S., R&D is not
significant enough to be mentioned, especially in
industries. It is not comparable to any of the leaders in
this regard.(Source: 65)
3.5.5 R&D in Firms' Strategies in Japan
In terms of strategic planning in firms, top management
in 66.5% of Japanese firms considered R&D to be one of the
most important issues in their management strategies (See
Figure 3.35). One hundred percent of top management of
firms in the medicine industry consider R&D to be centrl to
their firms' strategies. Also, the majority of top
management in electric machinery, communication,
electronics, general machinery, steel, and non-ferrous metal
industries consider R&D to be very important. Although the
construction industry is not as enthusiastic as some, the
attitude of construction firms to R&D is, as a whole,
positive because 67% of top management in construction firms
consider R&D to be is one of the most important issues and
27% consider R&D as an important issue.
A large number of Japanese firms are, with matured or
very competitive markets, making efforts to diversify, in
which R&D is the most important key. Current types of
diversification going on now or in the near future in Japan
are categorized below by the degree of diversification:
Figure 3.35
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: Position of R&D in Managerial Strategies
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1. Entry into other related fields through already possessd
technology; e.g.
Food to medicine
Medicine to food
Chemicals, communication, electronics to
instrumentation
2. Backward diversification, in which firms enter the fields
of materials they handled in their original fields; e.g.
Communication, automobile, precision machinery
to ceramics
3. Forward diversification, in which firms take over the
manufacturing stage in fields they previously supplied;
e.g.
Steel to metal products
Electric communication to medical machinery
4. Mixture of original technology with technologies in other
fields; e.g.
Steel to compounded material
The basic attitude toward future diversification for
firms in Japan is to diversify while staying fundamentally
in their traditional fields. Seventy five percent of
Japanese firms expressed this feeling (See Figure 3.36).
This fundamental attitude is reflected in each of the four
types of diversification outlined above.
However, firms in some industries, such as textile,
chemical, non-ferrous metal, electric machinery, and steel,
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Figure 3.36 : Strategies for Future Diversification in Japanese
Industries
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Table 3.33: R&D by Industry in the U.S.
(1978)
Industry R&D R&D % of % of Number
($mil) as % R&D R&D of
of Finan- Finan- Resear-
Sales ced by ced by chers
(%) Firm Federal (thou)
(%) Govern-
ment(%)
Total 33,400 3.1 66.2 33.8 469.9
Food 428 0.4 n.a. n.a. 7.5
Textile 86 0.4 n.a. n.a. 1.7
Lumber & Wooden Products 136 0.7 100.0 0.0 2.3
Pulp, Paper 394 1.0 89.8 10.2 8.2
Chemicals 1,835 3.5 81.1 18.9 22.1
Medicine 1,281 6.3 n.a. n.a. 21.1
Oil refinery 1,071 0.8 88.9 11.1 13.4
Rubber 485 1.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Stone, Clay, Glass 330 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Steel 546 0.5 98.1 1.9 3.6
Non-ferrous metal 283 0.9 91.9 8.1 4.6
Metal Products 397 1.1 90.7 9.3 9.3
Office machine, Computer 3,129 11.7 82.4 17.6 46.1
Other machinery 1,340 2.1 97.0 3.0 19.2
Radio, TV 54 1.1 100.0 0.0 1.0
Communication 3,251 7.7 58.0 42.0 51.2
Automobile 3,782 3.3 88.1 11.9 30.4
Other Transport Equipment 131 1.4 n.a. n.a. 1.2
Aircraft & Missile 7,700 12.3 24.2 75.8 96.1
Optical & Medical equip. 1,248 5.8 85.6 14.4 16.3
Non-mfg industries 1,094 3.1 54.8 45.2 ????
Source: 65
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are taking a more positive attitude towards diversification.
In textiles especially, 5 to 6 % of firms are trying to
enter completely new fields. Firms in the textiles,
chemicals, non-ferrous metal, and steel industries are in
the markets which are no longer growing. Firms in electric
machinery have two main reasons to diversify, first to
escape from severe competition in their existing markets,
and second to develop new markets which they can do quite
aggressively because of their proven ability to utilize R&D.
Many firms in the construction industry are considering
diversification but in a very conservative way. For
example, 75% of firms in the construction industry are
thinking about diversification but hoping to stay in their
traditional arena while 25% of firms are not thinking about
diversification at all.
3.5.6 R&D Activities in the Japanese Construction Industry
As stated so far, although R&D activities performed by
Japanese construction firms are not as significant as by
firms in high-tech industries, construction research
activities are advance comparing to firms in other non-
manufacturing industries. Furthermore, Japanese
construction firms are performing an enormous amount of R&D
compared to U.S. competitors, which usually do not have any
such activities.
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Moreover, as far as top Japanese contractors are
concerned, the features of their research activities are far
more significant than the above stated statistics would
indicate. These top contractors usually have their own
large research labs employing 100 to 250 researchers.
Some of these firms have more than 300 researchers and their
annual R&D budgets per researcher range from $200,000 to
800,000. (Source: 10)
In addition, their research covers all types of
engineering relating to all types of building and heavy
construction. For example, a typical research facility in
a top Japanese contractors have includes;
1. Fully equipped soil mechanics laboratories with
microcomputers to control and monitors of experiments;
2. Static test facilities with massive reaction floors and
abutment walls
3. Two directional, computer-controlled wind tunnels for
bridge and high-rise building aerodynamics;
4. Facilities for smoke-stack diffusion tests and micro-
climate analysis around models of urban building
development;
5. Large sound-proof rooms for testing acoustic materials
and designs for highway, railway, and industrial noise
suppression;
6. Hydraulic temperature apparatus for experiments with
structures for holding liquid natural gas and similar
materials;
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7. Solar energy systems for hot water, space heating and
cooling as well as thermal analysis of various types of
exterior materials for buildings;
8. Facilities for developing and testing electrical and
mechanical systems, especially for building lighting
HVAC;
9. Material laboratories for plain and reinforced
concrete, masonry, soil grout compounds;
10. Biochemical laboratories with environmental control
rooms, electron microscopes, mass spectrometers for both
chemistry and environmental pollution control;
11. Fire-testing loboratory;
12. Large hydraulics laboratory.
(Source: 10)
In addition, these physical facilities are staffed by
reseachers with graduate degrees from the top universities,
most of them with advanced degrees. They engage in
independent research and publication much like researchers
in universities and in the advanced laboratories of high-
tech industries.
R&D performed by Japanese contractors fall into four
main categories:
1. Siting problems which the technical expertise
of the lab can help solving;
2. Research studies initiated by researchers themselves with
the approval of management, whether or not the results
have short-term applicability;
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3. Research to support high-level corporate strategy,
possibly including future entry into new market; and
4. Research done for outside clients.
Originally, most research by Japanese contractors was
of the type in category 1. However, as their strategy is
developing, research types 2 and 3 have begun to be equally
important to their shown in the R&D. Also, in competing
among the homogeneous contractors in Japan, it is
advantageous for a firm to be able to prove to its clients
the firm's ability to perform complex total engineering
projects. For example, contractors are spending large
amount of money on advanced technology, such as management
information systems (See Figure 3.37). Their R&D is also
aimed at developing new methods and ways of building with
new structures and new materials with the intention of
gaining an edge in marketing areas into which client are
moving.
Construction firms have a mixture of incentives to
conduct R&D. To some extent, research raises a company's
status in the very homogeneous construction industry. The
favorable publicity that a company gains from publishing its
research attracts further jobs from clients. The
recognition of a firm's research lab aids the process of
the prequalification documentation for bids on major public
projects, a precess described above in the section on the
Japanese bidding system.
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Figure 3.37: Annual Rate of Growth of R&D Expense ill Information
Management
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New technology is universally considered to be the
short cut to more productive, economical or effective
construction designs and procedures.
The labs also develop quantitative data to determine
whether new designs meet Japan's strict building codes and
to substantiate data for document claims for changed
conditions at sites.
There are also tax incentives for corporate R&D.
However, the greatest incentives come from Japan's rigid
physical and social constraints. Japanese contractors have
to face mountainous and volcanic land, complicated rock
types and a lot of groundwater, frequent earthquakes result
from the geological conditions, world's strictest
regulations to preserve the quality of air and water, to
prevent noise, vibration, soil contamination, and land
settlement.
Given the established potential of R&D and the
incentives stated above, Japanese contractors are becoming
increasingly heavily involved in R&D. The top contractors
are especially interested because they see vertical
integration services as one of their corporate strategies
for obtaining contracts in the severely competitive domestic
and overseas construction markets.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Strategies for Japanese Construction
Firms to Enter U.S. Construction Market
Based on the information developed in argument in
Chapters 1 through 3, Chapter 4 will analyze the potential
of the U.S. construction market for Japanese contractors and
the strategies that Japanese construction firms should adopt
to successfully enter it.
First, general entry strategies and methods for
entering a new market are discussed. Secondly, after
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of Japanese firms
and their U.S. counterparts in the U.S. market and
summarizing what Japanese firms have done so far, the most
promising and appropriate strategies will be recommended.
The differing conditions depending upon types, and marketing
potential of special segments of the U.S. construction
industry will be considered.
4.1 General Strategies for Entrying a New Market
Entry strategies should involve comprehensive plans.
Such a plan includes the objectives, goals, resources, and
policies that will guide a firms' international business
operation over a period long sufficient to establish
sustainable growth in a foreign market.
There are two types of potentially successful
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strategies for entering a new market, depending upon the
types of market (See Table 4.1). They are;
Option 1: Acquire a part of the market by providing the
same services or products already offered by counterparts
in the new market. That is, simply steal shares from the
existing counterparts.
Option 2: Acquire a part of the market by comparative
advantages over the counterparts already in the new market.
Option 1 works well in a market in which none of the
existing firms are fundamentally different from each other
and a small share of the market is held by each firm. A
new entrant provides exactly the same features as those
already provided by the existing firms. A simple example may
be a market in which 10 firms compete and each has a share
of 10% of the total market. A new entrant steals a share
of 5% of the market by providing customers with exactly same
products or services, then makes the share of the first 10
firms go down to 9.5%.
In Option 2, there are three strategic way in which a
new entrant might outperform the existing firms;
a. Overall cost leadership,
b. Differentiation, and
c. Focus.
Overall cost leadership requires superior efficiency
which may be achieved through economies of scale, greater
experience, innovative technology created by massive R&D,
managerial and technological cost reduction by vertical
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Table 4.1: Entry Strategies and Modes
Entry Strategies:
Option 1
Option 2
Obtain shares by providing the same
products or services as counterparts in the
target countries
Obtain shares by providing comparatively
advantageous products or
services over counterparts in the target
countries in the areas of:
a. Overall cost leadership,
b. Differentiation, or
c. Focus.
Entry Modes (Measures):
Option I
Option II
Products entry mode -- methods to make
entry through products or commodities
a. Export entry mode
i. Export through agent/distributor
ii. Export through subsidiary/branch
iii. Franchising
b. Investment entry mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
Contractual entry mode -- methods to make
entry through services or intangible goods
a. Licensing
b. Franchising
c. Contract production (construction)
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integration, tight cost and overhead control, avoidance of
marginal customer defaults, and so on.
The "differentiation" strategy requires a firm to
provide products or services perceived to be unique or
especially attractive to customers. Design, brand image,
technology, features, customer service, net work or other
dimenSions may be involved. Ideally, a firm differentiates
itself in several ways. However, While the
differentiation strategy does not allow the firm to ignore
cost control, this is not the primary strategy target.
The "focus" strategy is a strategy that involves
focusing on a particular customer group, segment of the
product line, or geographic market. While the low cost and
differentiation strategies are generally aimed at achieving
industrywide objectives in the new market, the focus
strategy targets a particular group. The entering firm
tries to serve its narrow strategic target more effectively
or efficiently than companies involved in more general
competition. A firm deploying this strategy must either
differentiate itself from others to better meet the needs of
its particular target, or provide the most competitive costs
for its particular target, or both.
No one strategy will work well necessarily in all types
of markets or all segment of a market, nor is it effective
for all types of entrants. However, some of these
strategies may be used simultaneously and may work
effectively to increase effects in a combined form under
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some circumstances. The use of these strategies by
Japanese contractors entering the U.S. construction market
will be discussed later in this chapter.
4.2 General Entry Modes
Entry modes are the ways in which a firm uses its
resources to enter foreign market. Entry strategies are
fundamentally plans, entry modes are concrete methods to be
used in implementing entry strategies.
Modes of entering a new market fall into two essential
groups, based on what is provided (See Table 4.1).
They are;
I. Products entry mode
II. Contractual (or Services) entry modes
The products entry mode is most applicable by
manufacturers, that is, firms which produce commodities or
tangible goods. The contractual entry mode is applied by
firms which provide customers with services or intangible
goods. This entry mode is generally most appropriate to
construction services traditionally provided by contractors
working on a contractual basis.
The products entry mode can be subdivided into:
a. Export entry mode
b. Investment entry mode
The export entry mode can be subdivided into three;
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i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
Firms that adopt the export entry mode stay in their
home countries and export products or goods to the target
countries through mediators or agents located there, through
the firms' branches or subsidiaries, or sometimes through
franchised dealers.
In the investment entry mode, firms may establish a new
company in the target country or set up a joint venture with
a foreign firm located there, and provide products or
services through the new entity. Firms may also acquire a
foreign firm which has been operating a similar business in
the target country, then introduce its own products or
services utilizing the marketing resources of the acquired
firm. In this entry mode, firms hold equity through
investment in firms in the target country.
The contractual entry mode may take several forms:
a. Licensing
b. Franchising
c. Contract production (construction)
Licensing is most useful to firms which possess
particular expertise or technology for production,
operation, services, and so on. These firms grant
companies in a target a country the right to use such
particular expertise or technology on a fee basis.
Franchising enables firms having comparative advantages
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in technology, expertise, features, capital, resources,
management and so on to give companies in the target
countries the authority to use these special advantages on
a fee basis.
Contract production is usually appropriate for firms
which provide services on a contract basis or produce large-
scale machinery, equipment, or facilities as one single
units on a contract or order basis. Of course,
construction contracts received through bids are included in
this mode.
The applicability of these modes depends not only on
the goods and services a firm can provide to customers but
also on the ways in which the firm is doing business.
Becuse of the practical nature of entry modes, they should
be chosen after establishing suitable entry strategies.
A firm's choice of entry strategies and modes for
entering a target country will be the net result of several,
often conflicting, forces. The variety of forces, the
difficulty of measuring their strengths, and the need to
anticipate their directions over a given planning period
combine to make the choice of entry strategies and modes
complex process with numerous trade-offs among alternatives.
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4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Japanese Construction
Firms entering the U.S. Construction Market
-Adaptation of Entry Strategies and Modes to Japanese
Contractors and U.S. Construction Market
In order to develop strategies and modes for Japanese
contractors seeking entry into the U.S. construction market,
it is necessary to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of
Japanese general contractors compared to the U.S.
counterparts. Analysis will then turn to whether these
strengths and weaknesses should shape the strategies and
modes of Japanese firms seeking entry into the U.S.
construction market.
As closely reviewed in Chapter 3, the Japanese
construction industry is one of the largest in the world.
Construction investment in 1984 amounted to $218 billion,
70% of the vallue of new U.S. construction put in place in
the same year. The construction industry has been one of
the most important industries in Japanese economy;
construction investment accounts for slightly below 20% of
Japan's GNP. In this industry, there are more than 514
thousand establishments, more than 60% of which are small
firms. It is very fragmented industry.
However, although the Japanese construction industry is
fragmented and may look poorly integrated to outsiders, it
actually is integrated, organized, and coordinated very well
by general contractors. While in the U.S. construction
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industry architects or engineering firms (though recently
displaced by the designer/constructor firms) are customarily
responsible for controlling projects, in Japan general
contractors play this key role.
Japanese contractors, especially large ones, are
vertically integrated in their functions and organizations.
Each firm operates not only a construction division but also
a research lab, departments of plannning and design
(architectural, structural, mechanical, geotechnical,
electrical, and so on), procurement, safety control, and
even real estate (both development and sales).
Furthermore, each Japanese general contractor has its
own multilayers of subcontractors under its umbrella.
There traditionally have been close relationships between a
general contractor and its subcontractors. These
subcontractors provide skilled workers on demand and
function not only as buffers of fluctuations in the amount
of available work but also as regulators of cost and
schedule control. The relationship between a general
contractor and subcontractors can be termed "quasi-vertical
integration".
Moreover, the vertical integration and performance of
Japanese contractors has been facilitated by weak labor
unions, the bidding system (especially the special
nominative bid), strong relationships between general
contractors and clients, (another quasi-vertical
integration), and relatively cheap material and labor cost.
250
Also, Japanese general contractors are backed by
financial institutions and insurance firms which have
invested in the contractors' stocks. (A quasi-vertical
integration between a general contractor and financial
institutions). Therefore, there is a strong vertical
integration around Japanese contractors, from the bottom
layer of multi-layer subcontractors through clients and
through financial institutions, and the Japanese general
contractor is pivotal to the integrated functioning of the
construction industry.
Through this vertical and quasi-vertical integration,
Japanese general contractors provide clients with vertically
integrated and carefully detailed services. They often
manage projects from beginning to end including such
functions as study of the needs of clients, search for
projects and suitable sites, feasibility study, negotiation
with community, financing, design, of course construction
service, and even finding tenants for clients. In
addition, Japanese general contractors have excellent
records of safety and on-time completion, without overruns
of contract prices.
Among these superior capabilities, those originating
from the unique social systems characterizing the Japanese
construction industry might be lost to them in the U.S.
construction industry. Because Japanese general
contractors would not have their own fully controllable
subcontractors, they would no longer have buffers that
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Japanese subcontractors provide for workload, schedule, and
labor cost in Japan. Japanese contractors would have to
use U.S. subcontractors that used to working on a job-by-job
basis with general contractors. U.S. subcontractors are
primarily interested in their own profits and, rather than
acting as buffers to protect the general contractor, would
be likely to act in self-defense.
Japanese general contractors would also have to pay
higher wages in the U.S. than in Japan whether workers are
open shop or union workers. Also, Japanese contractors have
to use U.S. suppliers, and U.S. materials that are
relatively expensive. Therefore, Japanese general
contractors would lose their overall cost leadership over
U.S. counterparts. That is, they could not establish a
strategy based on overall cost leadership--Option 2.a. (See
Table 4.1).
Japanese contractors would lose the privileges they
enjoy in the unique Japanese bidding system, especially the
special nominative bid. Because they fundamentally have to
face open bidding in the U.S., work volume could fluctuate
considerably. This would affect Japanese general
contractors negatively. They could not provide
construction services at discount prices because of unstable
profit margins. Rather, they would have to concentrate
only on the projects that seem to be profitable, as U.S.
contractors are doing.
Among Japanese contractors' superior capabilities,
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their internal organizational structures would continue to
serve them well in the U.S. construction market. For
example, the vertically integrated services that
characterize Japanese general contractors would be an
advantage that Japanese contractors could have over U.S.
counterparts. Such a wide range of vertically integrated
services differentiate Japanese firms from their U.S.
counterparts. This factor points to the "differentiated"
and "focus" strategies as potentially applicable (See Option
2.b. + 2.c., Table 4.1).
The differentiation strategy through vertically
integrated services could be strengthened by combining it
with the focus strategy. At present, Japanese firms do not
specialize in plant and industrial facilities construction.
Japanese general contractors have to focus on a particular
segment of building and heavy construction. For example,
by utilizing their expertise in providing vertically
integrated services, e.g. planning, land development,
construction, sales of housing, maintenance, security,
insurance on a guaranty basis, even financing of a project
and financing of tenants or buyers, a large Japanese firm
could exercise a strong competitive advantage over the
highly fragmented group of small house builders in the U.S.
housing industry. (Option 2.b + 2.c, Table 4.1)
A combination of vertically integrated housing
construction and franchising provide an even comparative
advantage. According to the model created by Prof. Fred
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Moavenzadeh, the highly fragmented U.S. housing industry can
be effectively aggregated through franchising.
In this model, a large firm establishes a brand name
and a franchising organization, and provides U.S. small
house builders with advanced technology, cheap
materials(through scale of economy), ample workers, capital,
attention to local codes and regulations and even
information from and connection with local authority on a
fee basis. These integrated services are not available to
a small firm working alone.
Working together, a large number of such small house
builders would, under the brand name of the franchiser,
provide customers with vertically integrated services.
Because this system is maintained on a fee basis between a
franchiser and franchisees, it would create more effects on
profit of franchisees by providing customers with high
quality of housing on a guarantee basis. If small firms
(franchisees) have to do fewer repair and fewer claims are
made against them by customers, small firms can cut costs
from their maintenance, guarantee, and insurance services
(Option 2.b. + 2.c. + Option II.b., Table 4.1).
Also, Japanese contractors' technologies developed
through their R&D could be an advantage. Japanese
contractors could find cost advantages in focusing on the
areas in which they are already very strong, e.g. in
geotechnical engineering, an area involving special
technologies for shields, underground LPG tanks, dams,
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sewage systems, etc. In such particualr areas, they could
provide cost leadership as well as excellent performance
through advanced technology. (Option 2.b. + 2.c. + Option
II.c., Table 4.1)
The relatively strong financial structure of Japanese
contractors could be an advantage. Although their
financial structures are weaker than those of firms in the
high-tech industries in Japan, they are generally stronger
than those of U.S. counterparts, and have the added security
of the fund pipes from Japanese financial institutions and
insurance firms as mentioned in Chapter 3. Furthermore,
compared to the large Japanese general contractors entering
U.S. building and heavy construction market, U.S. firms in
such fields are usually small. Large U.S. contractors have
considerable expertise in plant construction. In
addition, most of their work is now performed in foreign
countries. U.S. firms other than plant contractors are
small and financially weak. The combination of Japanese
contractors' financial power and the idea of privatizing now
public utilities could provide an effective strategy.
Highways and water resources in the U.S. are mostly
operated by federal and local governments. Japanese
general contractors could privatize such facilities (a kind
of acquisition, as categorized among the entry modes) and
operate and maintain them with more efficiency than the
public sector can, while their cash-poor U.S. counterparts
could not. By forming joint ventures with other Japanese
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contractors, Japanese financial institutions, Japanese cash-
rich firms, or U.S. cash-rich firms, the effect could
increase dramatically (Option 2.b. + 2.c. + Option I.b.iii,
Table 4.1). The firms could increase cost reductions by
adopting more vertically integrated forms, e.g. by financing
and constructing a facility, such as a small water resource
facility, by themselves or through forming a joint venture.
(Option 2.a. + 2.c. + Option I.b.i. + I.b. iii).
Japanese contractors' financial strength could be
combined with an investment mode of entry, in the form of
purchasing real estate in the U.S. Investment in assets
in the U.S. has attractive features for Japanese firms.
For example, in the U.S. there is no tax for acquired real
estate (4% in Japan), 20% of acquisition tax by short-term
(below 10 years) transfer (46% in Japan), 10% of tax on
acquisition price for short-term transfers in purchases by a
foreign firm registered in the U.S., a tax shield through 15
years of depreciation although possible change is expected
after 1987, (65 years in Japan), and a high rate of income
from tenants because of the much higher value of buildings
in the U.S. (As is well known, land price in Japan is
extremely high compared to construction cost or cost of
buildings, and has still been increasing at a very high
rate.) (Source: 73) Examples of real estate purchased
recently by Japanese firms in Manhattan are shown in Figure
4.1. Many firms have been rushing to obtain property in
Manhattan for investment purposes. Some Japanese firms have
256
Figure 4.1: Investment in Assets in Manhattan by Japanese Firms
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demolished buildings and built hotels, condominiums, and
office complexes (Option I.b., Table 4.1) A Japanese
general contractor even performed construction by itself
(Option I.b. + II.c., Table 4.1).
Investment in U.S. stock market is another investment
strategy. Profiting from investment in stocks is
controversial because nothing tangible is produced through
such investment. However, the yields from such
investment, whether they are government or corporate bonds,
could be far higher than the yields from more familiar
forms of production or other business in Japan, considering
the generally low yields of Japanese firms and the high rate
of return in stock market (See Figure 4.2). In addition,
high interest rates in the U.S. since the late 1970s support
this strategy. (As long as interest rates in the U.S. are
kept at a high level, return on stocks and bonds will remain
at a high level because of market mechanisms.)
Such a strategy will help Japanese construction firms
create more diversified or safer portfolios. Recent
aggresive investment by Japanese firms has been aimed at
this point. Japanese firms invested $49.6 billion of
savings in the U.S. capital market in 1984 (See Fig 4.3).
Such funds came mostly from Japanese life and non-life
insurance firms, city and trust banks, and many
manufacturing firms that were making large profits
(Source 17.a, b.) (Option 1.b., Table 4.1).
One strategy for new firms could be to follow other
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Figure 4.2 : Rate of Corporate and Government Bond in the U.S. and
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Figure 4.3 : Outflow of Japanese Savings
Source: 17.b
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Japanese firms' direct investment in the U.S. Many number
of Japanese firms have been pursuing production or business
in the U.S. Construction contracts received by Japanese
contractors so far fundamentally fell into this type of
strategy. It is very likely that Japanese customers in
the U.S. will continue to choose Japanese contractors for
convenience. Because of the strict protectionism of the U.S.
government against Japanese products, many Japanese
manufacturing firms are planning direct investment in the
U.S. Therefore, this strategy is still one of the most
important for Japanese contractors though nothing is new in
this strategy and much contracts cannot be expected
(Option 2.b. + 2.c. + Option II.c., Table 4.1).
One extreme strategy could be Option 1, that is, to
obtain shares by providing exactly the same features of
products or services as U.S. counterparts. Probably, the
most appropriate method would be to acquire U.S.
contractors, engineering firms, architecture firms, or
engineer/constructors. As shown above, because one of the
disadvantages for Japanese contractors could be lack of
familiarity with systems and mechanisms in the U.S.
construction industry, e.g. other parties, laws, codes,
regulations, local community and authority in the U.S., such
a problem would be alleviated by using U.S. firms (Option 1
+ Option II.c.)
All of these disadvantages for Japanese contractors
could be solved the most easily through acquistion of a U.S.
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firm (Option 1 + Option II.c.). Furthermore, Japanese
contractors which do not have capability to engineer and
build plant and industrial facilities could gain this
capability through acquiring a U.S. firm which expertise the
field (Option 1 + Option I.b.iii + II.c.).
In order to ensure profits, CM (Construction
Management) contracts might be crucial because they enable a
general contractor to maintain a certain rate of fee at
least. Receiving contracts on a design/construct basis
might also be effective stablilizing profits because a
general contractor can avoid several problems that arise
between a general contractor and subcontractors (Option
2.c.-focus on type of service).
It is also important to select appropriate geographical
market segments and types of construction. For example,
office buildings in the sunbelt zone have enormously high
vacancy rates because of the construction rush precipitated
by the tax shield through depreciation and investment tax
written into the present tax code. Firms are still
rushing even now to take last-minute advantage of these tax
provisions. Because it is highly probable that firms (often
developers) financing new office building projects in such a
saturated area might fall into bankruptcy, the selection of
an advantageous geographical segment of the market and type
of project is crucial. Large cities with significant
vacancy rates as of December 1985 included: suburban Houston
31%, downtown Dallas 17.8%, suburban Dallas 23.5%, Atlanta
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20%, San Diego 23.4%, Los Angeles 18%, and San Jose 21.2%
(Option 2.c.-geographical focus). (Source:11.a.)
Furthermore, Japanese contractors should focus on
projects of a specific size, type, and complexity. A firm
of a particualar size can best perform projects of a scope
and nature familiar to the firm. It is wise to market
projects of a size, type, and complexity commensulate with
the amount of resources a Japanese general contractors is
able to maintain, especially in the U.S. This focusing
strategy should be employed for any construction whether
Japanese contractors provide differentiated services or not
(Option 2.c.-focus on size, type, and complexity of
project).
As the foregoing discussion suggests, Japanese firms
have many options. After observing what Japanes firms have
done in the U.S. so far, we will recommend systematically
the best entry strategies and modes.
4.4 What Japanese Firms Have Done in the U.S. Construction
Market
So far Japanese firms have not performed spectacularly
in the U.S. construction market. Table 4.2 shows the
overseas investment by Japanese firms. Only five
construction firms appear, and they rank below 40 in scale
of investment. The amount invested by these five firms were
very low. These statistics include all investment in
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Table 4.2: Ranking of Overseas Investment or Finance by
Japanese Firms
(1983)
Rank Firms Amount of
Investment or
Finance by
Japanese Firms
($ mil)
1. Mitsubishi-Shoji 1,496
2. Nihon Asahan Aluminum 1,270
3. Marubeni 1,220
4. Nissan 1,179
5. Mitsui-Bussan 1,073
6. Japan Oil Development 674
7. Ito-Chu-Shoji 587
8. Nissho-Iwai 505
9. Godo Oil Development 439
10. Sony 419
11.
20.
30.
40.
44. Aoki Construction 91
50.
55. Kajima Construction 75
60. Kumagai-Gumi 69
66. Taisei Construction 59
68. Fujita Kogyo 57
70.
Source: 68
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overseas, not just in the U.S.. Therefore, we may conclude
that investment in the U.S. by Japanese contractors has been
very small. Table 4.3 summarizes the establishment of
subsidiaries and offices in the U.S. which do business
related to construction and development. One of the
remarkable characteristics is the high percentage of
business located in Hawaii(27.8%). Japanese firms are
relatively familiar with Hawaii traditionally, many
Hawaiians are of Japanese background, a number of travelers
to Hawaii come from Japan, and Hawaii is so close to Japan.
The operation of housing and hotels, and tourist-oriented
businesses are especially evident in Hawaii. They are
included as "Others" in Table 4.3.
Real estate and development have been the most common
businesses. Fully 54.2% of business by Japanese firms
falls in this type of enterprise. Because this type of
business is very integrated (development, construction,
sales), profit could be created more easily for this than
for any other single type of business, for example than for
construction only. In addition, Japanese firms can
eliminate problematic cooperation with U.S. firms through
integration.
Only 36.1% of business falls into design/construction.
Of this, 76.9% of business is done on the U.S. mainland.
Table 4.3-(2) through Table 4.3-(4) show details of
business by Japanese firms. A large number of business is
also operated in California (like Hawaii, congenial to
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Table 4.3: Establishment of Subsidiaries and Offices Related
Construction or Development in the U.S. by
Japanese Firms -(1) Summary
(1983)
Content Development Design/ Others
of Construction
Business
Place Hawaii Main Land Hawaii Main Land Hawaii Main Land
U.S. U.S. U.S.
Number 8 31 6 20 6 1
(20.5%) (79.5%) (23.1%) (76.9%) (85.7%) (14.3%)
Sub-total 39 26 7
(54.2%) (36.1%) (9.7%)
Total 72
% of Number of Business in Hawaii 27.8%
% of Number of Business in Mainland U.S. 72.2%
Note: Total number of firms doing business in 1983
was 23. If a firm has several businesses, each
business was counted as one. Therefore, the total
number of business does not necessarily equal to the
total number of firms.
Numbers in parentheses indicate percentages of the
numbers.
Numbers above are as of 1983.
Source: 68
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Table 4.3: Establishment of Subsidiaries and Offices Related
Construction or Development in the U.S. by
Japanese Firms -(2) Details of Establishments
(Format and symbols are explained in (5))
Aoki Construction (General Contractor)
1. $ 2.5 5(1*1) RED n.a.
2. $ 5.2 5 (*1) RED U.S.1-0.2%
3. $ 2.6 3 (*1) RED U.S.1-0.4%
4. $10.0 8(5*1) RED U.S.1- 11%
Jpn.3- 40%
MD
MD
MD
MD
efim2P'J'
efiml'PdJ'
Efi2P'J'
EfimP'J'
Aoki Toshi-Kaihatsu (Realtor)
1. $ 1.0 3(2*1) RED,
2. $ 0.1 n.a. RED
n.a.
n.a.
Asahi Life Insurance (Life Insurence firm)
.1. $34.5 4(3*1) Real estate
investment
Ohbayashi-Gumi (General Contractor)
1. $ 0.3 55(1*1) Sightseeing- Jpn.several
bus business
2. $ 4.0 24(12*2) Construction,
RED
3. $ 5.0
4. $10.0
8(4*2) Construction,
Design,
RED
2(1*1) Construction,
Design
5. $ 3.0 220(3*1) RE,Mgt of Hotel
6. $ 1.0 5 (*1) Construction,U.S.1-10.3%
Kajima Construction (General Contractor)
1. $12.2 15(4*4) Construction,D
2. $ 2.0 n.a. RE investment
3. $ 4.5 169(31*7)Construction,Jpnl-8.1%
Design, RE
4. $23.5 5(3*0) Mgt of Hotel,Jpn8-53%
& Mall
HW n.a.
CA n.a.
NY FJ'
HW n.a.
CA EilP'J'
HW Ei2P'J'
HW EiJ'
HW
CA
EiJ'
ei
CA gim
HW gP'
CA fP'
CA n.a.
Kitano Construction (General Contractor)
1. $ 0.1 6 (*1) Construction,U.S.1-45%
RE
2. $ 0.01 1 (*1) Construction,
Design
Kumagai-Gumi (General Contractor)
1. $ 1.0 9(7*3) Construction,
RED
2. $ 3.3 12(6*6) Construction,
RED
HW eF3P'J'
NY eF3P'J'
HW eiml"P'J'
CA gimP'J'
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Table 4.3: Establishment of Subsidiaries and Offices Related
Construction or Development in
Japanese Firms -(3) Details of
Shimizu Construction (General Contractor)
1. $ 2.0 18(9*) Construction,
Design,Consult
Sumitomo Fudosan (Realtor)
1. $ 0.5 22(1*1) Mgt of golf Jpn.Several
course -49%
2. $ 1.0 9(4*2) RED
the U.S. by
Establishments
NJ defimtP'J'
HW eil
CA efil
Daikyo Kanko (Realtor)
1. $ 0.4 n.a. RED
Taisei Kensetsu (General Contractor)
1. $ 0.1 9(4*1) Construction,
D(Housing)
Daiwa House (House Builder)
1. $ 2.0 5(2*) Construction Jpn.Several
2. $ 2.0
3. $ 2.0
4. $ 4.0
& D of Housing,
RE
n.a. ditto
3(1*) ditto
5(4*) ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
20%
TX EfP'J'
NY DefP'J'
CA n.a.
TX n.a.
CA n.a.
TX n.a.
Daaiichi Seimei Hoken (Life Insurance Firm)
1. $ 3.5 n.a. RE investment NY efJ'
Takenaka Komuten (General Contractor)
1. $ 0.3 17(6*2) Construction,
Design,RED,Agent
of const.material
2. $ 0.2
3. $ 1.6
2(*1) Consultant
(2*1) RE
CA efil
U.S.Several-CA
50%
Jpn.3-51%
Tomen (General Trading Firm)
1. $100.0 n.a. RE
Toda Kensetsu (General Contractor)
1. $200.0 8(5*3) Construction
2. $ 0.01 n.a. Construction,
3. $ 0.2
4. $ 0.1
n.a. Construction,Jpn.1-20%
RED of Housing
n.a. RED ,Jpn.1-50%
Efgij
CA eiJ'
CA n.a.
NY i3P'J'
FL n.a.
CA n.a.
TX n.a.
Tokyu Kensetus (General Contractor, Subsidiary
Conglomerate)
1. $ 3.2 69(2*3) Construction HW ei
268
Table 4.3: Establishment of Subsidiaries and Offices Related
Construction or Development in the U.S. by
Japanese Firms -(4) Details of Establishments
Tokyo-Kyuko Dentetsu (Private Railway Firm)
1. $ 2.4 70(2*1) RED ,Jpn.1-35.4% WA
2. $ 5.5 876(2*1) Mgt of Hotel,Jpn.1-54% HW
3. $44.0 90(7*1) D ,Jpn.8-56% HW
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Tokyu Fudosan (Realtor)
1. $ 9.0 5(1*2) RE
2. $ 0.3 100(1*1) Sightseeing
bus
Nichimen (General Trading Firm)
1. $ 5 4(3*2) RE
Nihon Seimei Hoken (Life Insurance Firm)
1. $23.2 2 (*2) RE investment
Hasegawa Komuten (General Contractor-Housing)
1. $ 0.1 4 (*1) D & Construction CA
of Condominiums
2. $10.0 20(9*1) D & Construction HW
3. $ 3.0
of Condominiums,
Mgt of Hotel
5(5*1) D of Condominiums,
RE
CA 1'P'J'
HW 1'P""J'
FL J'
NY n.a.
Eiml"P'J'
Giml'P'
gimP'J'NY
Mitsui Fudosan (Realtor)
1. $ 5.0 681(1*1) Mgt of hotel
2. $25.0 14 (*5) RE
3. $ 4.0 3(1*1) RE
HW J'
CA e
NY EJ'
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Table 4.3: Establishment of Subsidiaries and Offices Related
Construction or Development in the U.S. by
Japanese Firms -(5) Details of Establishments
Format and Symbols:
1. $ xx(xx*xx)
(a) (b)(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
(a) Amount of capital ($ million)
(b) Number of employees
(c) Number of Japanese employees
(d) Number of Japanese directors
(e) Contents of business
RE ---Realtor
RED ---Realtor and engaged in development
D ---Development
(f) Investors other than a parent firm in Japan
U.S.x -xx% --x number of U.S. firms invested by xx%
(g) Name of a state where an establishment is located
(h) Symbols;
Purpose of business and investment:
a Procurement of raw materials or natural resources
b Easier manufacturing because of plenty of natural
resources
c Use of spot labor, cost reduction
d Protectionism by the U.S.
e Increase of market in the target country
f Collection of information
t Difficulty of export because of trade friction
with the U.S.
g Others
r Royalty
Where to sell
h Japan
i To the U.S.
j To the third country
Where to buy parts and raw material
k From Japan
m In the U.S.
n From the third country
Performance
1 Making profit
1' Delivering dividend
1" Retaining
2 Balancing
3 Making loss
Receipt of profit by parents firm Joining of overseas
P Yes investment insurance
Pa By dividend J Yes
Pb By interest J' No
Pc By royalty
Pd By others
P' No
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Japanese investment). For real estate investment (not real
estate development), Japanese firms tend to stay in New York
probably because information is easily available there and
much of the real estate with high value is in Manhattan.
The development project in East Manhattan by Kumagai-Gumi
should be noted. In this project, Kumagai-Gumi purchased
real estate in East Manhattan. Kumagai-Gumi is planning to
demolish the existing building and construct a building
complex (Option 2.c. + I.b. + II.c.).
Investment through joint venture with U.S. firms has
been rare so far. Focus on one geographic area has been
demonstrated by Kitano Construction. Its business is
fundamentally housing development in Maryland (Option 2.c.-
geographical focus). Although not included in these
tables, two construction contracts for manufacturing
facilities from Toyota should be noted. They were received
by Ohbayashi-Gumi and Simizu Construction respectively.
These two firms followed one of the strategies illustrated
in the previous section (Option 2.c. + II.c.).
4.5 Possible Strategies and Entry Modes for Japanese
Construction Firms
Based on the information presented in the previous two
sections, entry strategies and modes that could be adopted
by Japanese general contractors will be addressed
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systematically in this section. Each combination of entry
strategy and entry mode as a different option will be
considered in detail.
There are three major options for Japanese contractors.
Each reflects a different type of market segment and
services. They are;
Option A: Enter U.S. construction market through
construction services and related business
operations, and provide the same services as
those offered by U.S. counterparts
Option B: Enter U.S. construction market through
construction services and related business
operations, but offer services
differentiated from those provided by U.S.
counterparts
Option C: Enter U.S. construction market through
investment. Investment may be made in
real estate (buildings and land or both) and
public facilities (privatization). One
modified option may be investment in the U.S.
stock market as part of the portfolios for
Japanese contractors doing business in the
U.S.
Japanese general contractors that adopt Option A will
enter the U.S. construction industry by providing U.S.
customers with exactly the same features as U.S. companies
already offer. As shown below, this option is the
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combination of Option 1 and Option II.c. under Option A.
By doing so, Japanese general contractors would need to
steal market shares from their U.S. counterparts.
Detailed descriptions are provided in the chart in the next
page.
In order to work around their unfamiliarity with
systems and mechanisms in the U.S. construction industry,
Japanese contractors can utilize Option A in joint venture
with or by acquisition of a U.S. firm (Option Al). Through
this option, Japanese contractors may also gain the capacity
to engineer and build plant and industrial facilities, which
they traditionally have not done.
In order to stabilize profits, Option A and Al can be
developed further through combining focusing strategies. For
example, they might enter projects on a CM contract basis
(focus on type of service), or focus on projects of a certain
type, size, or complexity of, or focus on geographically
(Option A2).
Option B is for Japanese contractors trying to enter
the U.S. construction market through differentiated
services. Differentiation can be done fundamentally in two ways.
First, it will be achieved through vertically integrated
services which Japanese general contractors have
traditionally provided their customers. These services
include study of the needs of client, search for project and
suitable sites, feasibility study, planning and design,
finance, negotiation with community, construction,
--Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
b. Differentiation
c. Focus
*
*
Option A
Option 1
* Option II Contractual entry
* mode
* a. Licensing
* b. Franchise
********* c. Contract
construction
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 1 + Option II.c.
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with the same features of services
as those by U.S. counterparts. However, it may be
difficult for Japanese contractors to succeed by this option
because of their unfamiliarity with systems and mechanism in
the U.S. construction industry.
maintenance, and operation. This type of differentiation
can be easily combined with a focusing strategy, such as by
type, size or complexity of project, by forms of contract
(design/ construct), or by geographic area (Option Bi).
One extreme case of focusing is to concentrate on
serving Japanese customers. The services of Japanese
contractors are already differentiated toward Japanese
customers because of the convenience.
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Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
Of course, Japanese
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Option Al
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
b. Differentiation
c. Focus
*ll~
*
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
* b. Investment entry
* mode
i. Joint venture
* ii. Sole venture
********* iii. Acquisition
* Option II Contractual entry
* mode
* a. Licensing
* b. Franchise
********* c. Contract
construction
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 1 + Option II.c. + Option I.b.i or iii
[Features)
Providing U.S. customers with the same features of services
as those by U.S. counterparts. In addition, Japanese
contractors eliminate their unfamiliarity with systems and
mechanisms in the U.S. construction industry through
joint venture or acquisition of a U.S. firm. Furthermore,
through acquisition of a U.S. plant contractor or a plant
design/constructor, Japanese general contractors can obtain
the capability in such a segment of the market.
customers expect vertically integrated services and close
relationships. This vertical relationship will continue to
provide is one of the most effective way for Japanese
contractors to get projects in the U.S. (Option Bl').
Option B1 can be combined with franchising (Option B2).
However, segments to which Option B2 is applicable are
limited. They are the highly fragmented segments of the
market. Probably the most suitable segment is residential
275
Option A2
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
O tion 
2 --
Provide 
the
*l~~
features *
differentiated *
from U.S. *
counterparts *
a. Overall cost *
leadership *
*_
.a L eJ . L L eA a &.1
*
c. Focus *************
*
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
******** iii. Acquisition
Option II Contractual entry
mode
a. Licensing
b. Franchise
******** c. Contract
construction
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 1 + Option II.c. + Option 2.c. or
Option 1 + Option II.c. + Option 2.c. + Option I.b.ii or iii
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with the same features of services
as those by U.S. counterparts, but focusing market in
someway, such as focusing on type of service (CM), type,
size, and complexity of projects, or design/construct
contracts. In addition, Japanese contractors can combine
this with joint venture or acquisition of a U.S. firm.
construction.
The second type of differentiation may be achieved
through advanced technology developed through Japanese R&D.
However, the areas in which they are very advanced are
highly speciafic, such as goetechnical seismic engineering
and the underground construction utilizing such engineering.
Projects which use shields, up-down construction, slurry
walls etc. could involve this technology.
b 
Diff 
r 
nti 
tion
Because of the
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Option B
Option I --Product entry
mode
Option 1 --Provide the a. Export entry mode
same features i. through agent/
as U.S. distributor
counterparts ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
Option 2 --Provide the
features b. Investment entry
differentiated mode
from U.S. i. Joint venture
counterparts ii. Sole venture
a. Overall cost iii. Acquisition
leadership
Option II Contractual entry
b. Differentiation *** mode
(Vertically * a. Licensing
integrated * b. Franchise
service) ********* c. Contract
c. Focus construction
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 2.b. + Option II.c.
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with features differentiated from
those provided by U.S. counterparts. Differentiation
can be fundamentally achieved by vertically integrating
services.
limited areas of advanced technology in which Japanese
contractors specialize, the market segments for such
advanced technology must be targeted precisely (Option B3).
Finally, joint venture with and acquisition of U.S. firms
can be combined with any of Option B, Bi, B2, and B3 in
order to become involved in ongoing activities of the U.S.
construction industry. (These variations are not indicated
in the charts.)
The last option is to enter the U.S. construction
industry through investment. Perhaps the most familiar
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Option B1 (BI')
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
b. Differentiation ***
(Vertically *
integrated *
service) *
c. Focus *************
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
Option II Contractual entry
mode
a. Licensing
b. Franchise
******** c. Contract
construction
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 2.b. + Option II.c. + Option 2.c.
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with the features differentiated
from those offered by U.S. counterparts. Differentiation
can be fundamentally achieved by vertically integrated
services. In addition, such as by type, size and
complexity of project, forms of contract (design/construct),
by geographic area. The extreme of this option is to focus
on Japanese customers in the U.S.
approach for Japanese contractors is investment in land or
building in the U.S. One way to utilize such assets is to
operate purchased offices, apartments, hotels, and so on
(Option C). This
real estate business.
option can be combined with
Another way is to demolish
facilities and develop them into operatable assets, as
There is a possibility that such developmentlisted above.
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Option B2
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
Option II Contractual entry
b. Differentiation *** mode
(Vertically * a. Licensing
integrated ********* b. Franchise
service) ********* c. Contract
c. Focus ************* construction
(Fragmented segments)
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 2.b. + Option II.c. + Option 2.c. + Option II.b.
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with the features differentiated
from those offered by U.S. counterparts. Differentiation
can be fundamentally achieved by vertically integrated
services. In addition, focus should be on highly
fragmented segments of the market.
can be combined with construction of such facilities (Option
C1).
Option C and C1 can be combined with the concept of
privatization, that is, to focus on investment in government
facilities. Because only a limited number of government
facilities can be privatized, such as highways, water
resources and so on, Japanese contractors have to focus
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Option B3
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
Option II Contractual entry
b. Differentiation *** mode
(Advanced * a. Licensing
technology) * b. Franchise
•******** c. Contract
c. Focus ************* construction
(Segment where
advanced technology
is possessed
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option 2.b. + Option II.c. + Option 2.c.
[Features]
Providing U.S. customers with the features differentiated
from those offered by U.S. counterparts. Differentiation
can be achieved by advanced technology which Japanese
contractors possess. However, the focused must be on the
segments of market to which such advanced technology
is adaptable.
further (Option C2). As with Option C, Option C2
can be combined with construction by Japanese contractors
themselves (Option C3). Furthermore, in order to
alleviate risks and to facilitate financing, all C, C1, C2,
C3 can be combined with joint ventures. (Each option in
which joint venture may be adopted is designated by
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Option C (Cl)
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
b. Differentiation
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
(C',C1') mode
i. Joint venture
* ii. Sole venture
********* iii. Acquisition
* Option II Contractual entry
mode
c. Focus * a. Licensing
* b. Franchise
**(Cl)*** c. Contract
construction
Note: Purchasing assets can be interpreted as acquision in
terms of purchasing assets.
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option I.c. + (Option II.c.)
[Features]
Investing in assets in the U.S., then operating them.
Also, Japanese contractors can be realtors. Furthermore,
this option can be vertically integrated by constructing by
themselves.
superscript symbols " ' " One extreme in the investment
option is investment in U.S. stock market (Option C4).
Although this option is very attractive from the standpoint
of profit-making, it does not involve any relationship to
construction or construction-related business. Therefore,
this option cannot be considered a major strategies or modes
for the purpose of this study, but belongs among discussions
of general business portfolios. This option may be used to
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Option C2 (C3)
Option I --Product entry
mode
Option 1 --Provide the a. Export entry mode
same features i. through agent/
as U.S. distributor
counterparts ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
Option 2 --Provide the
features b. Investment entry
differentiated (C2',C3') mode
from U.S. ********* i. Joint venture
counterparts * ii. Sole venture
a. Overall cost ********* iii. Acquisition
leadership *
* Option II Contractual entry
b. Differentiation * mode
c. Focus ************* a. Licensing
* b. Franchise
**(C3)*** c. Contract
construction
Note: Purchasing assets can be interpreted as acquisition in
terms of purchasing assets.
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option I.c. + (Option II.c.) + Option 2.c.
[Features]
Purchasing government assets in the U.S., then operating
them. Furthermore, this option can be vertically
integrated by constructing them also.
protect against risks in the actual construction business in
the U.S. by Japanese contractors. As addressed so far,
all options considered systematically here are combinations
of strategies and measures with strong potential for aiding
Japanese general contractors successfully penetrating U.S.
construction market. At the same time, the market
segments discussed here are the areas with high potential as
arenas in the U.S. for Japanese general contractors.
Because the the discussion here has been made in a very
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Option C4
Option 1 --Provide the
same features
as U.S.
counterparts
Option 2 --Provide the
features ********
differentiated
from U.S.
counterparts
a. Overall cost
leadership
Opti
b. Differentiation
c. Focus
[Combination of Strategies and Modes]
Option I
[Features]
Investing in the U.S. stock market.
business portforlio.
Option I --Product entry
mode
a. Export entry mode
i. through agent/
distributor
ii. through branch/
subsidiary
iii. Franchise
b. Investment entry
mode
i. Joint venture
ii. Sole venture
iii. Acquisition
on II Contractual entry
mode
a. Licensing
b. Franchise
c. Contract
construction
To be used as a
general way, more variations or more detailed analysis may
be necessary in further studies.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Summary, and Future Studies
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
Since the destructive end of World War II, Japan has
had tremendous economic growth. The cooperative effort
among Japanese government, industries, and the Japanese
people enabled a tiny island country become to the second
economic power in the Western would. Japanese products
are flooding all national markets.
However, compared to the successful penetration of
foreign markets by Japanese products, the Japanese
construction industry has made no significant inroad into
the foreign construction market. Why have Japanese
construction firms not penetrated foreign markets?
There are several good explanations: 1) the government
policies of fostering manufacturing industries in order to
reconstruct and industrialize the Japanese economy; 2) the
absorbing task given to the construction industry to support
such manufacturing industries and to reconstruct the
nation's facilities and residences; 3) the specialization of
Japanese general contractors only in building and heavy
construction (no engineering or construction capability for
plant and industrial facilities); and 4) several problems
created by the delay in entering foreign markets. Taken
together, these factors left Japanese general contractors
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far behind the international contractors of other countries
in entering foreign markets.
The driving force behind industries in Japan's post-war
economic expansion was debt-financing. This strategy
succeeded until the oil crisis of 1973. However, the
combination of slow growth and energy conservation since
then allowed the burgeoning of industries for which equity
financing was most suitable.
The financial structure of construction firms has not
been improved in recent years. Its debt financing
structure is now closer to that of the declining capital-
intensive industries, than to that of the fast rising high-
tech companies.
Until the oil crisis, projects from various industries,
government, and households were sufficiently numerous to
keep the construction industry growing faster than Japan's
GNP. However, the slow-growth economy after the oil crisis
stopped the construction industry's expansion. Since then,
the construction industry has been faced with the need to
find new markets outside Japan. Among opportunities, the
U.S. construction market is the largest and one of the
healthiest.
The construction industry is one of the most important
industries in both the U.S. and Japan. However, the role
of the construction industry in Japan is much more important
to the national economy. The real value of U.S. new
construction has been widely fluctuating between $150 and
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$200 billion in 1977 constant dollars. This fluctuation has
been exactly parallel to the fluctuation in new residential
construction. Other types of construction in the U.S. have
been stable. Japanese construction investment
continued to increase until 1973. It has not grown since
then, and in fact has been shrinking since 1979. Japanese
new residential construction is proportional to the
fluctuation in total construction investment.
The share of public construction has been shrinking in
the U.S. but increasing in Japan. However, the
proportional increase in Japan is due to a decrease in
private construction rather than to growth in public
construction.
The construction industry is fragmented both in the
U.S. and Japan. However, U.S. construction industry is
much more fragmented. Such fragmentation is reflected in
the large number of tiny firms and special trade
contractors.
Construction cost in the U.S. had been kept high mainly
by labor cost. However, since 1973, material cost and
financing cost as well as labor cost sending total
construction cost up. Increases in construction cost in
Japan has followed the rate of increase in material cost.
Looking beneath the surface it is evident that a
considerably high rate of increase in labor cost has been
offset by a low rate of increase in financing cost. The
increase in construction cost has only coincidentally
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parallelled the increase in construction material cost.
U.S. and Japanese contractors have fundamentally the
same cost structure. However, because of the difference in
considering what entity employs each worker and in the role
of subcontractors in the two countries, Japanese contractors
appear to have high subcontract rates and low labor cost.
Japanese small contractors' subcontract rates are still high
because of the multi-layered subcontract system.
Profits are generally higher for U.S. contractors but
they fluctuate considerably year by year as well as firm by
firm. Japanese firms' profits are very low but stable.
Top U.S. contractors specialize in plant and industrial
facilities construction on a design/construct basis.
Because such projects are mainly offered by developing
countries or oil-producing countries, the percentage of
foreign contracts is very high for the top U.S. contractors.
Because of the complexity of such projects, their contracts
include a large share of CM contracts. The annual contract
volumes of U.S. top contractors fluctuate considerably.
Many top U.S. contractors are held by conglomerates or are
highly diversified to alleviate risks coming from
fluctuation in the business.
Japanese top contractors specialize in building and
heavy construction. Their main arena lies in the Japanese
domestic construction market. They do not perform CM.
Japanese top contractors have very stable volumes of annual
contracts partly because their contracts are determined by
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an accumulation of small to medium-sized building and heavy
projects and partly because the unique bidding system in
Japan establishes order among fundamentally similar Japanese
contractors.
Construction activity by Japanese contractors is much
more vertically integrated than by U.S. contractors. Such
vertically integrated services by Japanese contractors are
facilitated by the integration in their own resources and
organizations and by quasi-vertical integrations made
possible by the unique social system in Japan, which
includes such features as a multi-layer subcontract system,
close relationships between a general contractor and
subcontractors, the bidding system, extremely weak labor
unions, and special relationships between general
contractors and financial institutions.
R&D in the U.S. has been significant since 1975 and
have grown at a higher rate there than in other advanced
countries. However, the difference in R&D expenditure
between the U.S. and other advanced countries is not as
significant as the differences in nominal R&D expenditure
might indicate because of the considerable proportion of
defense-related R&D and the high inflation rate in the U.S..
The U.S. has the largest percentage of development
expenditure for R&D among the advanced countries. The
percentage of development R&D in Japan is slightly below
that in the U.S. In advanced countries, R&D is performed
mainly by industries. In the U.S., the largest
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segment of R&D, 46%, is financed by government, mainly in
relation to the defense and space programs. However,
nothing significant R&D has been done in the U.S.
construction industry. The rate of finance of R&D by
industry themselves is the largest in Japan (98.1%).
R&D in the Japanese construction industry is not
significant compared to high-tech industries. However,
Japanese general contractors are financing R&D at 0.53% of
total sales on an average for 1,300 firms. Large firms are
spending more. Their R&D covers all fields that relate to
building and heavy construction. Recently they have become
interested in high-tech fields.
The Japanese construction industry is organized by
general contractors using vertical and quasi-vertical
integration; the relationships between general contractors
and other parties are very close and intimate. The U.S.
construction industry is an aggregation of professionals.
Each specializes in a very narrow area. They are gathered
together on a ad hoc basis. Japanese contractors entering
the U.S. market would lose much of the operating efficiency
they owe to the unique social/industrial system in Japan.
In this context, potentially successful options for
Japanese contractors to enter U.S. construction market may
be classified in three groups;
Option A: Enter U.S. construction market by provide
U.S. customers with the same construction
services as those offered by U.S.
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counterparts
Option B: Enter U.S. construction market by providing
U.S. customers with the differentiated
construction services from those by offered
by U.S. counterparts
Option C: Enter U.S. construction market through
investment
Each option has several sub-options and variations.
Each option has an optinally suitable market segment. The
present study suggests areas for more finely tuned research.
Finally, we must consider whether Japanese contractors'
entry into U.S. construction market is beneficial either to
U.S. construction industry or to the Japanese construction
industry. The U.S. construction industry probably will
benefit. Though it remains to be seen whether Japanese
contractors can repeat in the U.S. their excellent
performance achieved in Japanese domestic market, it is
probable that their U.S. activities will stimulate U.S.
contractors to develop more vigorously their advantages as
outlined here.
By comparison, the Japanese auto industry significantly
affected the U.S. auto industry. By providing availability
of low cost, high quality, and fuel efficient Japanese
automobiles, consumers in the U.S. has been benefited. The
success of these imports stimulated the U.S. auto industry
which had been avoiding innovation for a long time.
Furthermore, even if Japanese contractors enter U.S.
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construction market, they mostly would use U.S.
subcontractors, U.S. workers, suppliers, and materials. The
negative effects for the U.S. industry could be less than is
usualy thought.
The Japanese construction industry would also benefit.
Of course, the new market would provide the struggling
Japanese contractors with a short break. Also, by
concentrating on the U.S. market, they would gain experience
in international trade that might be applicable in other
markets.
More importantly, entering U.S. construction market
will give Japanese top management fresh insights into the
effectiveness of the corporate strategies they are pursuing
currently. Japanese top managements traditionally have been
content to maintain their companies' rankings in the
industry and construction contracts received (the usual
deteminant of the rankings). Of course, profit-making
that is aggresively pursued by U.S. firms is not the only
purpose for management, either. There should be more
alternative corporate policies to be taken for the benefit
of the construction industry as a whole.
Moreover, the conservative nature of the Japanese
construction industy makes it very difficult for them to go
beyond traditional business the and to seek new fields.
Because the Japanese construction industry is now at its
first major turning point since World War II, entry into the
U.S. market may be the opportunity for the Japanese
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construction industry to reconsider the future of the
industry.
5.2 Future Studies
All the issues discussed in this study were reviewed and
compared very generally. All of them require further
investigation.
This study was carried out from the Japanese general
contractors' point of view. Also the areas compared were
mainly the arena of general contractors. A comparative
analysis of U.S. and Japanese construction next should be
made from viewpoint of other contributors to the industry,
e.g. government, clients, subcontractors, house-builders,
material suppliers, realtors, developers, and so on.
Other fields for future study may include paticular
segments of both countries' construction markets, for
example, building materials, interiors or parts of housings.
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